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THE
MILITARY DESPATCHES
OF A
SEVENTEENTH CENTURY
INDIAN GENERAL

*Being an English translation of the HAFT ANJUMAN of
Munshi Udairāj alias Tāle'yār Khān (Benares Ms. 53b-93b)*



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Dedicated
to
the sacred memory of
SIR JADUNATH SARKAR

PREFACE

Military despatches or written official reports regarding battles, events and the like sent by generals, ambassadors and others constitute a very important source of studying history, particularly political and military history and the ideas and principles of rulers and generals. There are numerous examples of these in western countries. We have very few extant examples of military despatches in medieval India. The *Fathiyya-i-ibriyya* of Shihābuddin Tālīsh, the *waga i'navis* or news-writer, who accompanied Mir Jumla, the Mughal Governor of Bengal, during his Kuch Bihar and Assam campaign in 1661-63 gives us a very reliable, eye-witness' account of the campaigns in the north-eastern frontier of India. Similarly the *Waqai'* of the reputed wit and satirist Niāmat Khān 'Alī (Mirza Muhammad entitled Dānishmand Khān) deals with the siege and conquest of Golkonda. But, strictly speaking, neither of these works can be regarded as constituting military despatches. *Sahib Rae's Khujistah Kalām* contains 'specimens of battle reports' sent from Bundelkhand by Muhammad Khān Bangash. From this point of view, the *Haft Anjuman* of Munshi Udairāj alias Tāl'eyār Khān, possesses a unique value, constituting military despatches of two famous Mughal generals, Rustam Khān and Mirza Rajah Jai Singh of the seventeenth century.

The present work virtually represents an English rendering of the Benares MS. of the *Haft Anjuman*, along with full notes, published serially in the *Bengal, Past and Present* from vol. LXXXI January-June, 1962 to vol. LXXXV July-December, 1966. This is now supplemented by the addition, in the Introduction, of three papers contributed by me to different learned bodies and journals. The first and second articles, 'Mirza Rajah Jai Singh and Shivaji' and 'New Light on Mirza Rajah Jai Singh's Policy in Bijapur' were published in the *Journal of Indian History* vol. XLII, Part I, April 1964 and vol. XLIII, Part III, December, 1965 respectively, while the third article, 'Recall of Mirza Rajah Jai Singh and His Death', containing additional information re: the Rajah and his *munshi*, was

submitted to and read at the Mysore session of the Indian History Congress, 1966, and published in the *East*, vol. I, No. 2.

I have received considerable help from Professor S. H. Askari of Patna College (now Honorary Joint Director of the K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute, Patna) in the task of translation of the manuscript. I have also to express my thanks to Sri P. K. K. Menon, Editor of the *Journal of Indian History* and Dr. B. N. Mukherji, Editor of the *East*, for their kind permission to include the articles published in their respective journals, to Sri N. R. Khadgawat, Director, Rajasthan State Archives, Bikaner, to Shri S. M. Hasan, Assistant Librarian, as well as to the officers of the Map and Atlas section, National Library, Calcutta, for the facilities offered to me by them and to Professor N. K. Sinha, formerly Sir Ashutosh Professor of Medieval and Modern Indian History, University of Calcutta, for first publishing the translation in *Bengal : Past & Present* and encouraging me in various ways in the matter of the publication of this work. To Major S. K. Sarkar I offer my sincere thanks for his kind permission to incorporate the translation of some portions of the manuscript made by his grandfather, the late Sir Jadunath Sarkar, in his '*House of Shivaji*'. Dr. P. C. Gupta, Professor and Head of the Department of History, Jadavpur University, has made some suggestions regarding the map. Finally, I have to record my sense of gratitude to Sarvasri Phani Bhusan Deb, Chittaranjan De and Dwijendra Nath Basu of Sri Gouranga Press for their co-operation and care in getting the book printed promptly. I crave the indulgence of my learned readers for the various shortcomings of the book of which no one is more conscious than myself. If time and circumstances permit, an attempt will be made to collate the different manuscripts and issue a complete translation of the entire *Haft Anjuman*.

JAGADISH NARAYAN SARKAR

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February 24, 1969

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
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MUGHAL BATTLE ORDER IN BIJAPUR



MIRZA RAJAH JAI SINGH 1

By courtesy of The Director, Rajasthan State Archives, Bikaner.

PART ONE

INTRODUCTION

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INTRODUCTION

SECTION 1. THE MANUSCRIPT

Udirāj (Udairāj) Munshi was the Secretary of two Mughal nobles,—Rustam Khān and Mirza Rajah Jai Singh I,—under whom he had successively served. Udairāj became the sole confidant and guide of the Rajah. The officers and relations of the Rajah became so jealous of him that he was suspected of having poisoned the Rajah (1667). The *munshi* saved his life by adopting Islam and seeking the protection of the Governor of Burhanpur. On Jumadi I, 18, year 10/26 October, 1667, the Emperor conferred the title of Tāle'yār Khān on the *munshi*¹. In these circumstances the official papers or despatches of the deceased Rajah, then with the *munshi*, were not deposited in the Jaipur State archives. The drafts of the despatches were put together in *Inshā-i-Haft Anjuman* by his son, Hemayet Yār, after the *munshi's* death (June 16, 1675) in 1698-99².

The absorbing story of the discovery of this important ms. has been told by Sir Jadunath Sarkar.³ Only three mss. of this work are known to exist. He secured copies of these during his lifetime. His collection of mss., now stored in the National Library, Calcutta, contains eight transcripts of the *Haft Anjuman*, as detailed in the following chart.

The third Anjuman containing Jai Singh's copious field despatches during the Deccan campaign, as given in the Benares Ms. (53b-94b), was partially translated by Sir Jadunath Sarkar in his *House of Shivaji*, Chapter IX. These relate to Shivaji and his relations with Jai Singh only. I have attempted here a detailed translation of the whole Benares Ms. (Sarkar Collection No 93), which I had the good fortune to use during his life time and which throws light on Jai Singh's policy and work in general in the Deccan. The portions already translated by him are indicated by asterisk marks, and certain portions in between left untranslated by him are indicated by square brackets. The folios of the Benares ms. and the corresponding

pages of the Sarkar ms. are indicated in the contents which have been analysed by me with suitable headings.

Before we come to the text it would be desirable to indicate the new light which the despatches of this ms. throw on Mirza Rajah Jai Singh's relations with Shivaji and the Rajah's policy in Bijāpur.

SIR JADUNATH COLLECTION IN NATIONAL LIBRARY

Name and Date when traced	Place	No. of MS.	Content
(i) The Paris Ms. (fragmentary) 1904: by Sir Jadunath Sarkar	The Biblio- theque Natio- nale of Paris Ms. No. Sup- plement 476 Blochet's Catalogue No. 704	(a) No. 86 (215 pages) (b) No. 87 (84 pages)	An abridged copy of Paris MS. No. Sup- plement 476. Gives des- patches of Jai Singh during the war of suc- cession, and pursuit of Dara, and also during the Deccan campaign, i.e., siege of Puran- dar, 1665. Ends abruptly just before Shivaji's visit to Jai Singh. Supplement. Gives Aurang- zeb's replies to Jai Singh. Anjumans Nos. 2-7 only. 3rd Anjuman only. 3rd Anjuman only, Contents same. Contains some letters of Jai Singh and Aurangzeb during the War
(ii) The Benares Ms. (damaged) 1905-7: by Sir Jadunath	From Babu Shyam Sun- dar Lal be- longing to an old Kayastha family of Benares.	(a) No. 89 (341 pages) (b) No. 90 (104 pages) (c) No. 93 (83 pages)	

- (iii) The An old curiosity shop at (a) No. 91
 Delhi Ms. (perfect copy) Jaipur. (151 pages)
 Purchased by Prof. 'Abdur Rahman of St. Stephen's College, Delhi.
- of Succession and the Deccan campaigns against Shivaji and Bijapur. Contains (a) all letters written by Udairāj for his two masters either directly from them or 'by order' (*hasb ul hukm*), (b) what he wrote on his own behalf, (c) two petitions to Emperor Aurangzeb drafted for Shivaji. *Anjuman* No. 1 and 4-7. An abridged copy.

By comparing and collating the different mss. it is possible to analyse the contents of the *Haft Anjuman* as follows:

	Original Ms.	National Library Ms.
Dibacha (Introduction)	Benares Ms.	No. 89
I. Letters of Rustam Khān to Shahjahān.	Delhi Ms.	No. 91
II. Letters of Jai Singh during the Thatta campaign.	Benares Ms.	No. 89
III. Despatches of Jai Singh to Emperor Aurangzeb :		
(a) during the War of Succession (1658-9) and Rajah's pursuit of Dārā.	Paris Ms.	No. 87 (pp. 1-35) No. 88 (pp. 1-12)

- | | | |
|---|-----------------------------|---|
| (b) during the Deccan campaigns against Shivaji and Bijapur. | Benares Ms.
-do-
-do- | No. 98 (mere abstract)
No. 90 (full but defective)
No. 93 (full and a better copy than No. 90 and used in the present work) |
| | also Paris Ms. | No. 87 (pp. 36-84) & 88 |
| (c) Aurangzeb's replies (Dec. 1658-65). | Paris Ms. | No. 92 (pp. 28) |
| IV. (a) Rustam to Shah-jahan's sons. | Delhi Ms. | No. 91 |
| (b) Jai Singh to 'Alamgir's sons. | and also
Benares Ms. | No. 89 |
| V. (a) Rustam to nobles (e.g. Nawab Sa'dullah Khan, Mu'azzam). | Delhi Ms. | No. 91 |
| (b) Jai Singh to some nobles of Aurangzeb's Court. | Benares Ms. | No. 89 |
| (c) Jai Singh to Deccan officers. | -do- | -do- |
| (d) Jai Singh to 'Adil Shah, Qutb Shah and intending deserters. | -do- | -do- |
| (e) Jai Singh to Mughal envoys in the Deccan. | -do- | -do- |
| VI. (a) Udairaj's letters re: Rustam Khan's affairs, especially the marriage of his grandson, Tahir Khan. | Delhi Ms. | No. 91 |
| (b) On behalf of Jai Singh to his son Ram Singh and to others. | Benares Ms. | No. 89 |

VII. Udairāj for others and self.

(a) Letters written for others :

- (i) In Shahjahān's reign.
- (ii) In Aurangzeb's reign.

(b) Letters written for self :

- (i) 'Araiz.
- (ii) Niaznamahs and Khatut-i-Khangi.

(c) to friends etc. Benares Ms. No. 89

(i) In the also Delhi Ms. No. 91
Deccan.

(ii) Others.

1. *Akhbārāt i Darbār i Mu'alla*, Year 10 VIII. 421, now stored in Rajasthan State Archives, Bikaner.

2. Ben. Ms. National Lib. No. 89. 2b. S. R. Sharma, *A Bibliography of Mughal India (1526-1707 A.D.)*, Karnatak Publishing House, Bombay 2, undated, p. 102.

3. Sarkar, *House of Shivaji*, ch. IX, entitled 'Shivaji and Mirza Rajah Jai Singh.' See also Indian History Congress Research Series, No. 1, Rajasthan Records "*Shivaji's Visit to Aurangzib at Agra*," ed. by Sir Jadunath Sarkar and Raghuvir Sinh, Calcutta, 1963.

SECTION II. MIRZA RAJAH JAI SINGH AND SHIVĀJI

The late Sir Jadunath Sarkar referred to the work of Mirza Rajah Jai Singh in the Deccan, in relation to Shivāji,¹ and to 'Ādil Shah of Bijāpur² on the basis of different classes of sources in different languages. One of the Persian sources used by him was the *Haft Anjuman*³ of the Rajah's *munshi*, Udirāj (Udairāj) alias Tāle'yār, containing the despatches of the Rajah to Emperor Aurangzeb. There are, however, certain references in the above manuscript which have not been fully utilised by him in his general histories of Aurangzeb and of Shivāji. But they throw new light on the policy and work of the Rajah in the Deccan. The purpose of this section is to draw attention to these references about Shivaji only.

The Purandar campaign leading to the submission of Shivaji was the last memorable achievement of Mirza Rajah Jai Singh. The negotiations for and the terms of the Treaty of Purandar (June, 1665) are well-known.⁴ These are briefly as follows :—

(a) Shivāji surrendered to the Mughals twenty-three of his forts⁵ with an annual yield of four lakhs of *hun*, but

(b) retained twelve for himself⁶ including Rājgarh, yielding one lakh of *hun* annually on condition of service and loyalty to the Emperor;⁷

(c) his son Shambhuji was to be created a *panj hazāri mansabdār* with a suitable jagir ;

(d) Shivāji himself was to be exempted from attendance at the Emperor's court like other nobles and Rajahs, but he promised to render military service anywhere in the Deccan ;

(e) Shivāji would pay forty lakhs of *hun* in thirteen annual instalments, if, after the expected Mughal conquest of Bijāpur, he was confirmed in the possession of certain lands with an annual yield of four lakhs of *hun* in the lowlands of Konkan and five lakhs of *hun* in the uplands (Bālāghāt), which he would occupy from Bijāpur ;

(f) Shivāji would help the Mughals in the Bijāpur campaign.

Not so well known are the why and wherefore of the Treaty, viz., what were the motives of Shivāji in making the Treaty ?

What was the initial reaction of Aurangzeb to Jai Singh's proposals regarding the terms of the Treaty? What were the objectives of Jai Singh in settling these terms?

It is possible to throw light on these points from the *Haft Anjuman*.

Shivaji's motives :

Why did not Shivaji, so distinguished for his tenacity, prolong his resistance to the imperialists? According to Duff, Shivaji was greatly alarmed and perplexed at the reputation of Jai Singh, the strength of his army and the unexpected vigour of his attack. Shivaji's chief officers also were in a state of indecision and irresolution on account of a communication of warning from goddess Bhavani to Shivaji that he would not succeed against Jai Singh.⁸ But this does not wholly explain Shivaji's surrender. There were several factors that influenced his decision.

Firstly, as noted by Sir Jadunath Sarkar, his surrender was due to his defeat at the hands of Jai Singh and the impending fall of Purandar. As a result of the far-sighted preparations and the military operations of the Rajah, Shivaji was forced to seek an interview with him, offer submission to the Emperor and conclude the treaty. But besides this there was another factor, namely, the isolation of Shivaji. The author of the Bijapur history, *Basātin us Salātin*, writes: "Shivā despairing of help from Bijapur (against the Mughals) made peace with Jai Singh."⁹ This is corroborated by the Rajah's despatches to Aurangzeb to the effect that 'now Shivā, despairing of hope from all directions, had bound his heart in imperial service'.¹⁰ In fact Jai Singh's diplomatic manoeuvres¹¹ had led to a coalition of all the Deccani powers against Shivaji. So the latter found himself isolated and realised the utter futility of further resistance to the Mughals. As Jai Singh informed the Emperor, "Shivaji had two alternatives: the first was to seek imperial mercy for the safety of his life and property; if this was not accepted, the second was to restore a part of the Bijāpuri Tāl-Konkan to 'Ādil Shah, join the latter and oppose the Mughals."¹² Moreover Shivaji perhaps expected some advantages from surrender. Indeed he stooped to gain. Far from losing all his forts he retained twelve of them. His

sense of prestige was satisfied by the exemption from attendance at court. At the same time the protection under imperial service was a suitable reply to his diplomatic isolation in the Deccan. But his greatest potential advantage perhaps was the chance of wresting, with imperial sanction, Bijāpuri lands in the Konkan and the Bālāghāt. Sir Jadunath Sarkar has referred to this as "a conditional engagement" which Shivaji made with the Mughals.¹³ Of course this prospect was not realised.

Aurangzeb's initial reaction

Aurangzeb's initial reaction to Jai Singh's proposals about the terms of the Treaty of Purandar was one of suspicion and distrust, not only of Shivaji but of the Rajah as well. The Emperor enquired from the Rajah how he could compose his mind about the possible bad faith and deception (*tāzuri*) of the Maratha chieftain. The Rajah had to assure his suspicious master that Shivaji did give adequate guarantees and take strong oaths. Shivaji promised never to act disobediently or plunder the imperial dominions. He promised to promptly perform any military duty in the Deccan. He promised that in case of any deviation on his part in the above agreements the Emperor would be free to encompass the ruin not only of himself but also of his family. He asserted that he would regard this ruin as being the result of his own action (*Kār o kirdār*). Unusually enough Jai Singh took an oath as he wanted to satisfy Shivaji who pressed him for it, and also as he considered it to be in the interests of the state.¹⁴

Aurangzeb did not at first concur in the proposal to allow Shivaji to retain twelve forts and even doubted the *bonafides* of the Rajah in setting the terms of the Treaty. So Jai Singh had to give a spirited defence of his own policy. This seemed to have satisfied the Emperor who acceded to the Rajah's proposals.¹⁵

Jai Singh's motives

In fact Jai Singh's policy towards Shivaji becomes crystal clear from the Rajah's despatches to the Emperor, notwithstanding the veiled hints, cautious and well-chosen words contained therein. The veteran Rajah, a past master in diplomacy,

preferred policy to force, expediency to might. He carefully evolved certain principles of policy and took action accordingly to cope with the complex situation in the Deccan.

Firstly, Jai Singh was opposed to two simultaneous wars on the same front. While Aurangzeb wanted him to strike at both Shivāji and 'Ādil Shāh together, the Rajah was opposed to such a war with two enemies at the same time. As he wrote to the Emperor: "True, it is not very difficult for the victorious Emperor's fortune to conquer both these wretched rulers. But if policy can accomplish a thing, why should we court delay (by resorting to force)?¹⁶ And again, "it was not politic enough for the eternal empire to cause the two improvident fellows to raise tumults all at once, though it was not difficult for the imperial forces to take effective action simultaneously against both these offenders (*tabāhikars*)."¹⁷ This is the rationale of the Rajah in first effecting the submission of the Maratha chieftain and then undertaking the expedition against Bijāpur. That the Rajah was wiser than the Emperor is amply proved by the failure of Mughal arms against Bijāpur alone, even though Shivāji rendered distinguished service on behalf of the Mughals. A war with both Shivāji and 'Ādil Shāh at the same time would surely have become a disaster for the Mughals.

Secondly, his policy was to first reduce Shivāji militarily to dire straits so that there would be no other alternative for the latter than to make peace. All the preparations, manoeuvres and military operations of Jai Singh were directed to this end. The storming of the outworks of Purandar and the impending fall of the lower fort brought Shivāji down on his knees. Jai Singh persisted in refusing to negotiate with Shivāji's agents or to answer his letters. "I know", the Rajah wrote to the Emperor, "unless a strong hand was laid on him, his words and stories would not contain a particle of truth". On the ground of imperial prohibition the Rajah declined to meet him openly at first. Even when Shivāji, as a supplicating offender, interviewed the Rajah the latter signalled Dilir Khān to deliver an assault on Purandar in order "to conquer any lingering reluctance that Shiva might still have had." Duff writes that Jai Singh "who understood the character of his adversary did not relax in his efforts or preparations, and Shivajee now seriously reverted to his early plan of entering the Moghal service and

relinquishing a part of his acquisition."¹⁸ In fact, for Shivāji, the Treaty of Purandar was a treaty concluded under duress.

Thirdly, after securing the submission of Shivāji the Rajah followed a wise policy of moderation in order to win him over to the Mughal side. So the Rajah bargained with or lured Shivāji by offering him hopes of imperial favours in the future. As the Rajah wrote to his master, "If, inspite of my solemn promise and safe conduct I had by strategem detained him, (there would have been two effects): first, (all) the chieftains of this country, poligars and Nayaks, would have lost faith in the promises and oaths of your officers which are firm like Alexander's rampart; and secondly, trustworthy informants had reported to me that Shivā before starting on his visit to me had made such arrangements about his household and forts that in the event of his not being allowed to return from our camp his followers might give him up for lost and do their best to guard his house. In view of the above two possibilities, I considered it true policy to re-assure Shivā, grant him leave to depart and assent to his prayers".¹⁹ That is why the Rajah agreed to leave as many as 12 forts to Shivāji even though he was fully conscious of the strength of his position, and had at first, "declined to abate a single fort."²⁰

Aurangzeb looked askance at such a generous concession to the undeserving Shivāji. Jai Singh explained it as follows: "True, he has got 12 large and small forts including Rajgarh. But even while he had *all* his impregnable forts and was besides aided by the king of Bijāpur, we succeeded through God's help and his Majesty's fortune in pressing him hard. Now that we have taken away from him the forts of Bālāghāt, such as Purandar, Rohirā, Kondānā, Lauhgarh and in Tāl-Konkan Māhuli, Muranjan, Khirdurg, Takhul (?), etc., not one of which had hitherto been besieged and taken by anybody, and now that we have hemmed him round, like the centre of a circle, (with our possessions), if Shivā strays by a hair's breadth from the path of obedience he can be totally annihilated by us with the slightest exertion."²¹

The Emperor observed that "the location of the forts of Shivāji differed from (i.e. did not fit in with) the position of the other conquered forts, that out of the twelve forts left in the possession of Shivāji, five lay in between the imperial forts, that

in view of the sedition, mischief and unreliability of Shivāji, these should not have been left to him, and that the entire territory should have been cleansed of the stains of his existence".²²

So Jai Singh had to remove the suspicion of his master by asserting that he was determined to extirpate Shivāji.²³ He accepted Aurangzeb's charges against Shivāji but pleaded strongly for imperial forgiveness to the latter on the basis of two precedents of the time of Shāhjahān; the rebellious Jagat Singh Hādā was pardoned by Shāhjahān; and the disloyalty of Jadu Rai Deccani was forgiven by the grant of Sindhker to his sons. Another reason why Jai Singh pleaded for Shivāji was the inadequacy of the system of communications. In those days communications proved a great handicap for the Mughal Empire. Greater the distance of a place, greater was the difficulty of controlling a rebellious or ambitious person. If Shāhjahān had pardoned the rebellious Jagat Singh Hādā, whose homeland was near the imperial capital, there was greater justification, argued Jai Singh, for Aurangzeb to pardon Shivāji, whose territories were situated at a great distance from the Imperial capital.²⁴ Moreover, the difficulties created by distance were aggravated by Shivaji's expectation of help from the two Deccani Sultanates in a common cause. So Jai Singh pleaded before the Emperor for the grant of fresh life to Shivāji by giving twelve forts and one lakh of *hun* from other forts and *mahals* of Nizām-ul-mulk. The Rajah's argument was that if this was not done, Shivāji would again join the Deccanis.²⁵

Jai Singh requested the Emperor to issue a *farmān*, confirming the grant of 12 forts and the territory yielding one lakh of *hun*. The Emperor had observed that "so long as a chief like him (Jai Singh) with a large army was not posted there", his mind would not be at rest. Jai Singh thanked him for this and replied: "It is in the interests of the state that in four good subahs, the Deccan, Kabul, Bengal and Ahmadabad, specially in the Deccan, to which four other subahs were attached, there should be one of the servants with an army strong enough to face daring land-marchers and refractory people. What to speak of Shivā? Even others who have none to keep them under control and suppress them, might assume refractoriness and rebellious attitude like Shivā. The stability of the position of

Shivā also in this short period has been due to disorganisation and lack of means to punish him. How his strong forts and citadels like Purandar, which had for a long time, been a base of his sedition and mischiefs, the forts of Kondāna, Lohgarh, Rohirā, Māhuli, Muranjan, Khirdurg, each of which was unique in serving as lurking places for ambuscades of the erring people (*gumrahān*) have been brought within the imperial possession." Jai Singh further emphasized that the twelve forts (and especially the five forts) and the territory yielding one lakh of *hun*, all situated on lowlands and plains, had no potential strength and so their possession by Shivāji need not cause any apprehension in the mind of the Emperor. Moreover, if the Rajah who would be staying in the Deccan for some time detected any sign of faithlessness on the part of Shivāji, he could bring about the complete overthrow of the latter.²⁶ Thus Jai Singh framed a wise policy of moderation towards Shivāji. While making him actually harmless Jai Singh did not *at first* want to extirpate him outright. It would have caused a reaction in the minds of the Deccan powers, especially the two sultanates of Bijāpur and Golkonda.

Sir Jadunath Sarkar writes that in the Treaty of Purandar "no promise was made by Jai Singh or his master to confer on Shiva the viceroyalty of the Deccan as the Bakhars allege. (Sabhasad 38)".²⁷ In this opinion the idea of such a promise was extremely improbable. The *Haft Anjuman* does not categorically refer to any such promise. But it does state that Jai Singh suggested not only the conferment of the title of Rājgi on Shivāji but also the latter's journey to the imperial court in cautious terms. This would imply that Jai Singh intended, at least for some time, to use Shivāji against 'Ādil Shāh virtually as a Mughal sentinel in the Deccan. "After the accomplishment of this (i.e. Bijāpur) expedition as he (Shivāji), would become the servant and slave of the court, his life and property would be attached to the imperial *sarkār*, I pray that an exalted *farmān*, decorated with the symbol of auspicious palm and containing acceptance of his prayers and conferring the title of Rājgi, together with a robe of honour (*Khila't*), may be granted to him. Having conferred these favours and set his mind at rest, I would arrange that he should march with good things for the imperial court, and render such good services

as may atone for all his past faults. I would see that he brightens his forehead with the mark of servitude, fidelity, good faith and rectitude. Although in submitting my replies regarding the affairs of Shivā, I have taken much time and shown much presumption, this had necessarily to be done, and I am hopeful of getting imperial pardon and grace".²⁸

Fourthly, Jai Singh planned to use Shivāji as a lever against Bijāpur in consonance with an eternal principle of diplomacy. He had the foresight to regard the Deccan problem as a whole. To him the question of securing the submission of Shivāji was not an exclusive problem of subduing the Maratha power only. The Treaty of Purandar was not an isolated plank in Jai Singh's Maratha policy. It was so designed as to form a solution of the wider Deccan problem. As he wrote to Aurangzeb (June, 1665) "Concerning the territories of Bijāpur—of which Bijāpur Tāl—Konkan is actually in his possession and some other tracts of Bijāpuri—Bālāghāt are desired by him—if your majesty is planning to punish him—, in view of his insincerity and alliance until recently with the enemies of the Emperor (i.e. Bijāpur), and his consent to accompany the imperial army in this very expedition now that the time is favourable (to us), what can be better than this that first we overthrow Bijāpur with the help of Shivā ?".²⁹ The silence of the Rajah regarding the next step is more expressive than a thousand words.

In this connection it is interesting to know Jai Singh's assessment about Shivāji's position in the Deccan. "I had repeatedly brought to your majesty's notice", the Rajah wrote to the Emperor, "that Shivā is a *zamindār* and the pillars of his *zamindāri* will not endure beyond a period of seven or eight years". The Rajah wanted to use him for the imperial cause against Bijāpur, a proposal which he broached before the Emperor in very delicate terms. He even pointed out that this step should have been taken earlier in the spacious days of Emperor Shāhjahān: "At the time he had captured the fort of Parnala (i.e. Panhala) and both he and 'Ādil Khān had voluntarily opened negotiations with the servants of the court, if the exigencies of the state had permitted Shivā to be brought forward (*peshwardar*) (i.e. used against 'Ādil Shāh) the affair of 'Ādil Khān would have been managed and afterwards it would not have been a protracted affair, for the position of 'Ādil Khān

in the eyes of the Deccanis is of a different kind, the position and condition of Shivā are different." So Jai Singh, after reaching Māhuli, the lowlands and the other parganas in the uplands and lowlands of Bijāpur, which had been conquered by Shivāji, considered it a favourable opportunity and resolved to capture these territories consisting of even plains. But 'Ādil Shāh had, before the arrival of the Rajah at Punā, already wrested these parganas from Shivāji. 'Ādil Shāh made a show of loyalty and service to the Emperor but in reality he considered help to Shivāji as security to his own territory.³⁰

Fifthly, Jai Singh aimed at averting a triple *entente* of Shivāji, Bijāpur and Golkunda against the Mughals. To 'Ādil Shāh Shivāji was a buffer against the Mughals. Outwardly professing loyalty to the Emperor he sent an army into the Maratha territory but secretly concluded an alliance with Shivāji and helped him with money and other requisites. 'Ādil Shāh also induced Qutb Shāh to follow his example and supply money to Shivāji. So the two Deccani Sultans could never endorse any plan of "rooting Shiva out".³¹ Hence 'Ādil Shāh must be alienated from Shivāji at all costs. In June 1665 the Rajah wrote to the Emperor, "When I learnt of this (Bijāpur's duplicity) it struck me that to render Shiva hopeless would only drive him into an alliance with Bijapur"³² Subsequently, in recommending the retention of the twelve forts by Shivāji, Jai Singh again emphasized: "Shivā, . . . who had a wordly man as 'Ādil Khān as his helper and ally, who received considerable monetary help from Qutbulmulk, although he was at a great distance from him and who was also being supported by other *zamindārs* of this region, has now lost hope from all directions and bound his heart in service of His Majesty's Court."³³ Jai Singh proposed to utilise Mulla Ahmad, the second leading noble in Bijāpur (being next to the Prime Minister), to undermine 'Ādil Shāh's alliance with Shivāji.³⁴ Jai Singh recommended to the Emperor the acceptance of Shivāji's prayers regarding the formal grant of Bijāpuri Bālāghat to the latter, besides Bijāpuri Tāl Konkan. The Emperor replied, "Mulkokan 'Ādil Khāni is granted to Shivā, but no order will be issued by me about (the taluqs of) Bijāpuri Bālāghāt being given to him. If he can take it, let him wrest it from 'Ādil Shāh." Jai Singh wrote to the Emperor that though such a remark was equivalent to an order

from imperial grace, yet Shivāji, out of extreme obedience to imperial wishes, would not venture to undertake the conquest of the latter territory unless he got a definite *sanad* to that effect... the standard revenue of these *mahals* was nine lakhs of *hun* in former times, but it would fall short of it even after pacification of the country and settlement of the ryots. When 'Ādil Shāh was prepared to cede these lands to Shivā on condition that his brother's son would enter Bijāpuri service (and Shivāji had declined) Jai Singh suggested to Aurangzeb that these territories be granted by the Emperor (so that this would enhance Shivāji's obligation to the Empire). "As this was the first occasion of the malice of Shivā against 'Ādil Khān," Jai Singh requested the Emperor to issue an imperial *farmān* to the effect that the territory yielding 9 lakhs of *hun* from Mulkokan and 'Ādil Khāni Bālāghāt had been granted to Shivāji on condition of his paying *peshkash* of 40 lakhs of *hun* by fixed instalments. The Mughals agreed not to claim this portion after the conquest of Bijāpur.³⁵ Thus did the shrewd Rajah attempt to throw an apple of perpetual discord between Shivāji and 'Ādil Shāh. The Treaty of Purandar has, therefore, been rightly described by Sri Jadunath Sarkar as Mughal-Maratha agreement for partition of Bijapuri Kingdom.³⁶

On the above considerations Jai Singh strongly pleaded the case of Shivāji before the Emperor. But this pro-Shivāji policy of Jai Singh was more apparent than real. Its basis was diplomacy and not union of hearts. Sri G. S. Sardesai³⁷ has referred to a metrical letter in Persian written in the name of Shivāji to "Jai Singh", "appealing to his heart as a Hindu to appreciate and support the national and religious uplift undertaken by Shivāji in order to deliver his land from the oppressive Muslim yoke. Shivāji urged that as Hindus they must both work together to win back their religious liberty. . . ."³⁸ But Jai Singh did not go out of his way to fraternise with Shivāji. His loyalty to Aurangzeb was so strong that never for a moment did he think of establishing a Rajput-Maratha *entente* against the Mughals. In fact the Rajah firmly assured his suspicious master in the following terms: "The intention (*niyat*) and resolution (*irada*) of your slave had been bent on this: to erase the portrait of his (i.e., Shivāji's) existence from the tablet of Time but in spite of the resources

and equipments which were available there it required opportunity and time for displacing him and driving him out of that land and effecting the conquest of all these difficult forts. It did not behove the victorious army to allow such patience and delay of so long a time in marching upon a person, whose sole cause of pride and ornament of publicity in every clime lies in the fact that his father was a servant of 'Ādil Khān and Nizām-ul-mulk.'"³⁸ Thus Jai Singh secretly aimed at the eventual extirpation of Shivāji after the liquidation of Bijāpur.

The task before the Rajah was not at all easy. He had to soothe the shrewd Maratha chieftain; he had to satisfy and persuade his suspicious and distrustful master to accept his suggestions. The Rajah who displayed smoothness of tongue and gentlemanly and courteous behaviour towards Shivāji, used non-complimentary phrases towards the latter (e.g. *beshukoh*) in his secret despatches to the emperor,—perhaps because he knew the attitude of the Emperor towards the Maratha chieftain,—and did not hesitate to tell his master that he himself was determined to root out Shivāji. Yet never did the Rajah give Shivāji any occasion to suspect that he was being used as a pawn in the Deccan chess board. Shivāji would never have consented to go to Delhi,³⁹ if Jai Singh had ever roused his suspicion.

The success of Jai Singh's policy may be judged by the following facts:

(a) Jai Singh wrote to the Emperor (June, 1665): "the task (of subduing Shivāji) which had engaged the victorious army for years has been accomplished in months".⁴⁰

(b) 'Ādil Shāh pressed Shivāji to send his brother's son to Bijāpuri service (as he had sent his own son to imperial service) and promised to give Bijāpuri Tāl Konkan and Bālāghāt to him. But Shivāji did not agree, "relying on the faith of the imperialists and considering the imperial grant a boon".⁴¹

(c) Jai Singh claimed that the submission of Shivāji to the Mughals produced a favourable reaction on the *zamindārs* of the Karnātak, and suggested that they should be won over by the Mughals for the success of the Bijāpur expedition. As he wrote to the Emperor: "Seeing the rectitude in the words given by me, the slave of your majesty, and the granting of leave to Shiva to depart, now all the *zamindārs* of the Karnatak and the

wild people of Barkol and Kanul, etc., have sent their agents, just as one captured deer draws many wild and forest deers. And they are waiting for hints or signs and for the sake of the Bijāpur expedition it is absolutely necessary to conciliate them and give them hope to get their *watan* (homeland). Afterwards, if they render good service and prove their loyalty it would be better, otherwise, why should this much land or houses, be left in the open places either to Shivā or to others?"¹⁴²

Thus the Treaty of Purandar was neither a mere imposition of the victor on the vanquished, nor the result of mere imperial military might, but clearly the outcome of the diplomacy of the Rajah, as also an offspring of an bargain between the two, arrived at after prolonged negotiations. It was something more than a Mughal-Maratha agreement for the partition of Bijāpuri territory. It was a whole outline of Jai Singh's Deccan policy. The loyal Rajah modestly described his suggestions as 'presumptuous'. But these were more in the interest of the Empire than Aurangzeb's plans. The wisdom of Jai Singh's advice was wasted on his suspicious master. Indeed if Aurangzeb had treated Shivāji subsequently in a way different from what he actually did, the course of history would have been different.

1. Sarkar, *Shivaji* (1961) ch. V; *House of Shivaji* (1948) ch. IX. Grant Duff attributes the commission of Jai Singh and Dilir Khan to Aurangzeb's distrust of these two generals and desire to keep them employed in a distant region, unknown to them, but quite familiar to himself (Cambray ed. I. 166).

2. Sarkar, *Aurangzeb*, Vol. IV (1930) ch. XLI.

3. Vide Bengal, *Past and Present*, LXXXI, pt. 1 (Jan.-June, 1962) article by Jagadish Narayan Sarkar, pp. 69-75.

4. *Shivaji*, ch. V.

5. These 23 forts were: (a) *In the Deccan*: (1) Rudramal or Vajragarh, (2) Purandar, (3) Kondānā, (4) Rohirā, (5) Lohgarh, (6) Isāgarh, (7) Tanki, (8) Khadkalā near Kondānā, (9) Tikonā, (b) *in Konkan*, (10) Māhuli, (11) Muranjan, (12) Khirdurg, (13) Bhandārdurg, (14) Tulsi-Khul, (15) Nardurg, (16) Khaigarh or Ankolā, (17) Mārg-garh or Atra, (18) Kohaj, (19) Basant, (20) Nang, (21) Karnāla, (22) Songarh, and (23) Mangarh. (A.N. 905; *Shivaji*, p. 126).

6. The names of these 12 forts were: (1) Rājgarh, (2) Tornā, (3) Rāiri, (4) Lingānā-garh, (in Colaba dt.; suggests alternative reading Malang-garh (Thana dt.)), (5) Mahār-garh, (6) Pāl-garh (also known as Saragarh in Bhor state), (7) Ghosālā (Ghosāl-garh, alias Virgarh in Colaba dt.), (8) Āsheri (in Thana dt.), (9) Pāl-garh (in Ratnagiri dt.), (10) Bhorap (alias Subha-garh in Bhor state), (11) Kumāri (in Poona dt.) (12) Udai-durg. From the rent roll (*tumar*) forwarded by the Rajah, with their identification as given by Sir J. N. Sarkar. *House of Shivaji*, p. 152.

7. *Shivaji*, p. 123.

8. Duff (Cambray ed.) I. 168.
9. *Basatin us Salatin*, 376.
10. *Haft Anjuman*, Benares Ms. 69 a.
11. Sarkar, *Shivaji*, pp. 106-108.
12. *H.A.*, 64 b.
13. *Shivaji*, 124.
14. *H.A.*, 66b-67a.
15. See below, *H.A.* 68b-69a; 62a. For the Emperor's *farman* to *Shivaji* (5th September 1665) see Sarkar, *House of Shivaji*, 150-152.
16. *H.A.* 55a.
17. *H.A.* 68a.
18. *H.A.* 54a; 55a; *Shivaji*, pp. 122-3; Duff (Cambray ed.) I. 170.
19. *H.A.* 56b; Manucci, an eye witness, (*Storia*, II, 135-6) says "that *Shivaji* surrendered of his own accord" and allowed himself to be persuaded by Jai Singh's pleasant words and large promises.
20. *H.A.* 55b.
21. *H.A.* 57.
22. *H.A.* 68b.
23. *Ibid.*
24. *H.A.* 68b-69a. Rajah Jagat Singh of Mau Nurpur, vide B.P. Saksena, *History of Shahjahan of Delhi*, 40, 45, 90, 93-103; *Ma'asir-ul Umara*, II, 176-9; 298-41, for Jadav Rao of Sindhkher, a Nizamshahi Noble, see Sarkar, *Shivaji*, 15-17. He was the maternal grand father of *Shivaji*; murdered (c. 1630).
25. *H.A.* 69a; see below.
26. *H.A.* 69b.
27. *House of Shivaji*, 146.
28. *H.A.* 70b.
29. *H.A.* 57b; Sarkar, *Aurangzib*, IV, 104.
30. *H.A.* 68.
31. *A.N.* 909-13, 397; *H.A.* 60a, 79a, 70a; BS-373-375, as quoted in Sarkar, *Aurangzib*, IV, 100-1.
32. *H.A.* 55a. "The Sultan of Bijapur, while professing that the wresting of some *mahals* of his former Tāl-Konkan was a proof of his loyalty to the imperial cause, had secretly promised (to *Shivā*) every possible help and was posting an army of his own in that Tāl-Konkan, in order that the imperial forces might not desire to march thither". *Ibid.*
33. *H.A.* 69.
34. *H.A.* 65a.
35. *H.A.* 70a; see Sarkar, *Aurangzib*, IV, 102.
36. Sarkar, *Shivaji*, 124; *House of Shivaji*, 146. According to Duff "the most remarkable part of this agreement was *Shivajee's* being allowed certain assignments on Beejapoor, probably in lieu of his pretended hereditary claims in the Nizamshahee territory, and as some recompense for what he had ceded to the emperor. These assignments were estimated at five lakhs of pagodas, being a fourth and a tenth of the revenue, termed by him the chouth and *Surdeshmookhee*, of certain districts above the Ghauts; the charge of collecting which he took upon himself Aurangzeb's letter (of confirmation) does not specify chouth and *Surdeshmookhee*; indeed, it is probable he did not comprehend their meaning or insidious tendency, but as he also had sinister views, in his plan of undermining the government of Beejapoor, he agrees to *Shivajee's* proposal, on condition of his accompanying Raja Jey Singhs, with his troops, exerting himself in the conquest of that state, and paying the first instalment of the promised *peshkush*". (I. 172, Cambray ed.).
37. Sardesai, *New History of the Marathas*, vol. I, 159-60 for details. The contents of this sarcastic letter are given in *Shivaji Souvenir*, English section art. 11, pp. 169-178.

38. H.A.

39. Tod has only one sentence regarding Jai Singh and Shivaji, a misleading one. "He made prisoner the celebrated Sivaji whom he conveyed to court, and afterwards on finding that his pledge of safety was likely to be broken, was accessory to his liberation." (Routledge and Kegan Paul, II, 287).

40. H.A., 57a.

41. H.A., 69a.

42. *Ibid.*

SECTION III. MIRZA RAJAH JAI SINGH'S POLICY IN BIJAPUR

The late Sir Jadunath Sarkar has dealt with Jai Singh's invasion of Bijāpur (1665-66) in detail,¹ dwelling on (i) the causes of war with Bijapur, (ii) his diplomatic intrigues in alienating Shivāji from 'Ādil Shāh, seducing Bijāpuri nobles and officers, inducing Qutb Shāh not to join Bijāpur, (iii) his military resources and preparations, (iv) the course of the invasion,—first his uninterrupted march to Bijāpur, then the setback and finally his retreat, (v) his failure, the financial loss of the Mughals and the Emperor's displeasure. All these events, stage by stage, have been woven in a story of absorbing interest, marked by mastery of details, culled from different contemporary sources,—the official history, the *'Ālamgirnāmā*, the Rajah's despatches contained in the *Haft Anjuman*, Manucci, Bhimsen Burhanpuri's *Nuskha-i-Dilkusha*, and other reliable, though later, sources,—Khāfi Khān's *Muntakhāb ul Lubāb* and the *Basātin us Salātin*. While seeking to vindicate the position of Jai Singh—by pointing out that he had inadequate army, insufficient war material and food supply as against the then unimpaired strength of Bijāpur as compared to that twenty years later,—Sir Jadunath Sarkar has very rightly concluded that "the Rajah had never a fair chance in the war", and "died, overwhelmed with loss, disappointment and public disgrace."

Sir Jadunath Sarkar, however, has not discussed the immediate sequel of the failure of the expedition, the reactions of the defeat on the mind of that veteran general and his suggestions to retrieve his honour. These are available in his secret despatches to his suspicious master whom he loyally served till his death, as given in the *Haft Anjuman*.² Perhaps Sir Jadunath Sarkar did not consider these necessary in a general history of Aurangzeb. But the biographer of the Rajah must necessarily take these into account. They not only throw new light on Jai Singh's military tactics in Bijapur and reveal his optimism but also give his own defence before his prosecuting master. An attempt has been made in this section to throw light on these points.

1. *Jai Singh's war tactics in Bijāpur*

Though Jai Singh's campaign proved to be a failure he did not lose heart and was keen on recovering his prestige. But exaggerated and incorrect reports of the war seemed to have reached the Emperor and prejudiced his mind against the Rajah. The latter hastened to dispel any wrong impression in the mind of the Emperor. "The incorrect news about the Bijāpur expedition which has reached the imperial ears has no truth in it. The body of people who had to suffer defeat there are reduced to dire extremities".³ Jai Singh's efforts, however, do not appear to have been successful.

Both the Emperor and the General were equally anxious to retrieve the fallen prestige of the imperial army. But they differed on the plan. So when Aurangzeb sent instructions, Jai Singh sent counter-proposals. On receiving the news of the failure the Emperor personally wrote a letter to Jai Singh, containing his views as to what he considered to be the best means of turning the tide. Jai Singh received it on 16th Sha'ban (11th February, 1666). But the Rajah begged to differ. In the first place, Aurangzeb suggested the establishment of *thanahs* from Parenda to Bijāpur, the despatch of an army to punish the Bijāpuris and the safeguarding of the provision of supplies to the imperial army. To this Jai Singh politely pointed out that the proposal to establish *thanahs* was too late, and that the construction of forts along the way from the Mughal frontier to Bijāpur was a time-absorbing process that was not likely to be effective or successful. As he wrote to the Emperor: "I have already sent a detailed *'arzdāsh*t regarding the abandonment of the siege of the Bijāpur fort. Had it not been the case I would have appointed a force to punish those who had invaded the imperial dominions and established police posts on the way of the coming of the enemy, in spite of the obstructions placed by those short-sighted enemies. If I had erected forts everywhere and left the *thanahdars* there, it would have taken a long time, and a smaller number of people outside the shelter of the *thanah* would have perished. The Emperor might have come to know of the harm done to the enemies and the punishment meted out to them from place to place. . . I hope that. . . this expedition would be brought to a successful end."⁴

Further, Jai Singh boldly pointed out that the Bijāpur campaign, in order to be crowned with success, required much greater preparation than what had been made, and that considering the various odds at his end, he should not be asked to hurry up, i.e. branded with infamy. The Rajah continues: "Your Majesty knows how small Shivāji's territory is and yet how very long our troops had to fight against him (before achieving success). Surely, a war against such a kingdom requires very great effort and organisation (of resources). Knowing that the conquest of Bijāpur is the prelude (*muqadamma*) to the conquest of all Deccan and Karnatak, Qutb ul Mulk and other zamindars of the South have thrown the veil off the face of devotion and obedience and they have united their interests (with 'Ādil Khān) and are acting in unison. If this is the situation it is a matter of anxiety and requires earnest planning. I pray that I, who do not require any injunction as regards devotion and performance of imperial service, may not be required to hurry up".⁵

Secondly, Aurangzeb even thought of proceeding in person to the Deccan in order to bring the expedition to a successful close. Jai Singh's robust optimism led him to dissuade his master from undertaking this step. It was unnecessary, he held. Moreover, Jai Singh also considered the task of subduing Bijāpur to be well within the range of practical accomplishment by the imperial army, i.e., by himself and even without the personal intervention and presence of the Emperor. As he wrote to the Emperor: "As regards what Your Majesty has written about the nice sense of honour which makes the emperor think of proceeding to this side, when your slaves are always ready to put their utmost exertions, why should Your Sacred Majesty take such trouble? The accomplishment of this task would not be beyond the capacity of your servants".⁶

Dilating further on this point he asserted that he never considered the task to be beyond the strength of the Empire. What was imperatively necessary was "to bring disorder and disunion in the camp of the enemy". A shrewd diplomat, he considered it "necessary to detach three races",—the Afghans, the Abyssinians and the Mahdavi sect,—from the enemy and win them over to the side of the Mughals, by offer of rewards, *mansabs* and grant of *jāgirs*. But the greatest difficulty arose from the fact that owing to marches and counter-marches of

the Mughals and the Bijāpuris and the plundering activities of the Marathas, and the consequent wholesale devastation and depopulation of the surrounding regions, especially the *talukas* of Naldrug, Sholāpur and Gulbargā near the fort of Bijāpur the offer of *jāgirs* in those areas was not proving attractive enough to the potential Bijāpuri deserters.⁷

In fact the seduction of the Bijāpuris and other Deccanis was a very costly affair. Aurangzeb at first objected to such expenditure as being wasteful. Jai Singh counter-argued and sought imperial sanction for the same. "I know full well that the expenses of this expedition would not be like those of Balkh and Kandahar, (i.e. utterly useless), which did not yield adequate return and that after the conquest of such an extensive kingdom (i.e. Bijāpur), we can get ample compensation. . .".⁸

After politely demolishing the arguments of his master, Jai Singh unfolded his own master strategy for effecting the overthrow of Bijāpur,—the need of having two armies, one for offensive purposes against Bijāpur and the other for defensive purposes, i.e. protecting the imperial dominions from the surprise raids of the Bijāpuris. The necessity of adopting this strategy was brought home to him by the experiences of the campaign. During the campaign it was found that the Bijāpuris followed 'Cossack tactics' and guerrilla warfare, making sudden and harassing raids on the imperial army and dominions and dislocating the latter, without coming face to face in a decisive engagement. The Mughals, on the other hand, had to be always prepared for a dual task, making aggression on the Bijāpuris and at the same time being on the alert to resist their sudden swoops. A single army found it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to keep its eyes now ahead and now behind. It was impossible for Jai Singh to be Janus-eyed.

This reveals Jai Singh's generalship, based on his clear assessment of the military situation and its complexities, which do not seem to have been adequately appreciated by Aurangzeb from a distance. Jai Singh also analysed the advantages of this course. It would render the personal advance of the Emperor to the Deccan unnecessary. Jai Singh would assume the responsibility of such an expedition under these conditions. It would counter the concerted movements of the two Deccani Sultanates. It would prevent the Bijāpuris from indulging in

the harassing tactics in Mughal domains without the necessity of launching any offensive against them. An offensive was sure to 'invite resistance' from them. Jai Singh wanted to avoid launching a large-scale offensive in view of the fundamental weaknesses of his position. While the proposed two armies of the imperialists would always act in unison, their identities must be kept separate.

These ideas may best be studied in Jai Singh's own despatches: ". . . . Sometimes both these wicked people (i.e. Bijāpur and Golkonda) get together and attain stability. The reality of the situation will be speedily ascertained. They have no legs of stability to stand on. And they are extending the hand of plunder in every direction. If a small force is sent against them they hem it around and provide themselves with goods and property. But in the face of a bigger force they take to their heels. The advance of the imperial servants is for *mulkgiri* (conquest). To look behind is for the purpose of protection of the imperial domain. To precipitate matters is to invite resistance. To me it is crystal clear that two armies are necessary for the purpose of protecting imperial territories, the length and breadth of which are known to Your Majesty. When we, the slaves of the empire, advance for punishing the enemies of the empire and conquering territories of the hypocrites, another force should be left on this side (i.e. behind). The objective of both the armies would be the same, viz. the protection of the imperial dominions. They should be appointed for achieving this purpose. The ultimate object of the conjunction of the two armies is really for the purpose of the advance. Although it is probable that at the time when the imperial dominions are denuded of the victorious army, being engaged in devastating their territories,—the accursed enemies might not turn their attention towards this side; yet if they do so, both the armies,—those who are advancing and those with me,—would fall upon them. In the event of this enemy's not turning to this side, both the armies would, in unison, punish them adequately. If they divide themselves and raise tumult on two sides, these two armies of ours would adopt remedial measures against them. But it is necessary to distinguish between the two armies and keep them separate in view of the vastness of the imperial domains as well as the need of adopting

caution on both sides. If I make a request for both these forces, I know that it might not be in accord with Your Majesty's wishes"

The implementation of the scheme, so reasonably and forcefully outlined by Jai Singh was not free from difficulties, even if the initial opposition of the Emperor had been overcome and imperial sanction obtained. Jai Singh, therefore, placed these before the Emperor. True, the Emperor had invested Jai Singh, in the very beginning of the expedition, with absolute authority in conducting the Bijāpur campaign.¹⁸ But in practice his position was very much weakened by recalcitration among his subordinates and disloyal negligence of officers and spies. Naturally Jai Singh was very much perturbed over this and tried to adopt remedial measures so that the unity of the Mughal army might not be hampered in any way. In anticipation of imperial sanction he set apart a force consisting of the armies of Dā'ud Khān, Qutb ud din Khān and others, evidently as a temporary and working arrangement. While he himself would continue to be the general of the original and main army, the leadership of the second army should be conferred,—as he recommended to the Emperor,—on Maharajah Jaswant Singh. Anticipating that his suggestion of Jaswant's name might cause heart-burning among other Mughal generals, Jai Singh pleaded with Aurangzeb to keep it a closely-guarded secret and to issue a peremptory order appointing Jaswant the second commander with the task of protecting the imperial dominions, and warning all recalcitrant and discontented elements with the threat of dismissal from service and deprivation of *jāgirs*.

Let Jai Singh himself speak: ". . . in view of what I know of Your Majesty's mind, I have set apart, as stated in a separate sheet, a force consisting of the contingents of Dā'ud Khān, Qutb du din Khān and others. I request that an army might be despatched from the imperial court. Maharajah Jaswant Singh also is with Your Majesty. If approved, the Maharajah might be sent at the head of an army from the Court. After the appointment of both these armies which will ensure composure of mind, Your Majesty's servants will not spare any effort in engaging in battles and encounters, whether it was the rainy season or not. If my name is brought in in

this matter and Dā'ud Khān and Qutb ud din Khān come to know that this counsel and request had been made by me, they might show disgust in accepting this service, or they might request for a selected body of the imperial force to be placed under them. The difference it would make in the final issue of the affair would be quite evident to Your Majesty. The Emperor may issue an order and I hope that if these people want some other men from my contingent it may not be accepted. Rather a peremptory order should be issued in my name to the effect that if any one proposed different names for deputation from the pick of the army, he would go against Your Majesty's wishes and that he would be dismissed from his service and deprived of his *jāgir*. If orders are issued on these lines it would ensure the security of the imperial dominions."¹¹

Not less important than the question of leadership of the army was the problem of maintaining regular supplies of provisions and materials to it. The past experience of Jai Singh in this respect had not been happy at all. So Jai Singh requested the Emperor to issue a *farmān* entrusting this task to Dā'ud Khān.¹²

Further, one of the principal causes of the failure of the campaign was inefficient and corrupt—corrupt and therefore inefficient—espionage. Jai Singh's spies were "liars, pro-Deccanis and greedy of gain."¹³ So he wrote to the Emperor: "it is imperatively necessary to depute trustworthy *bakhshis* and *waqā'navises* in both the armies so that people may be called into account and that at the time of emergency they may not put forward lame excuses and seek safety therein".¹⁴

2. Jai Singh pleads his own defence

Far from accepting the revised war strategy of his veteran and loyal general, Aurangzeb recalled him from the theatre of war, suspended the campaign and made him the scapegoat of failure. In the words of Sir Jadunath Sarkar Aurangzeb "refused to forgive Jai Singh the one failure in his life."

But the despatches of the disgraced Rajah formed his best defence. These did not constitute special pleading but exonerate him from blame.

First, the question of initiative. Humbly but forcefully he argued that the initiative in the Bijāpur campaign had come from the Emperor and not from him. This is true. "I had not taken the initiative in this work and thought that this expedition would be undertaken in accordance with the royal orders. Now that the responsibility has devolved upon me, I pray to God night and day that the affair of this expedition should be accomplished in the way desired by the well-wishers of the court. Till life is present in the body, I shall continue in the service of the Emperor. I have no other desire to put forward except that till breath remains in my body I should not be remiss in doing my duty."¹⁵ In fact it was Aurangzeb who, while appointing Jai Singh Viceroy of the Deccan, had instructed him to wage war both against Shivāji and Bijāpur simultaneously. It was Jai Singh who counselled caution and did not deem it "wise to attack both these fools at the same time"¹⁶. He undertook the Bijāpur expedition after the submission of Shivāji and as the second part of the imperial order.

Secondly, the question of preparedness. In carrying out the imperial order Jai Singh had to face several handicaps. Admittedly he had to invade Bijāpur with incomplete preparations, hopelessly inadequate army, insufficient money, insufficient food supply and war materials. His artillery, the one single weapon to batter down all resistance of the defenders of the fort of Bijāpur, was extremely weak.¹⁷ As against the famous *Mālik i maidān* and other long range and large calibre artillery of Bijāpur, Jai Singh had only seven cannon with him. So he requisitioned 40 to 50 large pieces of cannon from the Deccan fortresses. He put down the bare minimum to be 30.¹⁸ Powder, shot and rockets in the same proportion and adequate for such an important task were also necessary. But even when he started, the much-needed, most essential pre-requisites, the big guns and siege materials, had not arrived from Parenda. The result was that Jai Singh was not prepared for a regular siege, and,—because of the military preparations, the wise plans of combined defence and reprisal, and the 'scorched earth' policy of 'Ādil Shāh and the harassing guerrilla warfare of the Bijāpuris,—Jai Singh found his position extremely critical. Artillery was the Achilles' heel of Jai Singh in Bijāpur. Aurangzeb did nothing to rectify this weakness.

Besides artillery Jai Singh was also weak in finance. The three months' war with Shivaji preceding the Bijāpur campaign had cost more than twenty-two lakhs. On the eve of the invasion of Bijāpur Jai Singh found to his alarm that the salary of his *mansabdārs* and artillerymen was in arrears for six months. Jai Singh's policy of seducing Bijāpuri nobles and officers and the *zamindārs* as well as the Karnātakis and Abyssinians in the Bijāpuri army, the Siddis of Janjira and others also involved a huge drain of money. To win the war by using the golden key and casting the diplomatic web widely Jai Singh pressed the Emperor for speedy supply of money.¹⁹ He got thirty lakhs from the imperial treasury only. But he had to spend more than a crore from his own pocket,²⁰ without any hope of recovery of even a part of it.

Thirdly, Aurangzeb's unreasonable haste. After the submission of Shivaji, Jai Singh delayed the march to Bijāpur. Some breathing time was of course necessary after one campaign. He had to use diplomacy to undermine Bijāpuri resistance. He had to endeavour to pacify Qutb Shah. He had to make administrative arrangements for imperial domains and also for Shivaji's territory. Postings of imperial officers had to be made, rewards and favours to deserving cases had to be given. More important than these, perhaps, was the problem of ensuring the supply of artillery, grain and musketeers, shots, lead and powder. This task had been entrusted to Saf Shikan Khān by imperial orders and Jai Singh hoped that he would leave no stone unturned in performing these services.²¹

All this delay, necessary for the success of the expedition and administrative expediency, made Aurangzeb anxious. In his eagerness he sent urgent exhortations to Jai Singh to expedite (*tākid talab*). Jai Singh replied that 'this old slave' did not require such exhortations in the performance of the services assigned. Of course Jai Singh assured his master that he himself was not at all unmindful of the delay. Rather he was impatient to start. His plan was to take 'Ādil Shāh in a state of unpreparedness, to take him by surprise, when the Bijāpuri army was disunited and the Sultān's nobles and officers, seduced by him secretly, were eager to desert their master and come over to the Mughals as soon as they entered Bijāpur.²² So any delay, Jai Singh knew, was dangerous. 'Ādil

Shāh would strengthen his position and put Bijāpur in a state of defence. As he wrote to Aurangzeb: "These days when the imperial army is standing idly, without work and the enemy are using this respite to gain strength day by day. The delay of a day now is equivalent to the loss of a year."

Yet there was delay. It was inevitable in the then situation. Jai Singh had to explain the reasons of delay. It was due to the imperative need of artillery and finance. "It was for quick action that I wrote to Saf Shikan Khān that, having supplied (to the army) shot and powder to serve the purpose of seven big cannon which are with us, he should despatch other cannon with their accessories through the direct road of Parenda. The news had been spread about the start being made from this place on 20th Rabi' us sāni (20th October, 1665) and he was asked to exert himself in taking charge of the houses and habitations lying on the way until the arrival of the cannon. But the treasure ordered from the provincial treasury of Malwa had not yet arrived and there was no sign of its having even started. . . . As regards conveying the treasure to Karnoor, Pir Khān had written. As soon as it is received, the time would be notified and the march would begin. There is no desire to make delay. It was very far seeing of Your Majesty to choose Saf Shikan Khān for making the arrangements for the march and other matters, otherwise the fact of the non-arrival of the treasure is known to Your Majesty."²⁴

On another occasion Jai Singh explained: "I had sent particulars through Naurang before this in an *l'arz dāshī*. The delay in setting out for Bijapur is due to the expectation of the arrival of the treasure. The victorious army is standing idly. As soon as the treasure arrives here and the demands of the seekers of salary are met, I will select a suitable time and proceed to execute the task entrusted to my hands without any delay or hesitation."²⁵

Jai Singh had again to account for the delay in starting for the expedition: "As regards the imperial order to me to start on the expedition soon, I have borne it in mind. As far as possible, I never make any delay in performing the services entrusted to me. The treasure amounting to 20 lakhs of rupees was received on 14th Jumadi I (13th November, 1665). Imme-

diately I set myself during the remainder of the month to make due arrangements and pay salaries due to the troops and started on 21st (20th Nov. 1665). The delay that occurred of a few days was owing to the need of despatching Mulla Almad and effecting abatement of baggages and accoutrements of the army¹²⁶

Fourthly. These initial handicaps and disadvantages were aggravated by the recalcitration, non-co-operation and insubordination of his lieutenants, Dilir Khān, Dā'ud Khān, and Qutb ud din and disloyal negligence of the *qīladār* of Parenda and betrayals of corrupt spies. About the disaffection (*dilgiri*) of Dilir Khān, Jai Singh wrote to the Emperor: ". . . . Although it would be impudent to submit repeatedly that this obstruction should be removed, yet owing to the fact that the things submitted have often come from our own army, there is a likelihood of disunion occurring among the imperial servants on the disclosure of these matters. Although the enemy is worthless, he might get scent of it and set his affairs aright. In the case of both these situations it is necessary to observe caution in my *'arzdāsh*t specially with a view to removing this obstruction from that side (i.e. Dilir)."¹²⁷

Dā'ud Khān and Qutb ud din Khweshgi exhibited recalcitration during the Bijāpuri siege of the Mughal post of Mangalbirā (3rd February, 1666): "As a big force along with the people of that side of the enemies was nestling under the forts of Sholāpur and Naldrug, waiting for an opportunity (to strike), if the victorious army went to the relief of the besieged of the fort (i.e. Mangalbirā) the Bijāpuris, distressed in their circumstances, might have entered the imperial territories and raised tumults. Accordingly I ordered Dā'ud Khān and Qutb ud din with Right (*maimanah*) and Rearguard (*chandawul*) wings to go to its relief; for the enemy was reported to have numbered not more than 5000 horse and 6000 foot. I, with two other armies led by Dilir Khan and Rajah Rāi Singh, was to have marched against the bigger (Bijāpuri) army (*fauj i kalān*). These generals wasted some days in vain discussions (*harf o hakaik*), and when strongly pressed, they flatly refused to go unless the Left wing (*maisarah*) led by Rajah Rai Singh was sent with them. I had no help but to consent to it. Allowing the three armies to depart, I had to stay behind myself, apprehend-

ing the bigger army of the enemy either to proceed towards this side or raid the imperial territories; in the latter case I would pursue them and chastise them adequately." That the Bijāpuris did not dare make a move and that at the approach of the three armies they raised the siege of Mangalbirā and retreated did in no way minimise the gravity of the crisis to which these two officers exposed the Mughal army. Jai Singh suggested to the Emperor their transfer and an enquiry into their conduct,²⁸ as "both of them adopted the same line and developed the same habit", and this might have a reforming effect on them. It is crystal clear that the unity of command in Jai Singh's army and his absolute authority were reduced to nullity in practice by his able lieutenants, who, by their disobedience and disloyalty, paralysed the army and lessened the chances of success of the imperial army.

Another sin of commission of Mughal officers dislocated the food supply of the army. The manner in which Jai Singh reported the matter to the Emperor about the disloyal negligence of the *qiladār* of Parenda shows his sense of helplessness and despair at the sorry state of the Mughal army: "I am motivated by no other consideration than the performance of service to the empire in bringing an accusation against the servants of the Court. But I have been appointed to look after the management of the army (*ihtamām i lashkar*) and have to state facts. I had given an account of the facts about the *qiladār* of Parenda. During this time Saf Shikan Khān had gathered a large number of *banjāras* (grain carriers) and had sent them. Relying on this very thing, I had thought that, having made arrangements for the provision of grain, I would proceed to the accomplishment of the object in view. But this man (i.e. *qiladār* of Parenda) made no arrangements for the pacification of the *banjāras*. He did not keep them under control, with the result that they dispersed and went away. Now after great efforts twenty thousand oxen of the *banjāras* had been gathered and the grain is being spent day after day. Although he is being asked to keep an eye on the imperial *kārkhānas* and leave the camp followers near the moat (*khandak*) he puts forward excuses which are not worthy of credence. But the fact is that this is the place suitable for the provisions of such a kind. Sikandar was killed uselessly,

after having been brought from Parenda although he fought valiantly and ended his devoted life. If all these efforts had been made in proper time with a good force something could have been achieved. . . .¹²⁹

Jai Singh's army suffered not only from inadequacy in numbers, deficiency in artillery and war materials, discontent and insubordination among his lieutenants and gross negligence in supply of food and provisions, but its effectiveness as a fighting machine was undermined by what in modern terminology would be called 'Fifth columnists'. The gravity of the danger was heightened by the fact that the Mughal secret service itself, the agency to checkmate and nip such activities in the bud, was the hot-bed of corruption and hence utterly inefficient. In his despatch to the Emperor Jai Singh expressed his sense of despair as follows: "The fact about the couriers (*harkaras*) is, as remarked by the Emperor, that even the tenth part of their news is not in consonance with facts: and this is quite evident to the Emperor. Although there is none at Bijāpur who can detect the falsehood in their statements, yet the nature of their news and other signs of these ignoble and worthless people give clear proof that they are liars, selfish, greedy of gain and pro-Deccanis. For some time when the enemy forces were at a distance of ten or twelve *kos* from the imperial army it was repeatedly ascertained that the Bijāpuris bribed them into betraying to them all information about the imperial army, big or small. Whatever they say is against the truth. The presence of these people in the victorious camp is tantamount to giving the spies of the enemy access to us."¹³⁰

Jai Singh was thus placed in the uncomfortable and unenviable position of a corn between two millstones, one above and the other below. Above him there was a master, exacting, but suspicious and heartless, who ill-appreciated the fundamental weaknesses and practical difficulties of Jai Singh in the distant theatre of war and who was loath to accept the responsibility of his own orders but ever ready to deride his veteran and loyal general and to doubt his bonafides. Below him there were subordinates, who were discontented, disobedient and disloyal, flouting his orders or delaying action on them or indulging in negligent or corrupt and subversive action. No

general could expect to come out unscathed out of two such enveloping fires and to lead his men to victory in such stagnant and unpromising conditions. It is a sad reflection on the state of the Mughal army even during the life-time of Aurangzeb under a veteran commander of a hundred campaigns like Jai Singh. So far as Jai Singh himself was concerned, he had ungrudgingly borne the burden of responsibility for the expedition, dictated by imperial mandate but not advised by the general. He also assured his master that he would faithfully do so till the end of his life. But the whole burthen of his despatches was that the acceptance of responsibility does not necessarily mean that the stigma of failure should attach to him. It was an irony of fate that the person ordering the campaign should so shamefacedly shift his responsibility on to the shoulders of his agent. It would not be a matter of surprise if Aurangzeb, cut to the quick by the inexorable logic of these arguments of his general, thought it fit to remove the servant, however loyal, experienced and serviceable, who, by implication, had the impudence to ink his master's face.

Jai Singh's defence given during his life time is to be found in his despatches. After his death his posterior defence was given by Aurangzeb's own campaign twenty years (1685-86) later. Aurangzeb himself took eighteen months to beat the already dying state of Bijapur with the entire resources of the whole empire. Did Aurangzeb pause to ponder over the work of Jai Singh in Bijapur, then in an inestimably stronger state putting forward a more resolute defence and revise his judgment on that general?

1. Sarkar, *Aurangzeb*, IV. 1930 ed. ch. XLI.

2. Except a few lines in *ibid.*, 146-47.

3. *H.A.* 91b.

4. *Ibid.*, 89b., 90a.

5. *Ibid.*, 90a. For the strength of Shivaji's army, see Sarkar, *op. cit.*, 126-7.

6. *H.A.*, 90a-b. The idea of Aurangzeb's going personally to the Deccan in 1666 is wholly new.

7. *H.A.*, 90-b; Sarkar, *op. cit.* 145. *Shivaji's* plunder of Hukeri and Raibagh, *H.A.*, 91a. On account of devastation the revenue of *jagirs* would fall below the expected yield.

8. *H.A.*, 91a; Sarkar, *op. cit.*, 145.

9. *H.A.*, 91b-92a.

10. *H.A.*, 71a.

11. *H.A.*, 92a-b.

12. *H.A.*, 92b.

13. *H.A.*, 89b; Sarkar, *op. cit.*, 149.
14. *H.A.*, 92b.
15. *H.A.*, 93b-94a. The initiative in the Bijapur Campaign of 1657-8 was taken by Mir Jumla.
16. *H.A.*, 68a; Sarkar, *op. cit.*, 118.
17. *H.A.*, Sarkar, 126-128.
18. *H.A.*, Sarkar, *op. cit.*
19. *H.A.*, Sarkar, 121-126.
20. *H.A.*, Sarkar, 148.
21. *H.A.*, 73a. Jai Singh's impatience to start, referred to by Sir Jadunath Sarkar, seems to be due more to Aurangzib's goad than to his own realisation. Jai Singh's diplomatic intrigues, *H.A.*, 72a, 76a-77a; 78, 79; inducing Qutb Shah, *H.A.*, 78b; administrative arrangements in Mahuli, 73b-74a; Shivaji's territories; Diwan Safi Khan to administer, *H.A.*, 76a; for Shivaji, *H.A.*, 75a, 77b; postings of officers, *H.A.*, 71b-72a; favours to officers, *H.A.*, 72b, 73.
22. *H.A.*, 85a; Sarkar, *op. cit.*, 128.
23. *H.A.*, 74a; Sarkar, 127-128.
24. *H.A.*, 74a; Sarkar, 128-129.
25. *H.A.*, 78a.
26. *H.A.*, 81b.
27. *H.A.*, 82b.
28. *H.A.*, 93a.
29. *H.A.*, 93a-b. For Banjaras, Irvine, *Army*, 192.
30. *H.A.*, 89; Sarkar, 149.

SECTION IV. RECALL OF MIRZA RAJAH JAI SINGH AND HIS DEATH

An attempt has been made in this section to throw new light on certain episodes in the life of Mirza Rajah Jai Singh on the basis of the *Akhbārāt i darbār i mu'āla* or manuscript news-letters of the imperial court and the Dingal letters in Rājasthānī¹.

(i) *Recall of Mirza Rajah Jai Singh from the Deccan*

It is well known that Aurangzeb censured Jai Singh when he first retreated from Bijāpur in January, 1666. After his abortive second campaign Aurangzeb became angry and wanted to replace him by Prince Muhammad Mu'azzam as Viceroy of the Deccan. Further the Rajah was held somehow responsible for the conduct of Rām Singh, his son, when Shivāji escaped (Aug. 1666) from Agra. After finally retiring from Bijāpur to Bir (beginning of October, 1666), Jai Singh was ordered to return to Aurangābād.²

A Rājasthānī letter (18 October, 1666) states that Jai Singh left his rainy season camp on 27 September and set out for Aurangābād on 30 September, that a *farmān* regarding the continuance of the four Deccan *subahs* (to him) was received and that the Maharajah had arrived in the vicinity of Bir and was expected to reach Aurangābād soon. His ladies were expected to come from Burhānpur to join him.³

But there was delay in the return of Jai Singh as well as of some officers like Dilir Khān and Qutbuddin Khān who had been directly summoned to the Court. Both informed Delhi that they would go when relieved by Jai Singh. Their petitions reached the imperial court on Rabi II 7, year 9 (27 Sept. 1666, Thursday) and Rabi II 26, year 9 (16 Oct. 1666) respectively as we know from the *akhbārs* of these dates.⁴

The Emperor was getting impatient at the delay in the arrival of the officers from the Deccan. So on Jumādi I 9, year 9 (28 Oct. 1666) Jumlat ul mulk Ja'far Khān was ordered

to convey imperial orders to Mirza Rajah Jai Singh : "Previously Bakhshi Muhammad Amin Khān had written to you, according to which you should have allowed the amirs to start." This was entrusted to Dost Beg *Yasāwal* for quick delivery.⁵

On Jumādi II 17, year 9 (5 December, 1666) information reached Jumlat ul mulk (Ja'far Khān) that Mirza Rajah Jai Singh was sending according to orders, the artillery and other articles to the Presence.⁶

Jai Singh arrived at Aurangabād on Jumādi II 9, year 9 (27 Nov., 1666). The news, conveyed by him, reached the imperial court twenty days later, on Jumadi II. 29, year 9 (December 17, 1666). The Emperor asked Muhammad Amin Khān to send a reply to the Rajah.⁷ The Aurangabād news-letter conveying the news reached the court a few days later on Rajah 9, year 9 (December 26, 1666).⁸

To understand why the Emperor was so anxious for the quick return of Mirza Rajah Jai Singh and the imperial officers, we have to look to the events in the north-west and Persian frontiers. The attention of the Emperor had for sometime past been directed to a threatened Persian invasion. About the middle of September, 1666, the Emperor is stated (in a Rājasthāni letter dated 15 Sept., 1666) to be planning to go from Agra (on 9 Oct.) to Delhi and thence to decide about the march to Lahore and Kābul.⁹ The imperial envoy to Persia, Tarbiyat Khān, returned with a taunting letter of the Shāh, addressed to Aurangzeb, threatening invasion.¹⁰ Maharajah Jaswant Singh left for Kābul on 3 Sept., 1666, with Prince Mu'azzam committed to his care.¹¹ The Prince was sent in command of the advanced division of the imperial army to check the Persian menace.¹² The Emperor evidently wanted the Deccan officers to reinforce Jaswant and Mu'azzam. He himself started from Agra towards Delhi on 9th October, 1666.

Meanwhile the King of Persia had died on 22 Aug. 1666 and had been succeeded by Mirza Safi. This news reached Aurangzeb (at the hunting-lodge of Palam) on 12 December, 1666. He at once decided to postpone the expedition against Persia for the time being, as "it would not be generous and heroic to send an army against the country of Iran." So Prince Muhammad Mu'azzam was ordered not to advance beyond Lahore but halt there for some time.¹³

Subsequently Aurangzeb deputed Mu'azzam to the Deccan (along with Jaswant Singh) to relieve Mirza Rajah. The *Ma'asir i 'Ālamgiri* states that on 23 March, 1667 (7th Shawwāl, 10th yr. 1077) Prince Muhammad Mu'azzam was given *conge* as subahdār of the Deccan. Rajah Jai Singh was recalled to court.¹⁴ On Zikada 10, (24 April, 1667) a *farmān* was issued to Mirza Rajah Jai Singh through the mace-bearer, 'Aqil Beg, to this effect: "when Prince Muhammad Mu'azzam reaches there, you should return to the court as early as possible."¹⁵ Prince Mu'azzam reached Aurangabād in May, 1667. Jai Singh handed over charge to him.¹⁶

On Rabi I, 13, year 10 (23rd August, 1667) 'Aqil Khān submitted (before the Emperor) that Isfandiyār mansabdār, *Sazawal* accompanying 'Umdat ul mulk Mirza Rajah Jai Singh had informed him that the latter left Asirgarh on 23rd instant (13 Aug., 1667).¹⁷

It was by the end of August, 1667, that Aurangzeb disclosed for the first time his views regarding the future employment of Jai Singh after his recall. This information, contained in an *akhbār* of Rabi I, 21, yr. 10 (31st August, 1667) is completely new. The Emperor intended to depute Jai Singh to Lahore, from where Prince Mu'azzam and Jaswant had been sent to the Deccan. That is why the patience of the Emperor seemed to be wearing out at the delay of arrival of Jai Singh. On Rabi I, 21, year 10 (31st Aug., 1667) the Emperor asked Jumlat ul mulk J'afar Khān to write to 'Umdat ul mulk Mirza Rajah Jai Singh conveying imperial orders: "You have made considerable delay in coming here; it is not desirable (*khub na gardad*). Now come to Lahore quickly by forced marches and retrieve the previous dishonour (*talāfi i guzashta shawad*)."¹⁸

Why did Aurangzeb recall Jai Singh from the Deccan and intend to send him to Lahore in place of Prince Mu'azzam and Jaswant? Why did he not retain them in their respective places? Jai Singh, as is well known, pressed hard for his retention in the Deccan viceroyalty but all to no purpose. Perhaps the Emperor thought that Jai Singh would not be able to dominate the situation in the Deccan after his recent failure in Bijāpur. Even his assurances of getting Shivāji killed left the Emperor unmoved. Why? Did he still disbelieve the Rajah in relation to Shivāji? But Aurangzeb must

have been fully aware of the ability of the indolent Mu'azzam and fickle Jaswant. He must have been under no illusion regarding their eventual futility when pitted against the shrewd and elusive Maratha leader. Did he want to play a waiting game in the Deccan? Perhaps the Emperor changed the relative priority of the Maratha menace and the Persian menace. The Deccan might wait. But Persia brooked no delay. In a military encounter with Persia certainly the age and experience of Jai Singh, his energetic diplomacy and superior generalship would be immensely more effective than the weak military abilities of Prince Mu'azzam and Jaswant Singh. But the argument of the more imperative necessity of a Persian war fades when we remember that the subject was not pursued by the Emperor after Jai Singh's death at all. Whether the Emperor's plan was to utilise the services of Mirza Rajah in a duel with Persia or to send him away as a penal measure it is not possible to state with certainty in the absence of direct information. Either the old and experienced Rajah could be ready at hand for the resumption of an offensive against Persia or he would be in a state of comparative inactivity in Lahore or available for subduing the Afghans of the frontier if no such offensive was undertaken. But it is clear that the Emperor did not consider the recall of Jai Singh from the Deccan to be an end of his active political career.

But there was a will higher than that of the Emperor. The summons of Death proved stronger than the imperial summons. Jai Singh had already died before the imperial *farmān* could reach him.

(ii) *Cause of Death of Mirza Rajah Jai Singh*

There is considerable uncertainty about the death of Mirza Rajah Jai Singh I. Manucci repeats the *bāzār* rumour that Aurangzeb caused poison to be given to the Rajah on the road.¹⁹ Tod makes Kirat Singh the murderer of his father.²⁰

Sir Jadunath Sarkar writes that Udairāj, the Munshi of the Rajah, was suspected to have poisoned him and Kirat Singh wanted to avenge his father's death by dragging the renegade out of the house of Governor of Burhanpur and killing him, but failed.²¹

New details of the last days of Mirza Rajah Jai Singh are available from the *Akhbārāt*. On Rabi II 8, year 10 (September 17, 1667) the Emperor called Rām Singh during meal and enquired if full details of Mirza Rajah Jai Singh have been known or not. Rām Singh replied in the negative. The Emperor again asked, 'Has not Kirat Singh written anything to you?' Rām Singh replied, 'No, he has not written.' The Emperor remained silent.²²

Subsequently on Jumadi I, 22, year 10 (October 30, 1667) the Emperor asked Kirat Singh how the deceased Mirza Rajah got his wound on the leg. Kirat Singh replied: 'One day he was riding an elephant, when he slipped his feet on the steps and got wounded. As a result of this his leg was wounded. From that day his illness started. After a few days, by God's will, he died.' On hearing this Emperor remained silent.²³

The fact that the wound proved fatal so soon presupposes that the Rajah was a diabetic patient and so the wound quickly developed into a gangrene.

(iii) *Date of the death of Mirza Rajah Jai Singh.*

What is the exact date of the death of the Rajah? The '*Ālamgirnamah*' states: "On the 28th (month not given) from the news-letters of Burhānpur the Emperor learnt that Rajah Jai Singh has died in that city."²⁴ But the *Ma'asir i 'Ālamgiri* which is based on the above, states: "It was learnt from the letters of the reporters of Burhānpur that Rajah Jai Singh was coming from Aurangabād to the Court when on arriving there he died on 28th Muhurram Julus year 10" (10 July, 1667).²⁵ This date of the *Ma'asir i 'Ālamgiri* is evidently wrong, because its sole authority, the '*Ālamgirnamah*', does not specify the month.

In 1930 Sir Jadunath Sarkar stated: 'Broken-hearted from disgrace and old age, Jai Singh sank in death on reaching Burhanpur, on 2nd July, 1667.'²⁶ The source of this statement is not given. But in 1961 he corrected this date as 28th August, 1667, after the discovery of the Jaipur records.²⁷

In fact the confusion about the date of the death of the Rajah in the official histories of Aurangzeb's reign is dispelled with the help of the Rājasthāni records and the *Akhbārāt i*

darbār i mu'āla. The date 28th August, 1667, is authoritatively learnt from a Rājasthāni letter (of Saturday, 14th Sept., 1667); "Your letter has been received reporting that the Maharajah (Jai Singh) died on Asoj Budi 5, Wednesday, 28th August, 1667. It is a great calamity . . . (सो जो बड़ो अनर्थ हुयो).²⁸ The dynastic list maintained by the Jaipur State mentions 28th August, 1667.²⁹ 28th August, 1667, is 18 Rabi I, year 10. Hence Sir J. N. Sarkar writes: "The Maharajah having died on 18 Rabi I, 1078 A.H. (28 August) the news must have reached the Emperor on 28 Rabi I (7 September, 1667).³⁰ That Sir J. N. Sarkar was correct in his supposition is proved by the *Akhbār* of Rabi I. 28 year 10 (Sat. 7 Sept., 1667). It bears out that on that day the Emperor learnt of the death of Mirza Rajah Jai Singh. But the rumours of his death had already reached Kumār Rām Singh. The *Akhbār* is as follows: "Bakhshi ul mulk Asad Khān stated that Kumār Rām Singh had written to him—'It is rumoured that Mirza Rajah is dead. If the Emperor has any information and if it is true, please inform me so that I may be in mourning'. The Emperor replied: 'I have heard that Mirza Rajah is dead (*faut shud*). None can control Divine will. (*āz Khwāhish i Khuda chārah na dādah*). Let mourning be done. Please order other amirs to go there for condolences.'³¹

(iv) *Disposal of property of the deceased Mirza Rajah*

From the *Akhbār* of Rabi II 3, year 10 (12 September, 1667) we learn that before Mirza Rajah's death, the *diwani*, *amini* and *talugdāri* of Mewat etc. were given to Rai Dalip. Now this has been increased by 600 *Zat* 100 *suwar*, bringing the total to 1200 *Zāt* 200 *suwār*.³²

The Rajah's property was brought under the law of escheat. On Rabi II 2, year 10 (11th September, 1667) the Emperor ordered Asad Khān Bakhshi ul mulk to write to the *mutasuddis* of Mirza Rajah Jai Singh deceased (*mutawaffi*) conveying imperial orders that his property be brought with full care to the Presence (*āmwāl Mirza Rajah ba ihtāt tamām badargāh*) and that its seizure by Kirat Singh and others be strictly avoided.³³

There was one important change with regard to the

pargana of Tonk. Jai Singh had coveted Tonk for a long time. As early as October, 1658, we find the Rajah asking his agent Chemaji to try hard to obtain the pargana. After defeating Shivaji he got Tonk as reward. Formerly the pargana had been given in jāgir (valued at 1 crore 9 lakhs dams) to Rajah Rai Singh Rāthor. Later its value was raised by 11 lakhs and it was given in *tankhwah* to Mirza Rajah Jai Singh.

On Rabi II 21, year 10 (30th September, 1667) Prince Muhammad Mu'azzam suggested its restoration to Rajah Rai Singh after the death of Jai Singh. The Emperor ordered Jumlat ul mulk to give full details of the jāgirs of Rajah Rai Singh.³⁴ The suggestion of Prince Mu'azzam was accepted. On Rabi II 23, year 10 (October 2, 1667) it was ordered to be included in the jāgir of Rai Singh as of old. In return 1 crore 9 lakh dams from pargana Naulāji and 11 lakhs dams from pargana Barwāra was ordered to be converted to *Khālsa*.³⁵

On Rabi II (blank), year 10 (Oct. (?), 1667), the wakil of Maharajah prayed that pargana Rewāri was included in his jāgir in the past and later it was included in the *tankhwah* of Mirza Rajah Jai Singh. So the wakil prayed its restoration to the Maharajah. The Emperor's orders will be followed. Someone said that it was fit for inclusion in crownlands (*Khālsa*), and that it should not be given in *tankhwah*.³⁶

On account of the mourning for his father, the *saropa* was carried by a *Gurzbardār* to Kirat Singh. The latter petitioned for being asked to attend court. After nine days (October ? 1667) Kirat Singh came from Pargana Naulāji to the Emperor with Rs. 400 as present, which was remitted.³⁷

(v) *Favours conferred on Udairāj, munshi of Mirza Rajah Jai Singh.*

It is well known that Udairāj, munshi of Mirza Rajah Jai Singh embraced Islam and was entitled Tāl'eyār Khan. From a Persian *akhbār* it is learnt that on Jumadi I, 18, year 10 (26 October, 1667), the Emperor ennobled Udairāj Munshi with the title of Tāl'e'yār Khān and given rewards (*Sar o pa*). It was ordered that he should write to the Bakhshi ul mulk whatever he had obtained during the hunting (*shikār*) of Mirza Rajah Jai Singh. Afterwards the Emperor would confer favours on him.³⁸

1. These letters originally preserved in Jaipur State Archives are now placed in the Rajasthan State Archives, Bikaner. The value of these letters has been discussed in Sarkar, *House of Shivaji*. These have been translated there in part and also more fully by Sir Jadunath Sarkar and Raghuvir Singh, see Indian History Congress Research Series, No. 1, Rajasthani Records 'Shivaji's visit to Aurangzeb at Agra', Calcutta, 1963.
2. Sarkar, *Aurangzib* IV (1930), 146-7.
3. *Shivaji's visit to Agra*, Rajasthani Records (Sarkar & Sinh) Harnath to Kalyandas. Letter No. 52, P. 57). In view of the Emperor's displeasure it is not clear why the charge of the Deccan subahs was continued.
4. *Akhbarat* (Jaipur records) Now in Rajasthan State Archives, Bikaner, year 9, III. 69, 86).
5. *Ibid.*, year 9, IV. 99. Yasawal means an armed messenger.
6. *Ibid.*, year 9, V. 129. The manuscript is somewhat illegible here. The word may be read as cannon (*tophai*).
7. *Ibid.*, year 9, V. 136.
8. *Ibid.*, VI. 149, *Ibid.*
9. Rajasthani records (Sarkar & Sinh) Letter No. 47, P. 54. (Ballu Shah to Kalyandas). This is corroborated by Persian sources. Aurangzeb (at Agra) learnt from the reports of his spies that Shah Abbas II planned to advance to Khurasan to invade India. *Ahkam i Alamgiri*. English Tr. by Sarkar, 104, refers to news letter of Persia sent by Md. Sadiq, leader of merchants.
10. *Ibid.*, Parkaldas to Kalyandas dated 18 Sept., 1666. Letter No. 48, p. 54.
11. *Ahkam i 'Alamgiri*, Eng. Tr. by Sarkar, 104.
12. Sarkar, *Aurangzib* III, 45.
13. *Maasir i 'Alamgiri*, 58; Eng. Tr. (Sarkar). 38 : AN. 974, 984.
14. *Maasir i 'Alamgiri*, 40; Sarkar, *Aurangzib*, IV, 147.
15. *Akhbārāt* year 10, (1077 A.H.) II, 212.
16. Sarkar, *Aurangzib* IV, 148; *Shivaji*, (1961), 160; An Agra letter (Aungier to Taylor) dated 1 Nov., 1667, states that Sultam Azum (i.e. Md. Muazzam) had been appointed 'Separsala (Sipahsalar) or General in Rajah Jesson's place, he being lately dead. *Eng. Fact. in India* (1665-67), p. 287.
17. *Akhbārāt*, year 10 (1077 A.H.) VI, No. 358.
18. *Ibid.* year 10, VI, No. 364.
19. *Storia do Mogor*, II, 152.
20. Aurangzeb held the tempting offer of the *gaddi* of Ambar to Kirat Singh, if he had his father murdered. The Prince is said to have mixed poison in the Rajah's opium. Tod (Routledge & Kegan Paul), 1950 ed. II, 288; Sarkar, *Aurangzib*, IV, 150n.
21. Sarkar, *Aurangzib*, IV, 150.
22. *Akhbārāt*, year 10, VII, 385.
23. *Akhbārāt*, year 10, VIII, 425.
24. *'Alamgirnāmah*, p. 1051.
25. *Ma'asir i 'Alamgiri* p. 63; Sarkar (Eng. Tr. 41).
26. Sarkar, *Aurangzib* IV (1930, 2nd Edn.) 113, 148.
27. Sarkar, *Shivaji*, 6th edn. 1961, p. 160.
28. Rajasthani records Ajitdas to Kalyandas, letter No. 68, p. 64.
29. Sarkar, Eng. Tr. M.A. 41.
30. Rajasthani Records : (Sarkar & Sinh) 64n; Eng. Tr. M.A., 41n.
31. *Akhbārāt*, year 10, No. 374.
32. *Akhbārāt*, year 10, VII, 380.
33. *Akhbārāt*, year 10, VII, 378.
34. *Akhbārāt*, year 10, VII, 396. According to *Imperial Gazetteer* (Provincial Series, Rajputana) Tonk was conquered by Rajah Man Singh

but in 1642 it came to be occupied by Rai Singh Sisodia (p. 308). Tonk was situated in Pargana Ranthambhor. Ain II, 109; I.G. XXIII.

35. *Akhbarat*, year 10, VII, 398, Barwara in Subah Ajmer, Sarkar Ranthambhor. Sarkar, Ain. II, 109, 280. Is Naulaji the same as Nawai?

36. *Akhbārāt*, year 10, VII, 399. "Under the Mughals Rewari was the headquarters of a *sarkar*, but its raja seems to have been almost independent". I.G. XXI, 299-301.

37. *Akhbārāt*, *op. cit.*

38. *Akhbārāt*, year 10, VIII. 421.

PART TWO

TRANSLATION OF THE TEXT OF THE DESPATCHES

SECTION A

THE CAPTURE OF PURANDAR

Benares Ms. f. 53b/Sarkar Ms. 1: On 15th Zilhijja, 1075 (Monday, 19th June, 1665) information was sent through Ghāzi Beg, Mir 'Tuzak,¹ that at this time when the good news of the weighing ceremony² was in the air, the royal letter was received along with the special robe (expresses gratefulness to Emperor).

Account of Jai Singh's success: The apologetic and vanquished Shivā is now in a position to seek shelter in Your Majesty's mercy and forgiveness. I am placing before Your Majesty the account of the capture of the difficult fort of Purandar and also of the other strongholds.³

Shivāji sends agents to Jai Singh.—[Benares Ms. f. 54a/Sarkar Ms. 2] * May it please your Majesty ! After the arrival of the imperial army near Pābal, Shivā's agents began to visit me, and again up to my arrival at Poona they twice brought letters from him. But I gave no answer, and sent them back in disappointment. I know that unless a strong hand was laid on him, his words and stories would not contain a particle of truth.

* When he sent a long Hindi letter with a trusted officer named Karmāji, and the latter repeatedly entreated me saying "Do please listen only once to the contents of this letter and condescend to grant an answer", I listened to what Shivā had written. Its purport was, "I am a useful servant of the imperial threshold, and many services can be secured from my humble self. If the Mughal army turns to the invasion of Bijāpur, such a course would be better than undergoing the many hardships (of campaigning) in this hilly region (i.e. Konkan) of difficult paths and stony soil". I wrote in answer to Shivā, "The imperial army, countless like the stars, has been appointed in the South against you. Do not put your faith in your hills and stony country. God willing, it will be trodden flat with the dust by the hoofs of the wind-paced chargers of the imperial army. If you desire your own life and safety, place in your ear the ring of servitude to the slaves of the imperial

Court,—which (ring) is a source of glorification and honour even to your masters,—and withdraw your heart from your hills and forts. Otherwise the fate you will meet with will be only the consequence of your own deeds". After getting this sort of reply, he repeatedly sent me (further) letters. In a less proportion than he was put to hard straits (by our military operations), [Sarkar Ms. 3], he proposed to pay tribute and cede one or two places, which I did not deem valuable. My reply was the same as the one he had received (before). Eventually our troops captured the fort of Rudramāl⁴ [Benares Ms. f. 54b]. And I divided my army,⁵ sending Dā'ud Khān and Rajah Rāi Singh to plunder Shivāji's country, and appointing one party to guard the camp and to go rounds, and another party to forge and patrol—who were to remain constantly in the saddle,—so that the soldiers in the siege-trenches in peace of mind worked their hardest to accomplish their task, and I as far as possible looked after every place.

* As the result (of these arrangements) at this time Shivā declared publicly, "While Dā'ud Khān and Rajah Rāi Singh were out riding, as often as I planned to go and destroy the trenches by an attack, I found the soldiers so ready and prepared that if I had made my way into (their lines) my return to Rājgarh⁶ would have been very difficult".

* In short, as the siege of the fort was effectively conducted, five towers and one battlement (*kangurā*) were captured by us, his country was plundered by our cavalry, his troops collected in such a long time were seduced by us—because I had at this time by giving passports and promises of safety summoned to myself many of his cavalry and induced them to enter the imperial service with proper *mansabs* (military rank) and stipends of 10 or 15 (rupees), and (by giving them) 10 or 20 rupees above the promised rate, in cash from the treasury.

* I had also summoned 500 infantry under Khelo Bhonsla from Jāvli,⁷ and daily sought how to separate Shivā's army from him.

Alternatives before Shivāji.—* Shivā finding the state of affairs to be such, decided to choose one of these two alternatives ; first, he would submit his proposals to me and beg to be spared his life and property. [Sarkar Ms. 4] If this overture

were accepted, nothing could be better. If not, he would adopt the second alternative, restore a part of the Bijāpuri Tāl-Konkan to the Sultān of Bijāpur, join the latter and oppose the Mughals.

[Benares Ms. f. 55a] *Bijāpur's duplicity*.—* Trustworthy spies brought me the news that the Sultān of Bijāpur, while professing that the wresting of some *mahals* of his former Tāl-Konkan^a was a proof of his loyalty to the imperial cause, had secretly promised (to Shivā) every possible help and was posting an army of his own in that Tāl-Konkan, in order that the imperial forces might not desire to march thither.

Jai Singh's policy.—* When I learnt of this, it struck me that to render Shivā hopeless would only drive him into an alliance with Bijāpur. True, it is not very difficult for the victorious Emperor's fortune to conquer *both* of these wretched rulers. But if policy can accomplish a thing, why should we court delay (by resorting to force) ?^a

Shivaji's offers : Jai Singh's terms.—* Just then, about the middle of the month of Ziqada (say 20th May, 1665) Shivā's *guru* styled the Pandit (Raghunāth Rāo),¹⁰ arrived on a secret embassy, and stated Shivā's terms after taking the most solemn oaths possible among the Hindus. In view of what I have reported to your Majesty, I replied, "The Emperor has not at all permitted me to negotiate with Shivā. I cannot, of my own authority, hold conference with him openly. If Shivā comes unarmed, in the guise of offenders begging pardon, and makes supplication for forgiveness, well, the Emperor is the shadow of God, the ocean of his mercy may possibly flow (towards Shivā)". The Pandit went back and brought the message that Shivā would send his son to me in the above manner. I replied, "The coming of his son is neither proper nor acceptable". Then Shivā prayed, "Well, if you cannot publicly grant me promise and safe conduct (*qaul o 'ahd*), make the same promise in private, that I may go to you in reliance on it".

* With promise and engagement I fixed the terms of peace in his memory, thus: If after his arrival (in my camp) Shivā consents to obey the Emperor's orders, he would be pardoned and granted favours, otherwise, he would be allowed to return in safety to his home.

[Sarkar MS. 5] *Shivaji visits Jai Singh and offers to*



surrender Purandar.—*On Friday, Zilhijja 5, 1075 (9th June, 1665), the Brāhman went to Shivā; and on Sunday, Zilhijja 7 (the 11th June) one *prahar* of the day being past, while I was holding court, he brought the news that Shivā had arrived at hand in that manner, accompanied by six Brāhmans and some *kahārs* (bearers) of his *palki* (palanquin). I sent Udairāj Munshi and Ugrasen Kachhwah to meet him on the way and tell him that if he agreed to surrender all his forts he might come, otherwise he should turn back (thence). After hearing this message, Shivā said, "I have entered into the (imperial) service. Many (of my) forts will be added to the imperial dominions". Saying this, he came on in the company of the men deputed by me. I sent Jāni Beg Bakhshi to the door of the tent to conduct Shivā in.¹¹

* After his arrival, Dilir Khan and my son Kirat Singh, according to a plan¹² which I have submitted to your Majesty in another sheet (*band*), on getting a signal (or order) from me, assaulted and entirely captured the fort of Khadkala¹³ and tried to conquer the interior of the fort (of Purandar). The fire of fighting could be seen from my place. Shivā immediately on his arrival and inquiry (into the matter) offered to surrender fort Purandar. I answered, "This fort has been (all but) conquered through the exertions and valour of the imperial troops. In an hour, in a minute, the garrison of the fort would be put to our swords. If you want to make a present to the Emperor you have many *other* forts (for the purpose)."

Capture of the fort.—* He begged for the lives of the besieged garrison. So, I sent Ghāzi Beg¹⁴ with a servant of Shivā to Dilir Khān and my son, to take possession of the fort and let off its inmates. Your Majesty will learn from the newsletter the details of how the imperialists entered the fort and how the garrison evacuated it.

Terms of Treaty of Purandar, 1665.—* Then I lodged Shivā¹⁵ in my audience-tent (*diwān-khāna*) and came away. Through the mediation of Surat Singh Kachhwah and Udairāj (Udairāj) Munshi negotiations were conducted. Till midnight questioning and answering, entreaty and submission on his part took place. I declined to abate [Sarkar MS. 6] a single fort. Gradually after much discussion we came to this agreement: [Benares MS. f. 56a] that 23 of his forts, large and small, of

which the revenue was four lakhs of *hun*, should be annexed to the Empire: and 12 forts, large and small,—one of which was Rājgarh,—and the standard revenue of which was one lakh of *hun*, should be held by Shivā on condition of service and loyalty (to the imperial Government).

* Besides the above mentioned prayer, Shivā further requested, "Hitherto I had no wisdom and prudence, and have trodden the path of shortsightedness. I have not the face to wait on the Emperor. I shall send my son as His Majesty's servant and slave, and he will be honoured with the rank of a commander of 5,000 horses (the same number of troopers, each man with two horses and three horses) [*pañhazāri Zāt o pañhazāri Suwār do aspa seh aspa*]. Wherever the High Diwān's office assigns him a *jāgir* on condition of payment for six months, it will be accepted by me. He will constantly attend on duty. As for me sinner, exempt me from *mansab* and service. So long as I live I shall not draw my neck back from obedience to orders of service. Wherever in your Deccan wars I am appointed to any duty, I shall without delay perform it. If, out of Bijāpuri territory,—of which Bijāpuri Tāl-Konkan yielding four lakhs of *hun* is in my possession—some *mahals* of Bālāghāt, of which the total revenue is nine lakhs of *hun*, be granted to this newly purchased slave (i.e. myself) and an imperial *farmān* be issued to the effect that 'if at any time the imperial command is sent for the conquest of Bijāpur, the above *tāluq* would be left to Shivā',—then I agree to pay a tribute of forty lakhs of *hun* to the Emperor, by instalments of three lakhs every year.¹⁶ [Sarkar MS. 7].

Jai Singh's motives and actions.—* If I had first reported the above proposals to your Majesty and waited for a reply, great delay would have taken place. And Shivā, too, after discussing affairs wanted leave to return. If, in spite of my solemn promise and safe conduct (for life and passage) (*'ahd o qaul bā tan o āmdan*) I had by stratagem detained him, (there would have been two effects): first, [all] the chieftains of this country, Paligārs and Nāyaks, would have lost faith in the promises and oaths of your officers, which are firm like Alexander's rampart; and secondly, trustworthy informants had reported to me that Shivā before starting on his visit to me had made such arrangements about his household and forts

that in the event of his not being allowed to return from our camp his followers might give him up for lost and do their best to guard his house. In view of the above two possibilities, I considered it true policy to reassure Shivā, grant him leave to depart, and assent to his prayers. Next day I urged him to give up those forts. He sent one of his men to fort Rohirā ordering it to be vacated. I wrote to Rajah Sujān Singh to send his brother Indraman with a suitable force to take possession of that fort. Shivā deputed another servant to fort Lauhgarh, Isāgarh, Tanki and Tikonā, all [four] of which forts are situated on the top of the same hill close to each other, and are very strong and lofty. I wrote to Qubād Khān to hasten to this part with 1,500 cavalry from the force posted at Poona and take possession of the above forts. Halāl Khan and other men of the (Mughal) outposts also would accompany him. About fort Kondānā Shivā said that after leaving me he would deliver it to my son Kirat Singh, and then proceed to Rājgarh. Sending his son he would direct the evacuation of the other forts (by his men).

* On the [9th of the aforesaid month] 13th of June, as the public did not yet know [Sarkar Ms. 8] of his arrival, I mounted Shivā on an elephant and sent him with Rajah Rāi Singh to Dīlir Khān¹⁷ at the [Benares Ms. f. 57a] *māchi* of fort Purandar. On the 14th I presented him with an elephant and two horses, and sent him away with Kirat Singh. He begged hard for the full suit of the robe of honour worn by me, and I made him wear it, and ordered that after taking him to the quarters of Dā'ud Khān (for a farewell interview) they should set out for their destination. So it happened. At noon he reached Kondānā, delivered the fort to my son, and set off for his home, taking with himself Ugrasen Kachhwāh who was to bring Shivā's son away with him.

* On the 15th Shivā reached Rājgarh, halted there for the 16th, and on the 17th sent his son in charge of Ugrasen. They came to Kirat Singh in the evening of that day, and on the 18th arrived in our camp (*lashkargāh*) with him. I lodged the son in my own quarters as I had done the father. That very day came the news of the entry of Indraman Bundelā into fort Rohirā, and of Qubād Khān into forts Lauhgarh, Isāgarh, Tanki and Tikonā. I am sending the keys of these 7 [big]

forts, and (that of) the Khadkalā or Rudramāl to your Majesty by the hand of Ghāzi Beg. Now that his son has arrived, I shall depute men to take his other forts over, and after they have been occupied their keys also would be sent to your Majesty.¹⁸

[For the present a short account of the forts has been sent in haste. By the grace of God and good fortune of the Emperor the task which had engaged the victorious army for years has been accomplished in months and the situation has taken this turn.]

* I beg to present to you, as an offering of congratulation on this victory, the money that has been spent out of the imperial treasury in the operations for the capture of Purandar,—because the conquest of this fort is the first victory of the Deccan expedition, and my life and fortune (*jān o māl*) are at the service of the Emperor. [Sarkar MS. 9] I therefore, hope that your Majesty would graciously accept it, and the aforesaid amount would be credited against me.

Jai Singh justifies his policy towards Shivaji—*The real facts about the humbled Shivā's proposals are as follows:—

(1) True, he has got 12 large and small forts including Rājgarh. But even while he had *all* his impregnable forts and was besides aided by the king of Bijāpur, we succeeded through God's help [and his Majesty's fortune] in pressing him hard. Now that we have taken away from him the forts of Bālāghāt, such as Purandar, Rohirā, Kondānā, Lauhgarh and in Tāl-Konkan Māhuli, Muranjan, Khirdurg, Tāshul (?),¹⁹ etc., not one of which had hitherto been besieged and taken by anybody, and now that we have hemmed him round, like the centre of a circle, (with our possessions), if Shivā strays by a hair's breadth from the path of obedience he can be totally annihilated by us with the slightest exertion.

(2) The rank which I have recommended for his son is not high in comparison with the ranks procured by previous viceroys (of the Deccan) for his officers. If he be granted a *jāgir* in Aurangābād, it would be politic, as the resumption or continuation of the *jāgir* would be in our power. Concerning the territories of Bijāpur—of which Bijāpuri Tāl-Konkan is actually in his possession, and some other tracts of Bijāpuri-Bālāghāt are desired by him,—if your Majesty is planning to

punish him,—in view of his insincerity and alliance until recently with the enemies of the Emperor (i.e. Bijāpur), and his consent to accompany the imperial army in this very necessary expedition now that the time is favourable (to us),—what can be better than this that first we overthrow Bijāpur with the help of Shivā? Your Majesty's wishes with regard to Bijāpur should be communicated to me without the knowledge of anybody else, so that I may submit proper plans for truly carrying them out. [Sarkar MS. 10] It would be impolitic to make them public.

Jai Singh seeks imperial orders.—* Please state your wishes and send to me your reply to all the points of Shivā's requests. [Benares MS. f. 58a] The *farmān* which your Majesty would issue to Shivā should contain the statement that every promise and agreement which this old slave (*pir ghulam* i.e. Jai Singh) had made to Shivā was approved by your Majesty, and that after the forts had been taken possession of by the imperial officers and another despatch had arrived at Court from Jai Singh, a *farmān* giving details (of the terms granted) would be issued (to Shivā).

Jai Singh recommends promotion of Dilir Khān.—As regards the promotion of Dilir Khān, which matter is sent in a separate piece of paper, not known to anybody (i.e. as a secret enclosure to this), it is submitted that this servant (i.e. Jai Singh) knows the mind of your Majesty and, if anything else has occurred to your Majesty, you are the master of us, slaves. It is entirely in imperial hands to give promotion for good services or to withdraw favours as a penalty for remissness in service,—that also due to exigencies of time and circumstances. The promotion granted today may become *tankhwah* (salary) after six months. And again its *tankhwah* will accrue on the day of Sunday. And because many demands (?) made on the responsible person at one time cannot be recompensed for the present, the favour of promotion to the extent of one thousand horse for him is necessary. For this will lead to his elevation and also satisfy the heart of this servant. And it will induce others to perform service in imperial cause. The approval for the rank of 1000, which had been recommended for Qutbuddin Khān at the time of departure, has been accorded. But, seeing the state of affairs diffe-

rent here, I did not give effect to it, nor do I propose to do so. As for Dilir Khān whatever I considered necessary has already been submitted and I hope that this would be approved and that the offence of his replies may be pardoned, and the matter may be dropped. For the many secrets which this slave of your Majesty confidentially submits are such as to be necessary as a matter of expediency. Their disclosure is as clear as light to your Majesty.

Details of Capture of Purandar.—[Sarkar MS. 11]*I shall now describe the manner of the capture of fort Purandar²⁰. I had reported before this the affair of two towers (or bastions) and one *khengar* (?*kangurā* or battlement) of the fort of Khadkalā (which is the lower half of Purandar). Next a trench also was wrested from the enemy. This place was chosen as the *malchār* of the imperial troops; the enemy retired further behind and fortified another place of shelter. In the night preceding 11th June 1665 (*shab haftam Zilhijja*), the news reached me that Shivā professing submission would arrive at my place next day (*subh haftam*). In case he arrived, sending forth our men to fight and ordering them to make an assault did not seem good (to me), but it was necessary to give him a demonstration of the power of the imperial army, that a consideration of it might make him the more eager to tread the path of submission.

*Therefore, in the night before the 11th of June 1 sent word to Dilir Khān and Kirat Singh that by the next dawn they should carry the *malchār* of our heroic troops to a place which bears two white marks (in the plan sent to the Emperor), in front of the trenches of the enemy. It was appointed that as soon as the *malchār* would reach them, (our men) must engage in fight. Our men armed and extended their trench to the appointed place. The enemy immediately sallied forth from their shelter and began to oppose. A fight at close quarters took place. My Rajputs and Dilir Khān's men after a heroic fight beat back the enemy in front of them.

*The enemy began to flee from the fort of Khadkalā—on both sides of which were strong bastions and broad and deep ditches, and the path was so narrow that only one or two men could pass (abreast) with the greatest difficulty.

*At some places, where they made a stand in the course of

their flight, they came within the reach of our arrows and swords, [Sarkar MS. 12] many of them were sent to hell, and the rest fled, till they reached the first gate of the fort. [Benares MS. f. 59a] At this time my men and those of Dilir Khān, who had taken post in the *malchār* right opposite the *deorhi* of the gate and had by their artillery fire demolished the tops of the gates and bastions,—rushed out of their places and mounted (the wall). From both directions our heroes engaged the enemy with sword and dagger, and slew many of them. On our side, too, many were slain and wounded. The enemy fled towards the fort. Our men after much fighting got possession of two strong gates of the fort, and arrived before the third gate which, too, had been damaged by our artillery, and tried to force their way in. Just then Shivā arrived to offer submission.

Jai Singh's recommendations for imperial favour to soldiers.—The facts of his (Shivāji's) seeking safety and the conquest of the fort of Purandar have been submitted in the introduction. May His Majesty, the giver of many gifts, be safe ! The slaves who have put in suitable exertions—especially Dilir Khān, who is a life-giving slave of the royal Court and a very serviceable officer—are hopeful of receiving royal favours. It is hoped that everyone will attain success in having the favours of His Majesty in proportion to the services rendered by him.

The following letter was despatched on 17th Muharram (i.e. 20th July, 1665) through macebearers.

Jai Singh's gratefulness for imperial favours.—It is submitted that the *'arzdāsh*t containing thanksgiving for the receipt of the dignified *farmān* and the special robe of honour which had been sent previously by His Majesty through Mirza Beg to me, had been despatched through Ghāzi Beg. These two macebearers had been kept to ascertain news about the possession of the fort of Māhuli and other forts for which men had been deputed from place to place.

Capture of Forts.—[Sarkar MS. 13] * Among the men deputed by me to different places, Muhammad, the sister's son of Qutbuddin Khān, took delivery of fort Nardurg, Sayyid Hāmid that of Khāigarh (also called Ankolā), Hāji Alahwardi that of fort Marggarh (also called Atrā). [Meanwhile news came that] on the 18th Muharram, 1076 (21st of July 1665)²¹

Abdullah Shirāzi entered Māhuli, one of the famous forts of this country and having much of Ahmadnagar [Nizāmulmulkia] Tāl-Konkan under it. Forts Bhāndārdurg and Tulsikhul, close to Māhuli, were also occupied by us. I am sending to your Majesty the keys of those six forts [with the above mentioned mace-bearers].

Emperor urges expeditious work.—All these conquests have been effected through the grace of God and the favour of His Majesty, for many excellent forts have come into our possession and are being conquered. May the King of Kings be safe! In reply to the submissions of this slave, royal commands have been issued that His Majesty had effected the conquests of Zafarabād and Kalyani in the midst of the rainy season and that the writer (myself) should also do all that is necessary for the accomplishment of tasks and the people should not be left idle and without work.

Jai Singh's explanation.—The tasks which your sacred Majesty have performed and the achievements of ever increasing fortune which everyone in the world-embracing empire is credited with have not been seen by the eyes of Time nor heard by the ears of the World. How can the slaves comprehend all these? I, a slave, who in discipleship is the humblest and most deficient one, consider it as my perfection if I perform anything on the lines laid down by religion and the sayings of the guide and the real master (i.e. Emperor). There is no possibility of keeping myself and my people idle and indolent. During the rainy season in these [Benares MS. 60a ; Sarkar MS. 14] regions when small rivers and high unexpected floods make the place a limitless sea, how can one pass through such difficult seas? The exertions of earnest workers are not possible. I have persuaded people by holding out hopes and exciting their fears and showing favours and also referring to imperial wrath and favours to do service and capture the sky-reaching forts. Consequently six good forts, each of which might have taken at least one month for capture, would not have come to imperial possession, had not so much efforts and exhortations been made during such a rainy season. And further persistent exhortations still continue. I always pray to God, the Real Cherisher, that this insignificant atom should always render service according to the wishes of Your Sacred Majesty.

Jai Singh's recommendations for Dā'ud Khān and Jānī Beg.—On 19th Zilhijja (23rd June), I received with due honour the royal order which came through the *Dākchauki* and conveyed to Dā'ud Khān the congratulations on the receipt of the favours of Your Majesty as also the orders for the grant, as pay, of certain parganas in the suburbs of Hissār in lieu of the *tuyul* in the subah of Mālwa. He offered his salutations of thanksgiving for these royal favours. Then he submitted that the pargana of Jhind, comprising his original home and habitations, were inhabited by many of his relations and he did not see the possibility of collecting the necessary contingent for taking possession of these parganas. Accordingly he prayed for the grant of parganas of Sarsad and Bhattiwal pertaining to Hissar. Although this slave of Your Majesty does not know the characteristics of these parganas, whether they are in *Khālsa i Sharifa* or in *jāgir*, yet, if this is in the *jāgir* of somebody up to the pargana of [Sarkar MS. 15] Jhind, it will not serve as a compensation. He submits further that if these two parganas are granted as salary for the *jagirs* that he holds in Mālwa, great favour would be conferred on him. As Dā'ud Khān is a loyal and serviceable officer and is a friend who knows their temper, and who has up till now never hesitated in doing whatever has been asked of him from time to time and who has got a good contingent under him, I also make my request on his behalf.

Jānī Beg, the paymaster of forces (*bakhshi i lashkar*), has up till now, exerted his utmost in accomplishing whatever I have commissioned him about the royal affairs within his jurisdiction. It will be in fitness of things if such a *bakhshi* of the royal forces is given the title of *Khān* but I hope that he will be favoured with promotion and title suited to his position. As regards the other servants, I would make my submissions later whatever I feel about their exertions and good work.

*'Arzdāsh*t : It is hereby submitted that the letter of the *Bakhshi ul Mulk*, Muhammad Amin Khān, which was written in accordance with the orders of Your Sacred Majesty, was received on 11th Muhurram (14 July, 1665). Let the life and soul of the slave be a sacrifice for the *farmān* of the world-obeying Emperor!

Jai Singh's explanation for delay.—As regards the delay which has occurred and been referred to by Your Majesty it has

really been the case. I admit my faults. I had no leisure for a moment because of the coming of Shivā and seeing him in a devoted mood, the capture of the fort of [Sarkar MS. 16] Purandar, the departure of Nisār Beg, the macebearer, and the despatch of the 'arzdāsh̄t [Benares MS. f. 61a] through Ghāzi Beg, the mace-bearer, after an interval of 8 days, ascertaining the affair of the capture of the forts such as Kondānā, Rohirā, Lauhgarh etc, bringing the son of Shivā after his departure,—each work being related to the other,—and in the end, the coming of his son. Composure of mind was necessary for writing the 'arzdāsh̄t, which was to comprise these topics. It was for this reason that the delay has occurred. Afterwards, when the affairs were settled on the lines indicated in details in my previous letter, Ghāzi Beg was sent to the Court. If, on account of the excessive rains and flood, delay occurs in his reaching there, it is beyond control and may be treated as a heavenly thing. The slaves do commit mistakes. But the kings are not only forgivers of offences but bestower of gifts as well.

Jai Singh's further explanation.—'Arzdāsh̄t : I acknowledge receipt of the letter of *Bakhshi ul Mulk*, Muhammad Amin Khān, containing the royal orders and sermons. As regards the order of the punishment of every one of the royal servants who commit some faults, and particularly of Subh-Karan,²² who, despite his remissness in service has not been punished, and about the reduction of whose rank by 500 royal orders have been issued, I admit my faults. No such dereliction of duty will occur in future. Further, the imperial order about not proposing *mansabs* for men of auxiliary forces (*Kumākis*) and stopping this practice will be carried out.

Your slave has been relieved from the troubles from these [Sarkar MS. 17] people by the grace and foresight of Your Majesty. Orders re : the bestowal of the increase of one hundred *zāt* and 150 *suwār* on the mansab of Udit Singh Bhādauria, the approval of the promotion of 100 *suwār* on the mansab of Turktāz Khān,²³ the enforcement of the royal order about the delivery of the approved proposals about the *mansab* and promotion of those deputed to the Deccan, had been issued in these respects in the name of the *Bakhshi* of the forces to the *wakil* of your slave, and I regard it as a mark of imperial grace and favour.

How Shivā is surrounded.—As regards the *farmān* issued about calling Akrām from fort without informing the Prince,²⁴ I plead guilty and promise that never will such a thing recur. But the reason for summoning him was this: The affair of the transaction of Shivā is not unknown to Your Majesty; so long as due search was not made from every side and the path of his shortsightedness was not blocked, it was not possible that he would show his helplessness. His journey through Nardrug, Māhuli, Kohaj, through the zamindaris of his neighbourhood and Rāmnagar²⁵ and Lakhidar (Lakdar ?) to attack Surat was obvious. After the arrival of your slave (i.e. myself) at this place, the despatch of Netu²⁶ by Shivā with an intention of creating troubles in that region and the deputing of Bhojrāj Kachchwa with a suitable force to repulse him must have been known to Your Majesty. To set the mind at ease from that side and for capturing the fort of Māhuli etc. from the path of the *zamindārs* who are united with one another Akrām was written to, (to the effect that) as he was acquainted with the ins and outs of the land he should, having set his mind at rest in all respects from the side of Hātghadh bring, one by one, the brothers and sons of the aforesaid *zamindārs*, so that, through them, the *qaul* and agreements with the *qiladārs* of Māhuli and Kohaj might be sent. [Sarkar MS. 18: Benares MS. f. 62a]. In this respect the good fortune of His Majesty did its work, and the capture of the said forts without much trouble was effected. As regards the fort of Hātghadh, there was no room for apprehension. This was the reason of his calling him and he was not at fault in this respect. I hope that the reduction of 10 *suwār* in his *mansab* would be restored.

Qiladārs to be deputed to captured forts.—As regards the other orders about deputing the *qiladārs* to the captured forts, action will be taken, according to the royal command and the particulars will be submitted in a later '*arzdāsh*t.

Emperor rewards Jai Singh and other officers.—'*Arzdāsh*t: I have to acknowledge receipt of the royal letter sent through Ghāzi Beg on 1st Safar (3rd August, 1665). I have been elevated by being given the promotion of 2000 *suwār seh aspa du aspa*, a sword which is of the finest quality and unique, there being perhaps no equal to it. I regard this as a special gift meant for this sincere slave, who has also received an elephant with silver

trappings besides a she-elephant. Rich robes have been conferred on Dilir Khān, with an increase of 1000 *suwār*; and Dā'ud Khān, Rajah Rāi Singh and Kirat Singh, the child of the slave, have received an increase of 600 *suwār*; and [Sarkar MS. 19] two caskets of Jahāngiri *otto (itr)* have been delivered to Rām Singh, my son, for this humble slave. I feel weighed down by these great favours and it is beyond me to render the thanksgiving that is due. With the help of the increasing good fortune and good services, many difficult transactions which require much time are being accomplished in the shortest possible time.

Emperor accepts Jai Singh's recommendations.—The guaranteeing of the life of Shivā and the acceptance of his pleadings on the requests of this slave, pardoning of his crimes and sins, have been due to the excessive favours and generous forgiving nature of my lord of this world and the next. The acceptance of what has been written about the *mansab* and *jāgir* of his son may be taken as a supplement of the favours of the world-conquering master. I, your Majesty's humble slave, offer my respectful salutations and thanks-giving for accepting my submissions. 23 forts which have been annexed to the imperial territories²⁷ from this newly purchased slave (i.e. Shivaji) through the grace of Good and the good fortune of His Majesty are all in possession of the slaves of the everlasting empire; [Sarkar MS. 20 Benares MS. f. 63a] and he has shown utmost obedience and willingness in yielding their possession.

Occupation of other forts.—*After this the imperial officers on different dates got delivery of forts Kuhaj, Basant, Muranjan, Nang, Karnālā, Khirdurg, Songarh²⁸, and Māngarh. The keys of these 8 forts and two other keys of the Khandkalā near Kondānā and of Rudramāl,—are sent to Your Majesty.

Expenses involved in Capture of Purandar offered by Jai Singh.—*In the capture of Purandar Rs. 30,000 in cash had been spent out of the imperial treasury. The price of the ammunition, such as shot and powder, which was spent from the imperial stores, will be reported later.

This will pass before Your Majesty's eyes.

Next, about the expenses incurred in the capture of the fort of Purandar, which is the beginning of the conquest of the

other forts of the southern regions, this slave has offered the *peshkash* and royal orders have been issued that after the deficit has been ascertained from the *'arzdāsh*t of the *diwān i lashkar*, whatever *farmān* is issued, it should be given effect to. May Your Majesty remain safe! I would submit in a suitable manner a note about the said expenses. It has already been reported that Rs. 30,000 cash from the royal treasury was spent and the price of things such as shot, gun-powder etc. spent directly from the royal *Karkhānas* would be sent afterwards. The *diwān* of the army has been exhorted to submit the particulars. May the life and soul of your slave be sacrificed for your auspicious head! What to speak of wealth! Everything is from Your Majesty and Your Majesty's gifts. I hope that this little by way of *peshkash* may be accepted, so so that fresh blessings and limitless concessions may be the object of other works.

Posting of forces in the captured forts.—Orders had been issued about fixing contingents in proportion to the needs of each of the conquered forts. The facts of the case are as follows: The *sanads* for keeping 10,000 foot on terms of monthly allowance according to the practice of the former *subāhdārs* of the Deccan had been received. Out of that from the [Sarkar MS. 21.] time when your slave arrived here, 5,500 men were present and I did not engage more than that in service. Even out of that 1,700 footmen who had been settled in the villages and *mahals* of the Deccan and whom Lodi Khān²⁹ had kept according to the *sand* of the Amirul Umarā and against the regulations of the Deccan, they were brought on the footing of conformity with the regulations and they were given less pay (*tankhwah*). From the day I consider the retention of these 2,700 foot of the rural areas in the conquered forts as inadvisable, they would be dismissed. Afterwards it would be better if the said footmen are sufficient for the conquered forts. Otherwise submissions would be made to the Imperial Prince that for the sake of the said strongholds he may send here out of the contingents of old forts which are (situated) more behind the frontier and where there is no danger. And for those places others would be deputed and he would having afterwards settled the affairs regarding the control and collection of stores and enjoined upon the *diwān* and the *buyutāt* of the army to sub-

fit an account of that, he would make his *'arzdāsh*t. There is much work here for intelligent and serviceable people, who are imbued with the zeal for work, honesty and loyalty. They have to be deputed here and there, particularly at this time when a big undertaking is impending. If four or five such serviceable and professional officers, of whom Serājuddīn is unemployed at Aurangabād, and three or four others are deputed, it would be a great favour and concession.

Jai Singh posts officers to captured forts.—Orders have been issued (by me) for entrusting the forts of Purandar, Kondānā, Lauhgarh, Rohirā and Māhuli to Manohar Dās Gaur.³⁰ The giving of remaining forts to other *mansabdārs* of the army would meet with your approval.—[Benaras MS. f 64a : Sarkar MS. 22] Keeping in view the need for speedy possession of the conquered forts, everyone was deputed to places far and near. Now, according to the *farmān*, worthy of obedience, the permanent appointments of fort-keepers would be made, and an account of it would be sent later. As regards Angad and others, the sons of the Bundelā, it had been submitted earlier that they were expecting to be enlisted in imperial service. If they perform any service, I would make my recommendations about them. Till now, I had kept myself informed about their affairs. As in the siege of the fort of Purandar they have rendered good service, I hope that they may be enlisted in the service of the Court. If the said Angad is promoted to the rank of 1000 *zat* and 500 *suwār* and Jām, his uncle, is given the *mansab* of 300 *suwār* and Chhatrasāl³¹ his younger brother is elevated with the *mansab* of 300 and 150 *suwar*, it would mean showing favour to your slave. I shall make my submissions separately regarding other servants who have put in their exertions in the siege of the fort. Whatever order is issued, it would mean cherishing your slave.

Jai Singh pleads for Muhammad Ibrāhīm.—(Imperial) Orders have been issued for reducing the *mansab* of Muhammad Ibrāhīm to the extent of 120 *suwār*. But this slave does not know his faults. If in going to Bijāpur, along with the embassy, some faults of his might have been communicated by somebody it would be opposed to facts. Your Majest'y slave (i.e. myself) has made enquiries. He has not done anything against the rules governing the people of the embassy. In fact,

the shape things have taken has been due to his going to the embassy along with his companions, otherwise the situation would have remained as in the past. In this circumstance, I hope that his rank would be restored. If, apart from the present service, some other faults might have been committed by him in previous service, which might have come to your sacred notice and on account of which the reduction has been ordered, you are the lord and master of your slaves.

1. "To preserve order in the audience-hall and its approaches, and to regulate the access of the public thereto, there were a number of guards (*yasāwah*), at whose head were several officers styled *Mir Tūzak* (literally, Lords of Arrangement). The first of these officials was one of the great officers of State, and it was his duty when the court was on the march, to fix the route, to decide on the marches, and to proceed ahead, select a place for encampment, and lay out the site of the various camps and the lines of shops (*bāzār*). When carrying out these duties, the first *Mir Tūzak* was more commonly known as *Mir Manzil*, Lord of the Stages." W. Irvine, *Army of the Indian Moghuls*, Eurasia Publishing House Private Ltd., 1962. pp. 190-191.

2. Weighing the body of the Emperor against gold and silver on his two birthdays according to the lunar and solar calendars was a royal prerogative. Aurangzeb stopped the ceremony in 1668. The 49th lunar birthday of the Emperor fell on 17th Shawwal, 1075/23rd April, 1665, and the 48th solar birthday on 25th Rabi II/25th October, 1665. *Ma'āsir i 'Ālamgiri*, 50, 52, 75, 81; Sarkar, *Aurangzib* III. 85-86.

3. Deputed by Aurangzeb to subdue Shivaji, Jai Singh arrived at Poona (3rd March, 1665) with Dilir Khān and vigorously pushed on operations. Shivaji visited him on 12 June, to surrender. This is the background of this despatch. See Sarkar, *Shivaji*, pp. 103-121.

4. Rudramāl is now called Vajragarh. Its possession was the stepping-stone to the capture of Purandar.

5. The disposition of the Mughal army is described in Sarkar, *Shivaji*, p. 113. Dā'ud Khan Qureshi and several other officers including Rajah Rāi Singh were posted at the postern gate of Purandar fort. But Dā'ud created mischief so as to cause the disgrace of Dilir Khān. So Jai Singh sent Dā'ud at the head of a flying column to ravage Shivaji's villages. *Ibid*, 115.

6. The Mughals marched towards Rājgarh on 30th April, 1665.

7. Jāvli, at the n.w. corner of Satara district was conquered by Shivaji in 1656. *Ibid*, 41-44.

8. Mul Kokan of the ms. is Tāl-Konkan, the coastal low land at the foot of the Western Ghats, while the high land on the top is the Bālāghāt. The Nizām Shāhis of Ahmednagar and the 'Adilshāhis of Bijāpur divided these territories in 16th-17th centuries, the northern and the southern parts being held respectively by them. On the collapse of Ahmadnagar, its territories were seized by its neighbours. By the treaty of 1636 between the Mughals and Bijāpur, the latter obtained Nizām-Shāhi Tāl-Konkan and Bālāghāt. 'Adil Shāh had agreed to cede it to the Mughals in 1657 but refused to do so during the War of Succession among Shahjahan's sons. Bijāpuri occupation was, however, never effective. Many places therein had been occupied by Shivaji before 1665. Sarkar, *Aurangzib*, vol. I. chs. 2 and 3; *House of Shivaji*, 147-148. *Haft Anjuman*, 67b.

9. This reminds us of Mir Jumla's policy. "Tasks there are, which can be performed not by war but by wisdom and policy" *Aurangnamah* by Haqiri, quoted in Jagadish Narayan Sarkar, *Mir Jumla*, 155.

10. Raghunāth Ballāl Atré, Shivaji's minister. Sarkar, *Shivaji*, 122 and f.n.

11. 'The Rajah advanced a few steps, embraced Shivā, and seated him by his side, while armed Rajputs stood around to guard against any treacherous movement on the part of the slayer of Afzal Khan!' *Ibid.*

12. It was conceived by Jai Singh to overcome 'any lingering reluctance' on the part of Shivaji to surrender.

13. The word *khadkal* means 'a rocky plateau' according to Molesworth (quoted by Sarkar, *Shivaji*, 113 n). Also written as *Khandkalā*. Purandar consists of two forts, one upper or citadel, and a lower (or *māchi*), 300 ft. or more below. "The latter is a ledge running round the waist of the hill. . . . On the north side the ledge widens out into a broad terrace bounded on the east by the high spur named Bhairab Khind, which starts from the base of the steep overhanging north-eastern tower (called *Khad-Kalā* or the Skyscraper) of the upper fort, and runs for about a mile eastwards in a narrow ridge, ending in a small table-land (3,618 ft. above sea-level), crowned with the fort of Rudramāl, (now called Vajragarh). *Ibid.* 112-113.

14. The Mir Tuzuk was sent with an officer of Shivā 'to order the garrison to capitulate. They begged respite for the night'. (*Ālamgirnamah*, 903, quoted in *Ibid.*, 123).

15. Shivāji had come without any baggage of retinue. So Jai Singh treated him as his guest, but was conscious of the strength of his position and adopted a stiff attitude over the terms of the Treaty of Purandar.

16. This was a conditional engagement of Shivāji, who was expected to wrest these Bijāpur territories with his own men. Jai Singh thus shrewdly threw an apple of discord between Shivāji and 'Adil Shāh. It was virtually a Mughal-Maratha agreement for the partition of Bijāpur territory, as pointed out by Sir Jadunath Sarkar. But it was much more than that, is explained in the Introduction.

17. This was done to soothe Dilir Khān, deprived of the chance of victory at the conclusion of the treaty. See *Shivaji*, pp. 124-126.

18. By the Treaty of Purandar the following forts were surrendered to the Mughals:—(a) *in the Deccan*: (1) Rudramāl or Vajragarh, (2) Purandar, (3) Kondāna, (4) Rohirā, (5) Lohgarh, (6) Isāgarh, (7) Tan'ki, (8) Khadkalā near Kondāna, (9) Tikonā; (b) *in Konkan*: (10) Māhuli, (11) Muranjan, (12) Khirdurg, (13) Bhandārdurg, (14) Tulsi-Khul, (15) Nardurg, (16) Khaigarh or Ankolā, (17) Mārg-garh or Atra, (18) Kohaj, (19) Basant, (20) Nang, (21) Karnāla, (22) Songarh and (23) Mangarh. Sarkar, *Shivaji*, 126. Number of forts surrendered was 20, acc. to Rajwade, followed by Ranade. See Nadkarni, *Rise and Fall of the Maratha Empire*, 1966, 64n. Not supported by the Despatches.

19. Text has Tāshul. From *Ālamgirnamah* (905) this is to be read as Tulsikhul. The following twelve forts were retained by Shivāji—Rājgarh, Tornā, Rāiri, Lingānā-garh, Mahār-garh, Pālī-garh, Ghosālā, Āsheri, Pālgarh, Bhorap, Kumāri and Udaidurg. For their location, see Sarkar, *House of Shivaji* (Second edn.), 152.

20. See Sarkar, *Shivaji*, 112-123.

21. Delhi Ms. reads 10th Muharram (i.e. 13th July), which appears to be correct. As the latter is dated 17th Muharram, it cannot refer to events of 18th.

22. Subh-Karan Bundela was disloyal. Though deputed to watch the postern gate of Purandar, he favoured the Marathas. *Shivaji*, 115.

23. He was the chief of the artillery.

24. Prince Mu'azzam, Viceroy of the Deccan. He left for the imperial court after giving charge to Jai Singh in Nov. 1665.

25. in Koli country in N. Konkan. See Sarkar, *Shivaji* (5th ed.), 95.

26. Netāji Pālkar, kinsman and *Sar-i-naubat* (master of the horse) of Shivāji, regarded as 'a second Shivāji' by the Deccanis. On account of a rupture with Shivaji in January, 1666, he joined the Bijāpuris. He was arrested and sent as a prisoner to Delhi under orders of Aurangzeb. Later on the embraced Islam and was sent as a soldier to Afghanistan (1667). He returned to Shivāji in 1676 and was "remade a Hindu". See Sarkar, *Shivaji*, 57, 128, 131-133, 157, 285.

27. See f.n. 15 ante.

28. Text has (Solgarh) which is an error.

29. Ludi Khan, the *faujdar* of Konkan. Sarkar, *Shivaji*, 166.

30. Nephew of Rajah Bithal Dās of Shāh Jahān's time; he defended the fort of Māhuli in N. Konkan in 1670 till the last for the Mughals against Shivāji.

31. He was the son of Champat Rāi Bundelā. Subsequently he deserted the Mughal army and offered to serve under Shivāji. The latter, however, advised him to rebel against Aurangzeb. See Sarkar, *Shivaji*, 180-1; *Aurangzeb*, ch. 61. Angad was Champat's second son.

SECTION B

THE BIJAPUR CAMPAIGN

[Sarkar MS. 23] *Emperor commissions Jai Singh to lead Bijāpur Campaign: Its prerequisites.*—The gracious *farmān* re: the Bijāpur expedition¹ has been issued. What else is more conducive to felicity than that by the grace of God and the good fortune of the Emperor, such service is entrusted to this old slave? As regards accomplishing this task during this interval of two months whatever is necessary would be submitted. For the present, it is necessary to get together the means of taking the fort and collecting all kinds of war implements:

(i) *Efficient Artillery*: I am first making my submissions about the cannon. They tell us of the *Mālik Maidān* cannon and many other cannon present in the fort of Bijāpur. In order to render them useless, and to accomplish the task (of conquering Bijāpur), if forty to fifty cannon be present in the (imperial) camp it would serve the purpose of the servants of the court. But there should be not less than thirty cannon. Out of the ten cannon which were in the camp, three were left in the fort of Purandar, as they were not very serviceable, and I would take seven cannon with me. Five other cannon which had been sanctioned by the Court may reach here very soon. Five cannon had been brought by Saf Shikan Khān from the fort of Daulatābād and he was thinking of sending the same. But after the accomplishment (? announcement) of this expedition it was postponed. They give indications of the presence of five or six cannon in Burhānpur and it would be the duty of Dā'ud Khān to transport them. The total comes to twenty-two cannon. I pray that a *farmān* may be issued in the name of Saf Shikan Khān for doing this work. And although other cannon from the subāhs of the Deccan may not be on the way, all the cannon with their equipments such as shots and powder and rockets (*bān*) [Sarkar MS. 24] and other artillery requisites (*masalah i topkhanah*) which may be necessary should be collected together and sent.²

(ii) *Supply of Provisions*.—[Benares MS. 65a] He (Saf Shikan) should also busy himself in despatching provisions regularly in such a way as to fulfil the seeds of your servants⁵

(iii) *Adequate number of mounted musketeers*. The mounted musketeers (*sawārān i barqandāz*) required for such an army for such an expedition are very few. Whatever number of them is allowed from the court it would be helpful in carrying out the imperial order. There is no necessity of other gunners besides those who are posted to guard the treasury and other royal *Kārkhānas*.

(iv) *Mulla Ahmad to be won over*.—Long live Your Majesty! The letters of Muhammad Amin Khān written according to His Majesty's orders about Mulla Ahmad⁴, the brother of Mulla Yahya, have been received to the effect that his being outside the transactions of 'Ādil Khān is tantamount to his interference with the affairs of *peshkash* on several occasions. (In other words, the fact that he has been separated from 'Ādil Khān is not of much advantage as it has produced a thousand troubles as regards the payment of *peshkash* etc.). His intentions have been communicated to His Majesty and he would be summoned to the Court. May the Emperor be safe !

(v) *'Ādil Khān's alliance with Shivāji to be undermined*.—Before this His Majesty's order in his own handwriting had brought the news that if at that place he was found serviceable it would be better; otherwise after his arrival, he would be exalted with the *mansab* which had been proposed by the *Amirul Umara*. On learning the contents of His Majesty's words, Mulla Ahmad repeatedly said that if he had any say in royal affairs he could not perform any service. The service which was there in view was to break the alliance between 'Ādil Khān and Shivā for, except the said Mullah, (*all other ministers in that place had refused to urge this pro-Mughal policy on their master). Accordingly, message of this affair had been sent to 'Ādil Khān. After the arrival of Muhammad Ibrāhīm and the other persons sent by me (Jai Singh) and the intervention of Mulla Ahmad, only this much transpired that 'Ādil Khān sent away the *wakil* of Shivā, (i.e. from his Court) and considered it advisable for himself to send his own contingent—towards Mulkokan (Tal Konkan i.e. fight the Marathas). I gave them

advice about the breaking off with Shivā in agreement with Mulla Ahmad. Although I opened correspondence and showed willingness to enter into agreements, [Sarkar MS. 25] I did not encourage him and said in reply that in the matter of Bijāpur no orders had been issued to me to enable me to give the *qaul* (agreement)⁵.

Mughal diplomacy at Bijāpur.—Now that the royal mandate arrived about the said expedition, the Mulla, having summoned Khurram Sāhib, said that orders had been issued that the affair of Bijāpur should be managed by a man of understanding. What would be better than this,—that things should be done in accordance with the desires of the well-wishers of the Court? Otherwise whatever might be possible he should do. As Shivā came himself and ascertained his affairs, the arrival or summoning of 'Ādil Khān himself was not proper. And among the nobles of the said Khān, such as Bahlol⁶ or Shāhu Bhonsla,⁷ none remains who may be summoned. And Khān-i-khānān Mulla Ahmad Lāri had come before Mahābat Khān. Accordingly it is not proper that Mulla Ahmad, who is among the oldest men of the region, should send nominally any other person in whom he had no confidence and get the matter ascertained by him. Otherwise, as it has been ascertained from the writings of the *harkārās*, 'Ādil Khān, because of levity and short-sightedness, is preparing for sapping the foundation of his own state. It behoves the servants of the Court also to be alert about this move lest after the matter had reached His Majesty, they might incur His Majesty's displeasure on the ground that they were sitting idle even after receiving the information. The said Khurram had written to his master. My intention is having such parleys was this: (i) first, that Mulla Ahmad should be summoned, for he had been given hint of this affair. Mulla Yahya also, who expects to get favours in return for this service says that after his arrival at this place Mulla Ahmad would carry out whatever be the desire of the servants of the Court. His coming out from that place by any other method is very difficult.⁸ If 'Ādil Khān sends him for negotiation he will be watched in this place. (2) secondly, (Sarkar MS. 26/Benares MS. 66a). I *[sent Rama (a man of Mulla Ahmad) and Govind Pandit (Mu'azzam Khāni) to lull 'Ādil Khān to sleep by means of smooth words and false stories of peace]. If 'Ādil Khān

sends Mulla Ahmad with others, the facts would be stated, so that a *farmān* may be issued in the name of the Mulla. If he (i.e. 'Ādil Shāh) delays or hesitates this very thing would be the cause of expedition against him and of his overthrow. *[If 'Ādil Khān sends envoys to me and opens negotiations about *peshkash*, I shall demand an exorbitant tribute in one payment, the cession of Sholapur and other Nizāmshāhi mahals, Chincholi and other villages which are attached to Jafarābād together with other hard terms which he cannot possibly accept]*. An *'arzdāsht* would be submitted for the same. For the present it occurs to me that, subject to any modifications by your Majesty, the *peshkash* affair is a difficult job, and the *Jamā' Wasil Bāki*, real statement of accounts stating the rent, collections, balances and arrears relating to the tribute (*peshkash*) of Bijāpur is not to be found with anybody here. Whatever has been ascertained from the writings of the *harkārās* and the *gomashtās* of Himmat Rai, employed in Bijāpur, is this: about seven lakhs in *hun* cash and besides that six boxes full of jewellery have been lying for a long time with Muhammad Sādiq. Regarding this matter, the Prince imperial was requested in an *'arzdāsht* to order him to send whatever was there, either to Aurangābād or to me, your slave. I do not understand the reason for guard over the amount of *peshkash*, which is actually within grasp and is required by the royal servants, for such a long time, in such an [Sarkar MS. 27] alien country. What is the royal mandate about Muhammad Sādiq and Muhammad Ibrāhim and the Brahman *harkārās*? [Benares MS. 66b]. They would be sent for before the army is on the move. For the present they have been left there. If they are not left there, the Vakils of 'Ādil Khān, as their substitutes, would be held (as sureties) or they may be dismissed. For whichever of these things orders are issued, I would act accordingly, specially in regard to Muhammad Sādiq, about whom people say different things. I do not know whether he enjoys the confidence of the Court or not. If I am informed of His Majesty's wishes, I may take him into my confidence.

May your Majesty be safe! I am submitting to Your Majesty whatever has been ascertained from the writings of Jumlat-ul-mulk Jafar Khān about the orders relating to certain *abwābs* connected with Shivā (*abwāb i tālluqa i Shivā*).

1. See Sarkar, *Shivaji*, 126-33; *Aurangzib*, IV. ch. XLI. Jai Singh started from Purandar for the Bijāpur campaign on 20th November, 1665. Besides the imperial forces and local auxiliaries there was the Maratha contingent led by Netāji. Jai Singh wanted to utilise Shivaji in capturing forts and making diversions in Bijāpur. The subsequent paragraph headings have been given by me.

2. See *Aurangzib* IV. 107-8.

3. See also *Haft Anjuman* 74a; Sarkar, *op. cit.*

4. He was the second leading noble of Bijapur, being next to 'Abdul Muhammad, prime minister. He belonged to the Navāiyat clan. He was the most eminent of Bijāpuri deserters. As early as 1656 Aurangzeb wanted Mīr Jumla to placate him. To imitate the career of Mīr Jumla he had been coquetting with the Mughal Governor of the Deccan since 1661. Setting a high value on his adhesion to the Mughal side, Jai Singh secretly won him over. He offered to guide the Mughal invasion of Bijapur in return for getting a high post in the Empire. The Emperor called him. (see f.n. 6 below). He interviewed Jai Singh near Purandar (29th September, 1665), was created a commander of 6000, and given 2½ lakhs, but died at Ahmadnagar on his way to Delhi (December, 1665). His younger brother, Mulla Yahya had joined the Mughals in December 1663. Sarkar, *House of Shivaji* (Second edn.), 99-100; *Aurangzib*, IV. 104; Jagadish N. Sarkar, *Mīr Jumla*, p. 116.

5. "Jai Singh tried to throw 'Adil Shāh into a sense of false security. To the Bijāpuri envoy in the camp he pretended that he had received no order to invade Bijāpur but only to settle the long-standing question of tribute unpaid." Sarkar, *Aurangzib*, IV. 105.

6. Bahlol Miāna, an Afghan commander and jāgirdar of Balāghāt under Shāh Jahān, left Mughal service in 1629 and fought for Sri Ranga Rāyal (1647). On the latter's defeat Bahlol joined Bijāpuri service and rose to be a leading noble. His two sons succeeded to the title of Bahlol Khān ('Abdul Qādir or Bahlol II and 'Abdur Rahim or Bahlol III). Bahlol III died in July, 1665, and his son 'Abdul Karim was made Bahlol IV by the Sultān. So 'Abdul Muhammad, son of Bahlol II joined the Mughals (Nov. 1665) and later was elevated to Mughal peerage as Ikhlās Khān (1669). Sarkar, *House of Shivaji*, 94-95.

7. Shāhuji, father of Shivaji, died on 23rd January, 1664.

8. When Aurangzeb summoned the Mulla, the latter's problem was how to leave Bijapur with family without rousing the suspicion and incurring 'Adil Shāh's vengeance. This was arranged by Jai Singh. "Jai Singh cunningly wrote to 'Adil Shāh that as he had been ordered by the Emperor to investigate and settle the questions at issue between the Mughal and Bijāpur governments, the Sultān should send Mulla Ahmad, the chief of his nobles, to him to explain matters personally; and the refusal to send him would be regarded as a proof of 'Adil Shāh's contumacy and provoke an invasion of his country. Sarkar, *Aurangzib*, IV. 104.

9. "Indeed Jai Singh's secret correspondence fully bears out the Bijāpur historian's statement that 'Adil Shah sent envoys to Jai Singh, soliciting peace, but the Rajah, proud of his 70,000 troopers and numerous infantry did not listen to his request, and invaded Bijāpur (*Basātin us Salātin*, 377)". See Sarkar, *Aurangzib*, IV. 106.

SECTION C

JAI SINGH'S POLICY TOWARDS SHIVAJI

Terms of the Treaty of Purandar :

*Your Majesty has enquired,—‘What promises and agreements have been made by Shivā? What oaths, considered solemn by the Hindus have been sworn by him? How could you compose your mind about his (possible) bad faith [and deception (*tazuri*)] when allowing him to go away’? My liege! when I dismissed Shivā, I took from him oaths no stronger than which a Hindu can possibly take and the violation of which is believed to make a man accursed and doomed to perdition. We agreed to the following conditions :

* (a) Shivā should be content with the 12 forts, large and small, and land yielding one lakh of *hun* (i.e. 5 lakhs of rupees), which I had left to him as a mark of imperial grace and he should never act disobediently nor plunder the imperial dominions.

* (b) Wherever in the (*subāh* of) Deccan, he is ordered on a service he should perform it.

* (c) His son Shambhuji, with the rank of a Commander of five thousand [*zat and 5000 suwār seh aspa du aspa*] and accompanied by Netāji [Netu] who is surnamed the Second Shivāji, should (always) attend on the subāhdār of the Deccan.

* (d) If lands yielding 4 lakhs of *hun* in Tal-Konkan and [i.e. lowlands] 5 lakhs of *hun* in Bijāpuri [*‘Ādil Khāniya*] Bālāghāt (i.e. uplands) are granted to Shivā by the Emperor [Benaras MS. 67a; Sarkar MS. 28] and he is ensured by a *farmān* the possession of these lands after the (expected) conquest of Bijāpur (on which Jai Singh was about to set out), then he would in return pay [*peshkash jawāb*] the Emperor 40 lakhs of *hun* in yearly instalments of 3 lakhs.

[In the event of any change in this transaction, he (Shivāji) kept his hands on eyes, and opened the tongue of humility for performing the conditions. In the end he finished with these words : ‘If I deviate from these agreements, whatever is done by the servants of the Court for my ruin and that of

my family and children, it would be the result of my deed or conduct (*kār o kardār*) and the fruit of deviation from agreements and confessions'. At that time I, your Majesty's servant, said that the *farmān* for the bestowal of twelve forts and lands worth one lakh of *hun* has been granted by the grace of His Majesty on condition of his remaining firm on the straight path.]

*(e) 23 forts with territory yielding 4 lakhs of *hun* in Bālāghāt and Tāl-Konkan Nizām-Shāhi (i.e. the former territory of the extinct kingdom of Āhmadnagar) will be taken away from Shivā and annexed to the Mughal empire.

Jai Singh's arguments: [Benaras MS. 67a].—So long as he remains on the path of servitude no harm would be done to him by the slaves of the court re: the *abwābs* allotted to him. But after his deviation from the path of obedience, the servants of the court are free to do whatever they like for his overthrow. It would have become manifest to your Majesty that although that undignified fellow (*beshukoh*) pressed me, your slave, for oath,—and from other quarters also such pressure was brought upon me,—I, in my whole life, have never made my tongue familiar with oaths for my own purpose and at this time, keeping in view the royal affairs,—for the expedition has become protracted,—and realising from what had happened before and after my arrival the need of taking an oath, I thought it beneficial to the state to keep him under control, and therefore, I expect the favour of your Majesty. [Sarkar MS. 29] May you, the King of the seven climes, be safe!

Aurangzib's enquiry about terms of partition of Deccan. Jai Singh's review. Your Majesty has enquired from me on what terms the partition of the country had been effected during the caliphate of the late Majesty' when I, along with Khān Daurān Bahādur had been deputed to the conquest of forts of Ausa and Udgir and when Mukramat Khān had been sent to 'Ādil Khān. My liege! Out of the forts of Nizām ul-Mulk, the fort of Parenda with its dependencies and Sholāpur and Purandar in Bālāghāt and Mulkokan, extending upto the ocean, the half of which was within the jurisdiction of Nizām-ul-mulk and half of which was given to 'Ādil Khan. At the time when Shāhu Bhonsla, the father of Shivā, had been besieged in the fort of Māhuli, Khān i Zamān Bahādur had taken the fort of Junnār

etc. from him by entering into agreement with him and he left the fort of Māhuli with whole of Mulkokan to 'Ādil Khān. Shāhu was sent with Randaula to the Khān and having returned therefrom, he sought the audience of His Majesty. Whatever I remember has been submitted in this 'arzdāsh^t.¹

Again, royal letters had been issued that during the time your Majesty was a Prince,² and the forts of Zafarābād and Kalyāni had been effected, it had been settled that the *mahals* of Bālāghāt of 'Ādil Khān should be annexed to the imperial domains. The deceased Khān-i-Khānān marched to that side and wanted that the fort of Parenda and its dependencies which fetched a revenue of 5 lakhs 52 thousand *huns* and the Nizām Shāhi territories of Mulkokan, whose revenue amounted to 2 lakhs 72 thousand *hun*, should be brought under imperial possession. Meanwhile Shivā, getting scent of this, used all his cunning in capturing the fort of Parnāla (i.e. Panhala) and also in course of time the *mahals* of the 'Ādil Khāni Bālāghāt and Nizām-ul-Mulki Mulkokan [Benares Ms. f. 68a. Sarkar Ms. 30]. In these circumstances, the *mahals* which were in the *jāgir* of his father and were regarded his homeland are Punā and Chākan; besides these, whatever he has in his possession, belongs either to 'Ādil Khāni or Nizām-ul-Mulki (territory). Peace be on your Majesty ! Whatever had been ordered was consonant with facts. Rather Punā and Chākan also belonged to Nizām-ul-Mulk.

Jai Singh's proposal to use Shivāji against Bijāpur.—I had repeatedly brought to your Majesty's notice that Shivā is a *zamindār* and the pillars (props) of his *zamindāri* will not endure beyond a period of seven or eight years. At the time he had captured the fort of Parnāla (Panhala) and both he and 'Ādil Khān had voluntarily opened negotiations with the servants of the Court, if the exigencies of the state had permitted Shivā to be brought forward (*Peshwardar*) [i.e. used against 'Ādil Shāh], the affair of 'Ādil Khān would have been managed, and afterwards it would not have been a protracted affair, for the position of 'Ādil Khān in the eyes of the Deccanis is of a different kind, the position and condition of Shivā is different. Accordingly, I, your slave, after reaching Māhul, the *pāyān* (lowland) territory and the other parganas of Bālāghāt and Pāyānghāt

of the 'Ādil Khānis, which had passed into the hands of Shivā, considered it a favourable opportunity and resolved to capture the same which consisted of even plains. But 'Ādil Khān, before the arrival of this slave at Punā, had already taken those parganas from him and made them over to his own men. He made a show of loyalty and service to the Emperor but in reality he considered help to Shivā as security to his own territory.³

Jai Singh not in favour of a war with two enemies at the same time.—Although it was not difficult for His Majesty's forces to take effective action simultaneously against both these offenders (*tabāhkār*) yet what I, your Majesty's slave, had said in those spacious days (*Zamān Sa'ādat*) may be recalled by your Majesty that it was not advisable for the eternal empire to cause the two inprovident fellows to raise tumults all at once.⁴ Thousands be the praise of God that through the grace of His Majesty the affair of one has been very quickly accomplished and the transaction of another, God willing, will also be brought to a successful end in accordance with the desires of the well-wishers of the court.

Jai Singh's policy towards Shivāji. [Sarkar Ms. 31].—Next, your Majesty had observed that the location of the forts of Shivā, according to the opinion of some persons who know the truth, differed from the position of the other conquered forts. His Majesty came to know that out of 12 forts left in possession of Shivā, five forts, the particulars of which are given in a separate sheet, lie in between the imperial forts, and in view of the sedition and mischief of Shivā and his lack of reliability, it was not proper for them to be allotted to him, that they should not have been left in his possession, and the whole of that region should have been purified of the stains of his existence.

May the all-knowing Majesty, be safe! The intention (*niyat*) and resolution (*irada*) of your Majesty's slave had been bent on this: to erase the portrait of his existence from the tablet of Time; but (in spite of the resources and equipments which were available there) it required opportunity and time for displacing him and driving him out of that land and effecting the conquest of all these difficult forts. It did not behove the victorious army to allow such patience and delay of so long a time in marching upon a person, whose sole cause of pride

and the ornament of publicity in every clime lies in the fact that his father was a servant of 'Ādil Khān and Nizām-ul-Mulk. It is quite manifest to those who are on the threshold of the exalted Court that when Jagat Singh Hādā⁵ despite his servitude to court and proximity of his home-land to the imperial capital, had the misfortune of taking to insurrectionary ways and a large force in the time of his imperial Majesty (Shāh Jahān) had been appointed to punish him, the royal standard was also moved behind, and eventually, by way of cherishing the slave his faults were pardoned. And the sons of Jādu Rai Deccani,⁶ despite his heinous crime—for he had turned his face away from loyalty and submission and joined the Deccanis and they killed him,—were granted through the favour of his Majesty the pargana of Sindhkhera [Sarkar Ms. 32 ; Benaras Ms. f. 69a] which is still in their possession. Thirdly, Shivā, who was at such a distance from the imperial capital and a worldly man as 'Ādil Khān as his helper and ally and who received considerable monetary help from Qutbul Mulk, although he was at a great distance from him and the other *zamindars* of this regime also were supporting him, has now,—lost hope from all directions, and bound his heart in service of His Majesty's Court. If, on the request of this humblest of slaves, he is granted fresh life by being given 12 forts and one lakh of *hun* from other forts and *mahals* of Nizām-ul-Mulk, it would not be beyond the royal grace and favours.

Bijāpur courts Shivā to send his brother's son:—Your Majesty might have learnt from the reports of the *harkaras* that 'Ādil Khān has been very earnest in his requests to him (Shivā) to send his brother's son to his service, as he had sent his son to the Emperor's service. He promised to give Mul Kokan Bijāpur and the 'Ādil Khāni Bālāghāt to him. Relying on the faith of the servants of His Majesty and thinking that whatever was granted by the Emperor was a boon, of which 'Ādil Khān also was in need, he did not agree to send his brother's son to him.⁷

The Karnātak Zamindārs to be won over by the Mughals.—Seeing the rectitude in the words given by me (slave of Your Majesty) and the granting of leave to Shiva to depart, now all the *zamindārs* of the Karnātak and the wild people of Barkol and Kanul etc. have sent their agents, just as one captured deer

draws many wild and forest deers. And they are waiting for hints or signs and for the sake of the Bijāpur expedition it is absolutely necessary to conciliate them and give them hope to get their *watan* (homeland). Afterwards, if they render good service and prove their loyalty it would be better. Otherwise, why should this much of land or houses be left in the open plains either to Shivā or to others ?^a

Jai Singh's justification of the grant of twelve forts to Shivāji: (Sarkar Ms. 33).—The Emperor ordered that so long as a chief like him with a large army was not posted there his mind would not be at rest from that side. May the King of the world be safe! This old servant has been raised from the dust and exalted by the Emperor. But it is in the interests of the State that in four good subahs, the Deccan, Kābul, Bengal and Ahmadābād, specially in the Deccan, to which four other subahs are attached, there should be one of the servants with an army which had to face daring land-marchers and refractory people. What to speak of Shivā? Even others, who have none to keep them under control and suppress them, might assume refractoriness and rebellious attitude like Shivā. The stability of the position of Shivā also in this short period has been due to disorganisation and lack of means to punish him. Now his strong forts and citadels like Purandar, which had for a long time, been a base of his sedition and mischiefs, the forts of Kondāna, Lohgarh, Rohirā, Māhuli, Muranjan, Khirdurg i.e. each of which was unique in serving as lurking places (for ambuscades) of the erring people (*gumrahān*) have been brought within the imperial possession. In the estimation of every servant of the Emperor, who is here, these 12 forts, especially the five forts whose *low ground* is known to all and the territory yielding one lakh of *hun*, most of which lies in the plains, have no potential strength or danger, so as to cause apprehension. As for me, as directed by your Majesty, I have been staying here for sometime. If I perceive (detect) any sign of lack of integrity and unreliability on his forehead, it is within my power to bring about his complete overthrow. Now, in all humility, I submit that the grant of 12 forts and the territory yielding one lakh of *hun* to him may be confirmed and this should be entered in an exalted *farmān*, decorated with the symbol of the auspicious palm and it should be issued to

him according to the details given (by me). May you, the lord and giver of manifold gifts, be safe !

Jai Singh recommends formal grant of Bijāpuri Bālāghāt to Shivā besides Bijāpuri Tal konkan : [Benares Ms. 70a ; Sarkar Ms. 34].*—Your Majesty has replied, Bijāpuri Tāl-konkan [Mulkokan 'Ādikhāni] is granted to Shivā, but no order will be issued by me about [the ta'luqa of] Bijāpuri Bālāghāt being given to him. If he can take it, let him wrest it from 'Ādil Khān (Shah). True [although those in the know of the secrets of the exalted royal orders realise that the issue of] such a remark is equivalent to an order from imperial grace, but he (Shivā), out of extreme obedience to your wishes, will not venture to undertake the conquest of the latter territory unless he gets a definite *sanad* to that effect. [He apprehends lest he might do something against the royal orders. Every one knows how much 'Ādil Khān, whose dominion extends up to the Karnātak and on whom one crore of rupees has been levied as *peshkash*, has paid out of that during this period. And one of the things about that expedition is that he procured a *sanad* of remission of 10 lakhs rupees in return for the despatch of remission of 10 lakhs rupees in return for the despatch of a force of 'Ādilkhāni Mulkokan, bearing the seal of *Amir ul umarā*. He did not realise that it was through the imperial grace that Mulkokan Bijāpur was being left to him, otherwise whatever was allotted to Shivā formed part of the environs of imperial dominions. In offering thanks for this royal favour it behoved him to render other services. On the request for remission of *peshkash* which Shivā had accepted for the territory amounting to 40 lakh *hun*, a major part of which exceeded that of 'Ādil Khān.]

*The standard revenue of these *mahals* was 9 lakhs *hun* in former times. But it will fall short of the sum, even after the pacification of the country and the settlement of ryots. [The 'Ādilkhāni army is still present in the 'Ādilkhāni part of Mulkokan. The talks that 'Ādil Khān had (with him) had already been communicated to your Majesty] When the said Khān is prepared to cede these territories [i.e. to Shivā] on condition that his brother's son would enter the Bijāpur service, why should the same be not granted from the exalted Sarkār (i.e. imperial government)? [The *peshkash* is being imposed

side by side with the designs of overthrowing him. And the slaves of the court do not get relief from striving and exertions. As this is the first [Benares Ms. 70b/Sarkar Ms. 35] occasion of malice of Shivā against 'Ādil Khān so] I pray that my request may be accepted and an imperial order may be issued through a *farmān* that the territory yielding 9 lakhs of *hun* from Mulkokan and 'Ādilkhāni Bālāghāt has been granted (to Shivā) on condition of his paying *peshkash* of 40 lakh of *hun* by fixed instalments." [No harm should be done to him after the conquest of Bijāpur. This would be the cause of his exaltation and source of exhilaration of my soul].

Shivaji to accompany Jai Singh to Bijapur, to be given the title of Rājgi and to proceed to Delhi :

The Emperor has further ordered that I should fix upon Shivā the duty of rendering thanks for the safety granted to his life. My liege! may the Giver of much remain safe! In whatever things this type of people are made to yield something for the state they did not hesitate to do so, as Ram Singh the son of your slave, has already communicated to your Majesty. Now it looks advisable and in the interests of the state that he be made to accompany me with a good contingent in the drive against Bijāpur and made responsible for a suitable service. After the accomplishment of this expedition as he would become the servant and slave of the court, his life and property would be attached to the imperial *Sarkār*, I pray that an exalted *farmān* decorated with the symbol of auspicious palm and containing acceptance of his prayers and conferring the title of *Rājgi*, together with robe of honour (*khila't*) may be granted to him. Having conferred these favours and set his mind at rest, I would arrange that he should march with good things for the imperial Court, and render such good services as may atone for all his past faults. I would see that he brightens his forehead with the mark of servitude, fidelity, good faith and rectitude. Although in submitting my replies regarding the affairs of Shivā, I have taken much time and shown much presumption, this had necessarily to be done, and I am hopeful of getting imperial pardon and grace.¹⁰

1. Vide ante note 8. Sec. A. Capture of Udgir and Ausa on 28th Sept. and 19th Oct. 1936 respectively. See Sarkar, *Aurangzib I.* 29f; *House of Shivaji*, 39-44. Saksena, *History of Shahjahan of Delhi*, chs. VI, VII.

2. Aurangzib's first viceroyalty of the Deccan (1636-44) and second viceroyalty (1952-58).

3. "Adil Khān in his folly played false with me. He outwardly sent an army into Shivaji's territory; but as he considered the utter destruction of Shivā to be harmful to his own interest and wished Shivā to stand as a wall between the imperial troops and the Bijāpuris, he made a secret alliance with the Maratha chief and helped him with lands, money and other requisites. He also induced the King of Golkonda to enter into this policy and send money to that infidel, while he was all the time sending letters breathing loyalty to the Emperor." (AN 909-913, 397; HA. 60a, 79a, 70a; B.S. 373-375) . . . It was impossible for the Deccan Sultanates to enter heartily into any plan for "rooting Shiva out." See Sarkar, *Aurangzib* IV. 100-1.

4. Sarkar, *Aurangzib*, IV. 99.

5. Rajah Jagat Singh of Maū Nārpur. Saksena, *op cit*, 40, 45, 90, 93-103; *Ma'asir ul Umara*, II. 176-9, 238-41.

6. Jādav Rao of Sindhkher, a Nizāmshahi noble. (*Shivaji*, 15-17). He was the maternal grandfather of Shivaji; murdered (C. 1630).

7. Sir Jadunath Sarkar has included this: 'But Shivā in reliance on the Sanctity of my promises and in hopes of the Emperor's liberality, declined . . . in his translation of f. 70a and b of the ms. *House of Shivaji*, 144.

8. It is clear that whatever success Jai Singh achieved was due to his combining diplomacy with military strength, reminding us of Mir Jumla, the general of Aurangzeb.

9. This differs at some places from Sarkar, *House of Shivaji*, 144-45.

The author of the Bijapuri history, *Basātin us Salātin* (376) thus comments on this "shrewd deal in (as yet unconquered land)": "Shiva, despairing of help from Bijapur (against the Mughals) made peace with Jai Singh. The two infidels agreed together to invade 'Adilshāhi territory. This *nimakharam* hereditary servant, the worst of base-born traitors undertook the work . . . Adil Shah was perplexed at the union of his neighbouring enemy with external foe, because a thief who knows the secrets of the house can do a harm, the hundredth part of which no thief from outside can commit." Quoted in Sarkar, *Aurangzib*, IV. 102.

10. This throws new light on Jai Singh's policy towards Shivaji, as explained in the Introduction.

SECTION D

PREPARATIONS FOR THE INVASION OF BIJAPUR

Mu'azzam Khān summoned to Court ; Jai Singh given absolute authority: (Benaras Ms. 71a/Sarkar Ms. 36). The imperial mandate came to hand on 21st Safar (23 August, 1665) (conventional epithets not translated). As to the imperial orders summoning the victorious Prince what would be more felicitous for that highborn personage than to have the favour of his imperial audience? In the course of the letter summoning the Prince, His Majesty observes that this slave (i.e. myself) possesses absolute authority¹ over the work entrusted to me and the mind of His Majesty was at rest from this side. This is due to your Majesty's magnanimity. May my liege the king remain safe! Whenever Providence is favourable for the fulfilment of the desires of Your Majesty, the means appear ready at hand. The life and existence of this insignificant atom is of little account. May the sacred mind of Your Majesty, in complete reliance on the Cherisher of mankind, be at ease!

Postings of certain officers.—As regards the orders about accomplishing the imperial tasks, I would write to Saf Shikan Khān² as directed. [Benares Ms. 71 b/Sarkar Ms. 37] During all this time he has done very well in the performance of all that was required (of him) in the course of this undertaking. Before this expedition had been decided upon, I had written to the imperial Paymaster (*Bakhshi-ul-mulk*), Muhammad Amin Khān, requesting the despatch of Fateh Jung Khān and Purdil Khān in place of Ludi Khān.³ Your Majesty has replied that Fateh Jung Khān was better than Purdil Khān. In the meantime the question of this expedition and the capture of the conquered forts of Mulkokan⁴ cropped up. Your Majesty knows full well what happens from the excessive rains, floods, storms, mud and marshes in Mulkokan. It was not advisable at that time to displace or replace people. Moreover, I was expecting the arrival of Fateh Jung Khān. Accordingly, keeping the imperial works in mind, I engaged the services of Ludi Khān for some days. Meanwhile I learnt more than once from the

writings of the reporters (*Waq'ai nigār*) about the ill-treatment and recklessness of his Afghans. I recalled Ludi Khān from that place for the sake of pacifying the subjects and repopulating the conquered territories.⁵

At this time I sent Rasul Beg Rozbihāni⁶ with his brothers and some others and another contingent totalling about 1000 *suwār* for a temporary period. As regards the permanent arrangement, as directed (by Your Majesty) I had communicated with Fateh Jung Khān, who told me he was earmarked for deputation to Nānder during the Bijāpur expedition. It would be better if he accompanies us in this expedition for much exertion is expected from him and in Kokan (i.e. Konkan) there was not much work to do. Only one officer with 1000 cavalry in that region can effectively supervise the conquered regions. Fateh Jung Khān has got a good contingent. I hope that my proposal would be accepted, and that he would join us in this expedition. As for Mul Kokan, if so directed, [Benares Ms. 72a/Sarkar Ms. 38] I may send Purdil Khān there, or do whatever Your Majesty orders.

Mulla Ahmad, won over by the Mughals, leaves Bijāpur—By the grace of God and good fortune of the Emperor, Mulla Ahmad⁷ had been sent out from Bijāpur. News had repeatedly come that 'Ādil Khān himself gave him leave of departure. Leaving one of his landmarchers (margraves) there, he came out of the city with his men belonging to his tribe and also his family and children. He quickly marched out of the place. I hope that after his arrival, whatever Your Majesty wills would be carried out as best as possible.

Policy towards Qutb Shah.—My liege! I think it is highly expedient now to show excessive imperial favours to Qutb-ul-mulk, the *Marzabān* (i.e. ruler) of Golkonda⁸ for the purpose of putting him off his guard and inducing him to give up the idea of joining the Bijāpuris. Accordingly I, Your Majesty's slave, have already opened the door of leniency and conciliation. The Emperor may be pleased to favour him with conciliatory gestures and royal favours. True, he is not in a position to render any help to 'Ādil Khān openly, but not to show conciliation is to draw the curtain on the door of hopes and aspirations. If the veil is withdrawn (from our real intention about him) and he despairs of peace from this quarter

(i.e. Mughals), he will be driven to ally himself with 'Ādil Khān. In spite of all this, if he takes to the path of ingratitude, I would get the better of him and at that time I would submit a petition (*'arzdāsh*t) and do as I would be ordered (by the Emperor). For the present it is expedient to do as has been submitted (i.e. by me).

Imperial favours on Dā'ud Khān, Shihāb Khān and Prithvi Singh.—Your Majesty's *farmān* bearing the sacred signature arrived here on 29th Safar (31st August 1665) [Benares Ms. 72b/Sarkar Ms. 39]. It confers the parganas of Sirsa, Dhātrat and Khanda among the dependencies of Hissār⁹ as *tuyul* on Dā'ud Khān¹⁰ and the title of *Khān* on Shihāb Khān. The aforesaid personages were favoured with the grants and made busy with the duties entrusted to them. The salaries of Dā'ud Khān would be given to him in accordance with the *farmān*.

My liege! Prithvi Singh, son of Mahārajah¹¹ is a child of Jaswant the slave of the Court, and he has, at this time, been favoured with being allowed to kiss the threshold of Your Majesty. I hope that he may be favoured with a *mansab* through the imperial grace, for it would be in consonance with the practice of cherishing the slaves and sons of the slaves.

The Emperor accepts Jai Singh's recommendations about some officers.—It is hereby submitted that (i) in the first place on 22nd Rabi ul awwal, (22 Sept. 1665) the exalted *farmān* containing the approval of my submissions was received through such and such persons (names not given) (ii) in the second place on 5th Rabi II (5th October, 1665) the royal mandate in the handwriting of the imperial Majesty was received through Naurang. I offered thanks for the royal favours. I am an ant before Solomon. Nevertheless in making my submissions I may sometimes seem to be presumptuous and bold. The deputation of Seraj ud din and Abul Hassan and 'Ali Reza (of olden times) with me and the issue of orders re:[Benares Ms. 73a/Sarkar Ms. 40] the deputation of some others this year and the gracious grant of *mansab* to Angad, son of Champat and Jām, his uncle and Chhatrasāl,¹² his younger brother and the increase given to the other officers according to the separate sheet, have been the cause of exaltation and the exhilaration of the soul of this servant. I offer my salutations.

Saf Shikan Khān to supply artillery, grain and musketeers:—As regards the arrangements for the provision of cannon, shots, lead and powder, and plenty of grains for the victorious army and the despatch of the musketeers royal orders had been issued to Saf Shikan Khān. I hope that he will not leave any stone unturned in executing these royal services.

Dilir Khān and the sons of Bahādur Khān.—Dilir Khān¹³ is a life-giving slave and a loyal officer. 'Arab and Muzaffar, the sons of Bahādur Khān, who are the children of the slaves of the sky-high Court rendered good service in association with the aforesaid Khān in the siege of the fort of Purandar, and they are so worthy that they are expected to render still more remarkable service afterwards. The paragona of Shāhjahānpur, which was in the *tuyul* and the homeland of the sons of Bahādur Khān had been confiscated to the *Khalsa-i-Sharifa* on the ground of his failure to effect an increase in the rental (*māhsul*). At the time the change was made in the same paragona, orders were issued re: the *altamgha* villages¹⁴ and fourteen lakh *dams* out of the total demands had been suspended with the assurance that after the submission of the facts of the present produce it would be given. They are expecting it till now.

The fact about the revenue from the total amount of the *abwābs* produce of the dwarf palm trees of the villages and lands which Bahādur Khān had allotted to the survivors and dependents who had gathered around him for royal services, and which had been resumed, may be submitted. The presence of the *Krori*¹⁵ at Shāhjahānpur is causing various kinds of troubles to his dependents and the protection of the honour of the servants and their children is always [Benares Ms. 73b/ Sarkar Ms. 41] through the imperial grace. If the paragonas of Kānt and Gola (are granted) it would be the cause of his exaltation.¹⁶ As regards the *altamgha* villages I am making one submission in all humility that the same may be conferred by way of cherishing the servants and children of the slaves, so that the dependents of the deceased Khān who are a very large number, meeting their needs of livelihood from the produce of the *inām* land, be engaged in praying for the perpetuity of the empire.

Qutbuddin Khān.—May the Emperor be safe! Qutb ud dīn Khān¹⁷ has got a contingent more than what is required by

the regulations and his soldiers have got good horses and are serviceable and experienced. I am not making a request for his increase but I make bold to suggest that in the matter of his *mansab* the condition should be to give his *jāgir* in lieu of his pay. What is better than that he should exert himself in this expedition? Otherwise his condition is practically tantamount to (imposing) no condition at all. This would be the cause of my exaltation and also of his pacification.

Jai Singh recommends restoration of rank to Rāo Amar Singh Chandrāwat and Raghunāth Singh.—Again, once upon a time there was a decrease of 500 *suwār* from the rank of Rāo Amar Singh Chandrāwat.¹⁸ Out of that he got *pansadī* (500 *zat*) 300 *suwār* in two instalments; 200 *suwār* remained as balance. A decrease of 100 *suwār* was ordered in the case of Raghunāth Singh Mairtia¹⁹ on account of the delay that he made in marching. As his contingent is excellent and this is the time for exertion, it is requested that the Emperor may graciously be pleased to restore the two decreases.

Arrangements for Māhuli fort : Manohar Dās : Amar Singh Rāthor.—May the Emperor be safe! The meaning of truth and honesty is this that the real facts about every one of the servants of the Court as seen and ascertained may be submitted (i.e. before the Emperor). In the beginning when the work was undertaken, the charge of the fort of Māhuli²⁰ was offered to Manohar Dās²¹ and he had written and pressed much that he should proceed at once towards the fort and take possession of it. If afterwards he would not be ready to accept the *qilādāri* of that place, another would be appointed to it. He did not turn his face towards that side and I had, through the good fortune of the Emperor, sent another person [Benares MS. 74a/Sarkar Ms. 42] and brought the fort under our control. Afterwards when the exalted *farmān* was issued in his name and it was sent to him he rose and came to me and remained for long in this place, putting forward excuses amounting to refusal. Afterwards there was no other way but to act on the proposal to give the fort of Māhuli to Amar Singh Rāthor.²² He accepted it but brought in far-fetched conditions, the details of which have been entered in the sheet of the occurrences. As I, Your Majesty's slave, was ordered to send the directions, whatever I said he carried these out in such a way that my

submissions might not be known to anybody. His difficult demands might have been brought to your notice through the writings of the couriers (*harkārās*). He should be chastised in such a way that others might take a lesson from it.

Delay in the start of the Bijāpur war.—May the Emperor remain safe! Regarding the resolve to undertake the excellent expedition to Bijāpur the imperial mandate had been issued that through the grace of God the transactions of that place would soon assume a good shape. My liege! there is no doubt about it. Who amongst the slaves can have any doubt, much less this old slave, who has seen with his own eyes the aid of God, and the good fortune of your victorious self helping the accomplishment of conquests in the expeditions? How can such a man require exhortations (*tākīd talab*) in the performance of the services assigned? These days when the imperial army is standing idly without work and the enemy is using this respite to gain strength day by day, the delay of a day now is equivalent to the loss of a year.²³

Need of artillery and finance.—It was for quick action that I wrote to Saf Shikan Khān that, having supplied (to the army) shot and powder to serve the purpose of 7 big cannon which are with us, he should despatch other cannon with their accessories through the direct road of Parendā. The news had been spread about the start being made from this place on 20th of Rabi' us Sāni (20th October, 1665)²⁴ and he was asked to exert himself in taking charge of the houses and habitations lying on the way until the arrival of the cannon.

But the treasure ordered from the provincial treasury of Mālwa had not [Benares Ms. 74b/Sarkar Ms. 43] yet arrived and there was no sign of its having even started. Out of the sum of one *lakh* of rupees which I had brought from the Court and six *lakhs* of rupees which I had brought from the Subāh of Mālwa, four *lakhs* had been made over to the clerks (*mutasuddis*) of the city of Aurangābād in accordance with the imperial order. More than 22 *lakhs* of rupees was spent on the victorious expedition (i.e. against Shivāji). Whatever this servant of yours considers indispensably necessary he spends. So far as lies in me, I would not spend a single rupee of the Emperor uselessly. An account of the income and expenditure of that (expedition) has ben sent by 'Abdul Latif, the *dīwān* of the army, to Jum-

lat ul mulk (i.e. the imperial *wazir*). The *mansabārs* and the artillerymen demand six months' pay which was in arrears and they are starving.²⁵ Besides this, as soon as the victorious army enters this kingdom many Deccanis would have to be enlisted in the imperial service²⁶ and cash money would have to be paid to every one according to his rank to enable him to arm and equip (his followers) and to relieve them of their distressed condition. Till the accomplishment of the conquest of Bijāpur the expenditure of money according to expediency will be very necessary. I hope that the costs (of the war) would be recovered afterwards.²⁷ As regards conveying the treasure to Karnoor Fir Khān had written. As soon as it is received, the time would be notified and the march would begin. There is no desire to make a delay. It was very far seeing of Your Majesty to choose Saf Shikan Khān for making the arrangements for the march and other matters, otherwise the fact of the non-arrival of the treasure is known to Your Majesty.²⁸

Shivaji: [Benares Ms. 75a/Sarkar Ms. 44]* My liege! you have graciously accepted my recommendation about the demands of Shivā. [After the receipt of the *farmān* decorated with the auspicious palm and the *Khila't* (robe of honour) in his name I thought it expedient in the interests of the state to invite him to come here instead of sending these gifts to his house, and to deliver these to him according to convention. I sent Ugrasen Kachchwah with a brief letter to fetch him. Shivā was in Mul Kokan 'Ādil Khānī and immediately on receipt of these glad tidings he travelled quickly and] reached my camp on 27 Rabi ul awwal (27 September, 1665). [On 30th of this month (30th Sept.) I sent him along with Kirat Singh and Jāni Khān Bakhshi to advance and welcome the imperial letter and favours and he performed obeisance and salutation and professed submission]. He promised to accompany me in the Bijāpur expedition with the troops of his son's *mansab*, and in addition, 7000 expert infantry²⁹ [I sent him to collect the forces and make other necessary arrangements and enjoined upon him that he should join me at the time of the march].

*As for the land worth one lakh of *hun* annually which the Emperor has left to him out of the old Nizām Shāhi dominions, he very humbly submits that he has no other source of income except this; because the ryots of Bijāpuri Tāl-Konkan have

been unsettled by the hostility of 'Ādil Shāh. As for Bijāpuri Bālāghat, though he (i.e. Shivā) can occupy it before our march on Bijāpur, yet during that expedition (in which Shivā must be present) [Benares Ms. 75b/Sarkar Ms. 45] the ryots will disperse and cultivation will cease. Shivā, therefore, prays that he may be granted villages and mahals yielding one lakh of *hun* in the Nizām Shāhi territory. [The papers regarding the aggregate rental of these parganas from the time of Nizām ul mulk are not traceable in the *daftar* of the *diwān* of the place] But after much enquiry I learn that there is an immense difference between the former (i.e. theoretical) revenue and the present (i.e. actual) yield of the Nizāmshāhi parganas. Therefore, instead of at once ceding to Shivā villages with a theoretical revenue of one lakh *hun*, I have decided that at first the entire Nizām Shāhi territory, except the 12 forts in Shivā's possession, should be administered by the crown-lands department, so that the true facts about its revenue may be learnt (by our collectors).

*At the end of one year, *mahals* yielding one lakh (in actual collection) will be selected for Shivā out of this tract. In the meantime [as it is necessary to fulfil the promises and it is equally necessary that he should participate in this expedition, I thought it advisable to pacify him by saying that] to meet the expenses of Shivā's contingent during the coming war³⁰ against Bijāpur I have agreed to pay him two *lakhs* of rupees in cash [from the treasury] as substitute for the *jāgir* (from which he is to be kept out for this one year).

*As for the *jāgir* due to Shambhaji, I told Shivā plainly that so long as I was not assured of the payment of the annual instalments of 3 lakhs of *hun* out of the 40 lakhs agreed upon as his fee (for the possession of Bijāpuri Tāl-Konkan and Bālāghāt), I could not grant any *jāgir* to his son. He very loyally replied, 'Although the land for which these 40 lakhs have been promised, *has not yet been fully taken possession of by me*, and although the real income from it [and the fact of the population] can be known only after taking full possession, yet, [for the sake of my fidelity and submission], I shall supply the contingent of troops which my son's *mansab* (rank in the army) makes it necessary for him to keep under his banner; and I pray that the salary of his *mansab* may be taken

as an equivalent of the instalment of tribute due from me to the imperial Government.

[Benares Ms. 76a/Sarkar Ms. 46]. [It was visible from his face and conduct that he would exert himself to him utmost in this expedition, and in the manner ordered about the bestowal of title of *Rājgi* he would render good services so as to win imperial favours and attain his desires. Having settled both these transactions on these lines, I allowed him to take his departure].³¹

Diwān Safi Khān to administer Shivāji's territory.—As Safi Khān³² diwān is deputed to administer the affairs of this district, I hope that orders may be issued to him that as Shivā is to join the victorious army there should be no illtreatment (untoward event) in his taking charge of the *mahals* of his *watan*. He should, after ascertaining the total revenue (*jamāa'*) at the end of the year of the villages and the *mahals* yielding one lakh of *hun*, act according to the agreements in consultation with me, so that it may redound to the good of the state affairs and cause the increase of imperial favours. For, by keeping faith and fulfilling agreements the imperial officers, would gain the trust of the people. God forbid, if there is a deviation from this, it would cause disorder and shake the faith of these people (i.e. the Marathas). I have stated whatever I have considered necessary.

Mulla Ahmad joins the Mughals.—At the time of my departure, I had tried to ascertain the royal wishes about Mulla Ahmad and Your Majesty had said that he should be brought out (i.e. won over from Bijāpur) in any manner possible and enlisted in imperial service. After I had made my submissions about his intentions, a *farmān* was issued that if he performed good service there it would be better, otherwise he would be promoted to the *mansab* in accordance with the proposal of the *Amīr ul Umarā*. Then orders were received that [Benares Ms. 76b/Sarkar Ms. 47] he should be enlisted in the imperial service and should be prevented from interfering in the affairs of the Shāh. At all times and occasions I have kept the imperial orders in view and abided by them. I summoned him from that place. Due to the good fortune of the Emperor he came to the camp on 29th Rabi ul awwal (29th September, 1665) and interviewed me.³³ His aptitude and resources are what had been

indicated in the imperial order. Among the men of these regions he appears to be very experienced and well versed in affairs. It would be his good luck if he wins imperial favours. At any rate his coming out from that place is possible only in this way,³⁴ and would be conducive to the good of the state. As directed, I pacified him much and secured his consent to accept the *mansab* proposed for him and his sons by the *Amir ul Umarā*. They are anxious to enter into the lists of royal servants as will appear from his petition (*'arzdāsh*t). I submit that in order to honour the assurances of mine, Your Majesty's servant, a *farmān* be issued in reply to his request, so that he may very soon kiss the threshold of the Empire. At the end of the petition, for the sake of truth and loyalty, something had been submitted regarding 'Ādil Khān. Orders may be issued in answer to the same, so that after reaching the Court whatever he submits may get a favourable response.³⁵

Mulla Yahya to be rewarded.—Mulla Yahya³⁶ has performed good services in this transaction and several people from Bijāpur have been induced by him to turn to us (i.e. join the Mughals). The exigencies of time and events demand that he should be favoured with an increase in the *mansab zāt* (*zāt* rank), of which he had great expectations.

Bijāpur tribute.—[Benares Ms. 77a/Sarkar Ms. 48] Orders have been issued that the boxes³⁷ containing gold plates and utensils with 7 lakhs of rupees on account of (*bābat*) the *huns* which are with Muhammad Sādiq, the *hājib* of Bijāpur, should be sent for by me. Your Majesty may have learnt that the imperial prince has sent somebody with a *nishān* to the aforesaid *hājib* for bringing the said cash and kind. It will be good if he sends it. Otherwise there is little time before the march of the victorious army. It is hoped that by the good fortune of the Emperor the affair of accounts and the receipt of *peshkash* would not be protracted and victory would fall to the lot of the imperial army. I informed Muhammad Ibrahim of the royal favours (Ms. illegible) and wrote to him that having sent back Datta Pandit, whom I had sent to him, he should proceed to this side. Muhammad Sādiq, who is a faithful servant, would remain there for performing certain works till I proceed towards that side. As regards not sending Mulla Khurram³⁸ before the arrival of Muhammad Sādiq I am doing as ordered.

Jai Singh praises Shivaji.—Jumlatulmuluk Ja'far Khān,³⁹ as ordered by the Emperor, had written about preventing Shivā from the useless intention of giving his brother's son in service to 'Ādil Khān. He has been enjoined upon (by me) not to do so in accordance with the *farmān*. True to his devotion and servitude (*obudiyat*) he avows that he, a newly purchased servant, who had taken the yoke of imperial service and entered the circle of (imperial) servants, cannot do anything against the imperial wishes and desires. [Benares Ms. 77b/Sarkar Ms. 49]. He would also devote himself as directed, in his own interests, to dealing with the rulers (*marzabānān*) of the Karnātak and the wild people (*wahshian*) of Karnul.⁴⁰ An entry has been made, as ordered, of the twenty forts, the *peshkash* of Shivā, including two forts conquered by the imperial servants, Khandakla and Kondāna.⁴¹

Emperor rewards Jai Singh.—I send congratulations on the Emperor's solar birthday of this year. I have accorded fitting reception to the *Khila't-i-khassa* (special robe) sent to me on the 22nd of this month.⁴² Though I am at a distance and so prevented from the facility of seeking the honour of audience, yet my heart and soul and all the hairs of my body are not far from the auspicious footsteps. The dignity conferred on Rām Singh⁴³ is a further favour and an act of cherishing the slave and sons of slaves. I offer my grateful thanksgiving for the imperial favours. I, the insignificant one, have been [Benares Ms. 78a/Sarkar Ms. 50] raised by the favour of 'Ālamgir and lifted from the dust. May this insignificant atom be in a position to render suitable services so as to gain further honours !

Delay due to non-arrival of treasure.—I had sent particulars through Naurang before this in an *'arzdāsh*t. The delay in setting out (for Bijāpur) is due to the expectation of the arrival of the treasure. The victorious army is standing idly. As soon as the treasure arrives here and the demands of the seekers of salary are met, I will select a suitable time and proceed to execute the task entrusted to my hands without any delay or hesitation.⁴⁴

Jai Singh's intrigues with the Siddis.—The fort of Dandā Rājpurī,⁴⁵ one of the dependencies of Nizām ul mulk, is among the excellent places of this district. The fact of the strength and solidity of this fort may have been brought to the notice of

Your Imperial Majesty. Shivā, now the loyal one, had striven his utmost to quickly capture it when attempts were made to overthrow him, but he had failed to achieve his purpose. Sometime before the expedition against Shivā was opened, I wrote to the Abyssinians, who had appropriated the title of Mir (i.e. Siddis, a corruption of Sayyidis) and had entrenched themselves in that strong fort, to join us as being advisable (i.e. in order to combine all possible enemies against Shivāji). Now, in view of the firm decision to launch the great expedition of Bijāpur, and as there is hardly any time left, I did not consider it advisable to besiege the said fort. Whatever of the environs and suburbs of that territory (i.e. Janjira) is attached to Shivā⁴⁶ yielding 10,000 *hun* and the region yielding one lakh *hun* which was granted to him from the *mahals* of Nizām ul mulk (as has been reported in the '*arzdāsh*t) have been resumed in *Khālsa i sharifa* (crown lands) this year (i.e. 1665); the *mutasuddis* of Chaul were directed to resume whatever was near it in the *Khālsa i sharifa*. The aforesaid Hābshis (Abyssinians) were also written to that if they wished to have a good time and prosperity they should voluntarily come (i.e. join the Mughals) and gain elevation by the grant of *mansabs*. [Benares Ms. 78b/Sarkar Ms. 51.] In this way there are two alternatives before me to win them over and use them for service. (i) If they do some work and join the imperial army the said fort in either case would be emptied for some time. Shivā also has suggested about the matter that as he is very near it, if his men would get the time and opportunity, they would annex it to the royal forts (i.e. for the Emperor); (ii) If this policy succeeds it is better, otherwise, after the conquest of Bijāpur due efforts would be made and, with the good fortune of the Emperor, the thing would be accomplished. Some men have been sent with letters to bring those Hābshis.⁴⁷ As to what happens afterwards will be reported in the '*arzdāsh*t.

Deputation of Rasul Beg to Tal Konkan and pacifying Qutb Shah.—The imperial mandate in reply to my '*arzdāsh*t came to hand on Rabi II (15 October, 1665). In the matter of deputing Rasul Beg Rozbihāni to Mulkokan, pacifying and conciliating Qutbulmulk, summoning his envoy who is in Aurangābād, action will be taken as directed after the departure of the Prince Imperial⁴⁸ to the Court. I offer my humble salutations and

thanksgiving for the favour of the *mansab* conferred on Prithvi Singh, the child of the slave⁴⁹ on the coronation day.

Bijāpur Tribute.—As regards the order regarding the letters of Muhammad Sādiq, the envoy of Bijāpur, in the matter of *peshkash* to Etamad Khān, the fact is this: [Benares Ms. 79a/Sarkar Ms. 52] before this I did not know anything of this matter,—as to what *peshkash* was with that said envoy. It was in the month of Safar that the *harkārās* (couriers of news) wrote from Bijāpur that seven months before, 7 lakhs of rupees as advance and six boxes of jewelled utensils were in the custody of Muhammad Sādiq. Accordingly I had made a report in the *'arzdāsh*t.

Jai Singh's intrigues with Bijāpuri Zamindārs.—Now that 'Ādil Khān is taking his stand on useless words and does not want to send it, (i.e. tribute) God wills that justice should be on the side of the servants of the Court. Otherwise of what stuff is the *zamindār* of Phaltan⁵⁰ that I should write about him to Shivā and he to the said *zamindār*. I have myself written letters of conciliation to the people of Bijāpur as soon as their letters of solicitations (for imperial favours) came. At first I agreed to the contents of their applications and then wrote replies thereto. I did not write any fresh letters of conciliation. But in this Court, whether it is the time of peace or war, it is customary that any one who comes (as a supplicant) shall not go back disappointed. During the tenure of the command of the *Amirul Umarā* and the *Mahārajah*, several had been favoured with *mansabs*. No details of such supplicants who now came and were given such documents (i.e. letters of conciliation) are sent to the capital.⁵¹ Seven months before when the victorious army was engaged in the expedition against Shivā nothing was communicated, for the remedy of this situation was sought from Providence. I pray to God, the Absolute Victor and the Real Transactor of events that the friends of the everlasting empire may attain success and victory by the good fortune of the enemy-overthrowing Emperor.

1. Prince Mu'azzam who had relieved Shaista Khān as Viceroy of the Deccan (mid-Jan. 1664) left for the imperial court (Nov. 1665) after making over charge to Jai Singh. The Prince had audience on 7th Rajab/3rd January, 1666. *Ma'ūsir-i Alamgiri* 52 (Eng. Tr. 34).

2. Saf Shikan Khān Muhammad Tāhir, Superintendent of the Artillery in the Deccan. *Ma'āsir ul Umara* (Text) II. 738-740; Eng. Tr. II. 672-73.

3. For Muhammad Amin Khān, son of the famous Mir Jumla (General of Aurangzeb) *Ma'āsir ul Umara* Text III, 613-20; Eng. Tr. I. 241-45; see also Jagadish Narayan Sarkar, *Life of Mir Jumla*: Appendices C and D.

Fateh Jung Khan Rohilla, brother of Sikandar (Iskandar), *Ma'āsir ul Umara* Text III, 22-26: Eng. Tr. I. 529-32.

There is one Purdil Khan, mentioned in *Ma'āsir ul Umara* Text I. 424-7, Eng. Tr. II. 483-6. But he is different from the person mentioned here.

Ludi Khan is perhaps to be identified with the person of the same name who became the *faujdar* of Konkan. Sarkar, *Shivaji*, 166.

4. See note 8. Sec. A. Sarkar, *House of Shivaji*, 147.

5. This shows Jai Singh's administrative wisdom. He was naturally keen that there should be no molestation of the local people. Any oppression would lead not only to disaffection but also to loss of revenue on account of their flight to neighbouring territories and also ill-repute of the Mughals in the Deccan.

6. Text defective. For Rasul Beg Rozbihāni, see *Aurangnamah* by "Haqiri" (*passim*). He played a very distinguished part in the War of Succession against Shujā' in Bengal. See Jagadish N. Sarkar, *Mir Jumla*, Bibliography.

7. See note 4. Sec. B. ante; Sarkar, *House of Shivaji*, 99-100: *Aurangzib* IV. 123-125 (2nd edn.). It was on 25th Rabi-us-Sani/25th Oct. 1665 that the *farmān* summoning Mulla Ahmad to the Court was issued. *Ma'āsir i 'Alamgiri*, 52 (Eng. Tr. 33).

8. This is a part of Jai Singh's diplomatic web. *Aurangzib*, IV. 126.

9. The text is jumbled up and reads Sarsādhābrat. The places are to be separated and identified with Sirsa, Dhātrat (originally in Jhind and then in British territory) and Khanda (in Jhind). These were *mahals*, numbering respectively 17, 16 and 24 out of 27 *mahals* in Sarkar Hissar Firoza. "In the time of Akbar the Sarkar of Hissar Firoza embraced the whole of the present district, together with Sirsa, as far as the river Wār, and parts of the modern Rohtak district and of territory now included in Bikaner to the west and the protected Sikh states to the east", vide Beames' edition of Sir H. Elliot's Supplemental Glossary pp. 132-55; *Gazetteer of the Hisar District* 1883-4, pp. 10-11) *Imperial Gazetteer* xxiii, 45-46: *Ain i Akbari*, Tr. vol. II, p. 299.

10. Dā'ud Khān Qureshi was sent to the Deccan with Jai Singh and made Governor of Khāndesh. He proved disloyal in the siege of Purandar. So he was sent away from the siege-camp with flying columns to ravage Shivaji's territory. See *Ma'āsir ul Umara*, Text II. 32-37; Eng. Tr. I. 462-4: Sarkar, *Shivaji* 115.

11. This gives new information re: the eldest son of Jaswant. *Ma'āsir ul Umara* (Text III 599-604; Eng. Tr. I. 754-6) has only one sentence about him: 'Kunwar Prithi Raj his eldest son died in his life time'.

12. Champat Rāi Bundela chieftain of Bundelkhand. Chhatra Sal, his fourth son, and his elder brother Angad, entered the Mughal army at Jai Singh's recommendation during the war against Shivaji (1665) and were rewarded by being created *Hazāri* and 3-*Sadi* respectively in August, 1666. Sarkar, *Aurangzib* Vol. V; Angad was the second son of Champat. See Bengal; *Past and Present*: LXXXI. Pt. II Serial No. 152 (July-Dec. 1962) p. 116.

13. Bahādur Khān Rohilla and his younger brother, Dilir Khān, were the sons of Darya Khān, a Dā'udzai trader and a soldier of fortune in the service of Jahāngir. They rose to prominence under Shāhjahān; Bahādur became *jāgirdar* of Kalpi and Kanauj. *U.P. Gazetteer* vol.

XVII (Shāhjahānpur), 136. For Dilir Khān Dā'udzai. *Ma'āsir ul Umārā* Text II. 42-56 : Eng. Tr. I 495-505, for the part played by Dilir Khān in the war against Shivaji, see Sarkar, *Shivaji*, 111-123.

14. Grant-under-seal, a special tenure introduced by Jahāngir. For explanation of the term, see Moreland, *Agrarian System of Moslem India*. (Allahabad edn.), 127, 270; also Irfan Habib, *Agrarian System of Mughal India*.

15. In the time of Akbar the *Krori*, was placed in charge of a tract theoretically expected to yield a revenue of one *Kror* of *dams* i.e. 2½ lakhs of rupees. Later on the title continued irrespective of the amount and meant merely a collector of state dues. Sarkar, *Mughal Administration* (4th ed.), 73-74.

16. Pargana Kānt is the western pargana of Tahsil Shahjahanpur Town of Kānt (27° 48' N, 79° 48' E). Gola Raipur (Pargana and Tahsil Pawayan) is a small village (28° 2' N, 79° 59' E), containing the remains of the old famous town of Gola, the original seat of the *Katehrias*. (U. P. *Gazetteer XVII Shahjahanpur*, 181-5, 164-5).

The parganas of Kānt and Gola were given in *jāgīr* to Isa Khān Kalkāpur under Sher Shah (Elliot & Dowson IV, 383). He subdued the local zamindārs, the *Katehrias* with the help of his lieutenant, Nasir Khān. The Rajputs tried to regain independence in 1555 but were crushed by Akbar's general, Ali Quli Khān (Uzbek) Khān Zamān. Kānt o Gola was originally a separate charge under Husain Khān Tukriya. But after his death (1576) it was merged in Badaun. Badaoni went there as judge in 1572.

In the time of Akbar the mahal of Kānt had 55,584 bighas of cultivable land, assessed at 2,439,369 *dams* exclusive of 48,444 *dams* assigned as *Sayurghals*. It comprised the entire Shahjahanpur *tahsil* as well as pargana Tilhar and portions of Jalalabad and Khera Bajhera, and was chiefly occupied by Bachhil Rajputs who supplied a force of 300 horse and 2000 foot.

The mahal of Gola had 24,540 bighas of cultivable land, assessed at 1,136,931 *dams* besides 4,257 as *sayurghals*. It comprised the pargana Nigohi, the Pawayan *tahsil* and parts of Kheri and Pilibhit districts, was chiefly occupied by Bachhils and Dewaks who supplied 100 horse and 1000 foot. U.P. *Gazetteer*, op. cit. pp. 134-6. 'Ain. Tr. II. 294.

17. Qutbuddin Khān Khweshgi, *Ma'āsir ul Umara* Text III 102-108; Eng. Tr. II. 548-552) ravaged Maratha territory during Jai Singh's expedition against Shivaji. Subsequently he was placed in charge of the rearguard of Jai Singh's army in the Bijapur Campaign.

18. Led one of the flying columns which ravaged Shivaji's villages under Daud Khān.

19. Text has Marmah, which may be read as Mairtia i.e. of Mairta see *Ma'āsir-i-'Ālamgiri*, Eng. Tr. 43.

20. It is situated in North Konkan, 50 miles n.e. of Bombay.

21. Manohar Dās Gaur, nephew of Rajah Bithal Dās Gaur (of Shah Jahān's time). He subsequently distinguished himself as an able and gallant Rājput soldier. See Sarkar, *Shivaji*, 166. For Bithal Dās, *Ma'āsir ul Umārā* Text. II 250-6; Eng. Tr. I. 401-404.

22. Eldest son of Rajah Gaj Singh Rāthor. He ravaged Shivaji's territories and subsequently Bijapur. *Ma'āsir ul Umara* Text II. 230-37; Eng. Tr. I. 232-6.

23. "The war with Shivaji being over, the vast Mughal army assembled under Jai Singh's command was standing idly, and profitable employment had to be found for it. An invasion of Bijapur offered the best means of doing this". Sarkar, *Aurangzib*, IV. 121.

"Jai Singh was impatient to begin the war. He knew that success depended on attacking Bijapur by surprise before 'Ādil Shāh had time to make preparations for defence", *Ibid*, 108. See also H.A. 85a (post).

24. i.e. Originally Jai Singh had decided to start on 20th October.
25. Jai Singh "could not move an inch without money". This was the position in October, 1665. Sarkar, *Aurangzib*, IV, 107-109.
26. i.e. in buying deserters from Bijāpur as soon as the war opened.
27. See Sarkar, *Aurangzib*, IV 123, 124, 145.
28. *Op. cit.*, 108-109.
29. Sarkar, *House of Shivaji*, (2nd ed.) 145.
30. Text has *safar* i.e. march or expedition.
31. Sir J. N. Sarkar adds after "imperial Government" in the previous para : "I have agreed to these proposals, as Shiva can render very valuable help to us in the impending war (with Bijapur)." *House of Shivaji*, 143; see also his *Shivaji*, 127.
32. Jai Singh rightly insisted that Safi Khān should act after consulting him in administering Shivājī's territory. This shows Jai Singh's administrative insight.
33. Near Purandar. Sarkar, *Aurangzib*, 125.
34. *Ibid.*, 124; See *Haft Anjuman* (Ben. Ms.) ante, 65b-66a.
35. The despatch here is naturally somewhat vague, because of the delicate nature of the subject.
36. Mulla Yahya Navaiyat, the younger brother of Mulla Ahmad, and a Bijāpuri noble who had joined the Mughals (Dec. 1663). See Sarkar, *Aurangzib* IV, 123.
37. See *Aurangzib*, IV, 118-119.
38. Text has Mulla Haram which should be read as Mulla Khurram.
39. Jafar Khan 'Udmt-ul-Mulk (Jumlat-ul-Mulk) was appointed wazir 'Azam on 30th Dec. 1663 and died on 6th May, 1670. M.U. Text I. 531-5; Eng. Tr. I. 722-3: Sarkar, *Aurangzib*, III 65-67.
40. cf. "The zamindārs of the Karnātak and the Abyssinian mercenaries who had established themselves in the Karnul district (south of the Raichur Doab) in almost open independence of the King of Bijapur, were invited with tempting offers of reward to join Jai Singh". Sarkar, *Aurangzib*, IV, 122.
41. *Khandaklā* or *Khadkalā*, i.e. lower fort of Purandar, See note 13 Section A ante. *Kondana* is 11 miles S.W. of Punā.
42. If "this month" referred to Rabi II, it would correspond to 22nd Oct., 1665. The Emperor's solar birthday fell on 25th Oct. 1665. Delhi MS. 60a.
43. Eldest son of Mirza Rajah Jai Singh. When Shivaji interviewed the latter, Rām Singh was "favoured with the grant of a robe of honour jewels, and a female elephant". *Ālamgirnāmāh*, 907. *Ma'āsir ul Umara*, Text II. 301-3; Eng. Tr. II. 591-3.
44. The campaign against Shivājī was over in three months (14th March-12th June, 1665). Jai Singh started from Purandar for the invasion of Bi'apur after five months. The date of departure is given by Sir J. N. Sarkar, in *Shivaji* (5th edn.) P. 127 as 20th November, 1665 but as 19th November in *Aurangzib* IV, 129.
45. Dandā—Rājpurī, constituted 'the head-quarters of the land-possessions of the Siddis' or Abyssinians of the rocky island of Janjira, 45 miles south of Bombay. The town of Rājpurī on the mainland is $\frac{1}{4}$ mile east of it, while Dandā on the shore of the creek is 2 miles s.e. of Rājpurī. The area possessed considerable strategic and commercial importance. The Siddis developed their independent power on the dissolution of the Nizāmshāhi dynasty of Ahmadnagar, but had to submit to Bijāpur government, which, however, recognised them as their own representative in the district (modern Kolaba). They also developed their naval power, unmatched by any Indian power on the west coast. Shivājī's 'life-long ambition' was to acquire Janjira. To the owner of Konkan, the Siddis should either be made an ally or powerless for mischief. On the other hand the possession of Dandā-Rājpurī and the

adjacent district was indispensably necessary for the very existence of the Siddis. So there were frequent skirmishes between these two powers. In 1659, the Siddis ceded Dandā-Rājpurī to Shivājī, but had to resort to piracy and depredations. So Shivājī began to build his navy.

46. By the Treaty of Purandar, the territory of Janjirā, contiguous to Shivājī's dominions, was left to him if he could conquer it.

47. Cf. "He (Jai Singh) also wrote to the Abyssinians of Janjira to unite with him, promising them enrolment in the Mughal peerage and other benefits, though he secretly plotted with his master to contrive their destruction and the annexation of their territory to the empire". Sarkar, *Aurangzib*, IV, 122.

48. See f.n. 1 *ante*, Section D.

49. Son of Jaswant Singh. See f.n. 11 *ante*.

50. About 35 miles S.E. of Purandar.

51. Cf. "Jai Singh also intrigued with many other zamindars of Bijāpur and sent to them letters for seducing them from loyalty to their legitimate sovereign and offering them service under the Mughal Emperor. When Adil Shah protested against this conduct, Jai Singh replied that it had always been the practice of Mughal viceroys to grant letters of conciliation to all who solicited their favour". Sarkar, *Aurangzib*, IV, 122.

Amir ul Umarā i.e. Shaista Khān was viceroy of the Deccan, 1659-63: Mahārajah Jaswant Singh went to assist him in the Deccan. Sarkar, *Shivaji* (5th ed.) Ch. 4. *Ma'āsir ul Umarā* Text III, 599-604; Eng. Tr. I, 754-6.

SECTION E

THE CAMPAIGN IN BIJAPUR

Initial successes of the Mughals : Conquest of Phaltan and Thāthvadā :

It is being submitted that on 21st Jumadi I (20 November, 1665) I accorded reception to the royal mandates, [Benares Ms. 79b/Sarkar Ms. 53] one of which bore the signature of the Emperor and also the *Khila't i khassa* (special robe of honour) which was sent to me.

After despatching Mulla Ahmad to the Court, I sought the Emperor's assistance, apparent and hidden, and advanced on the expedition stage by stage.¹ It is proper to despatch the first *'arzdāsh*t after one or two victories. First I turned my attention towards the strong fort of Phaltan² which lies in the *jāgir* of the chief 'Ādil Khāni noble and the *zamindāri* of Bajāji Nimbālkar (of Phaltan).³ Shivā sent Netu⁴ in advance with a suitable contingent, so that he may keep the besieged engaged till the arrival of the victorious army. After the arrival of Netu at that place an engagement took place until the advance of the victorious army shook the position of the besieged. Being dispirited they took to their heels towards the jungle and the fort came to the possession of the imperialists. Siddarām Cowar⁵ was put in charge of the fort with a suitable contingent of horse and footsoldiers as might be learnt from the news-sheets. After that the fort of Thāthvadā⁶ which is perched on a hill and is situated 7 *kos* north of Phaltan and a place of refuge [Benares Ms. 80a/Sarkar Ms. 54] was delivered to his men after he had sent his contingent and won over the besieged. Subsequently the royal officials were put in charge of the fort and a report would be submitted thereof. The total revenue of both these forts amounts, it is reported, to more than one lakh of *hun* ; the actual amount would be fixed afterwards.

It is hoped that the conquest of these two strong forts, one of which in extent and solidity is superior to the fort of Chakna⁷ and the other equalling that of Rohirā, perched on a hill and

very strong would be a cause of good fortune and happiness of the Emperor. The keys of both these forts have been sent to the Emperor and may be seen.

Jai Singh's successful intrigues with Mulla Ahmad :

Mulla Ahmad^s on the receipt of the special robe with jewelled dagger and the *mansab* of 6000 *zat* and 6000 *suwar* and 2 lakhs of rupees in cash, became a recipient of eternal felicity. Even since his arrival he has been striving to come to a settlement with 'Ādil Khān so that his garb of rectitude, goodness and reputation might remain. I wanted that such a peerless man in Bijāpur should come out of that region but that at the same time he must not say anything about the affairs of 'Ādil Khān which might run counter to the objectives of the Emperor. As our objects and motives differed there was much wrangling, the details of which will unnecessarily lengthen the letter. At last after thousands of efforts and much persuasion I made him agree to this view and allowed him to take his leave. He might say before the Emperor whatever he wanted. Ba'āz Khan and Ghāzi Beg (Yasāwals) were sent along with him, so that, accompanying him up to Aurangābād (*Khujaṣṭa buniyād*), they would every day make him proceed to the goal. From that place Saf Shikan Khān would give him an escort [Benares Ms. 80b/Sarkar Ms. 55]. His departure from that kingdom and joining the imperial service now is a sign of the auspicious fortune of 'Ālamgir. I had a talk with him re: the title and on that basis I suggest that the title of Jān-i-'Ālam (be conferred on him). Asad, his son, is a soldier, worthy of elevation and he would be successful in getting suitable *mansab* and title according to the *qaul* (agreement) given by the *Amir ul Umarā*. Besides the sum of two lakhs of rupees which have been given to Mulla Ahmad by way of *tankhwah*, another sum of 50,000 rupees has been earmarked as *tan* for Asad and his companions. As I learn from the talks with the Mulla, he had great familiarity with Mu'azzam Khān, the deceased Khān i Khānān. If through his mediation, the demands upon Muhammad Amin Khān, who is a well-meaning loyal servant of the Court, are settled, I would consider it to be good for the state.

The paraganas of Kalyān and Bhivandi better known as

Islāmābād, a dependency of Mul Kokan of Nizām ul mulk, including several villages and *mahāls* of the conquered lands, constitute the home land and habitation of Mulla Ahmad and most of the Navāiyat clan. There are many deserving (i.e. poor) men enjoying *sayurghāl* lands there." As these are a martial people and as the pacification of Mulla Ahmad is necessary, so the sanads were confirmed, written out and delivered. I considered this to be in the interest of the state. But now I await orders according to which the *mutasuddis* (accountants or clerks) would act.

Shivaji's services in the Bijāpur Campaign :

As regards the issue of the *farmān* in the name of Safi Khān¹⁰ according to the '*arzdasht* submitted by me concerning the attachment (*zabt*) of the Nizām ul Mulki territories and the ascertainment of the revenues thereof through conciliation and suitable treatment of the people of devoted (*obudiyat*) Shivā and the grant of 2 lakhs of rupees from the [Benares Ms. 81a/Sarkar Ms. 56] imperial treasury for his army at the time of emergency, I consider it as an excessive favour shown to me. Sanction may be given to the payment of the instalment this year in *tuyul* as *tankhwah* of his son. Secondly, the *dīwāns* will fix the salary after calculating the increase or decrease. It would be gracious if the Emperor issues necessary orders. It may be clear to the Emperor that my agreement or conflict with others is always with a view to ensuring the good of the imperial affairs and I have no other motive. In view of this fact I have considered it advisable for the state to keep Shivā engaged in acts of devotion. Much can be accomplished by him. In fact in the very beginning of this expedition he had rendered good service, in devastating and overthrowing the 'Ādil Khāni army, then present in Mulkokan Bijāpuri. According to the hints given by me and getting an opportunity he put to death about 300 men from that group including Sarmāhan who was a confidential soldier (*sipahi muqarrabe*) of 'Ādil Khān and the chief of the daring soldiers ready to risk their lives and also Fateh Punni and many other remarkable men of that country. He captured some of them. A fresh enmity has cropped up between him and the Bijāpuris. He is always prepared for service and sacrifice of his life at the head of 2000

horsemen and 7000 footsoldiers. The services that he rendered in the fort of Phaltan and Thāthvadā have been mentioned above. In short the lands yielding one lakh *hun* of Nizām ul mulk have been attached to crown-lands this year and nothing has remained for him by way of profit.¹¹ After enquiry it has transpired that the revenue of the dependencies, 12 forts which had been granted to him, is small and does not come up to one and a half lakh. At any rate at the end of this year, after due investigation of the entire amount it is hoped that according to the royal mandate, Hāji Shafī Khān, in agreement with me, would settle lands yielding one lakh *hun*. Meanwhile [Benaras Ms. 81b/Sarkar Ms. 57] if the Emperor is graciously pleased to give him a special robe of honour with a jewelled dagger in recognition of the good services that he has rendered at my request it will be very opportune.¹²

Emperor rewards some officers :

I have to express thanks for the change in the *mansab* of 1000 of Qutbuddin Khān¹³ from the conditional to the unconditional, the grant of 2000 *suwar* to Amar Singh Chandrāwat, and 1000 *suwār* to Raghunāth Singh Mairtia.¹⁴ Having congratulated the aforesaid persons on these favours I have exhorted them to be more devoted in service.

Jai Singh recommends promotion to Dā'ud Khān and Bhojrāj Kachwāha :

As regards Dā'ud Khān¹⁵ I have made my submissions and I hereby submit further that he is a very serviceable officer and has got a good contingent under him. It is hoped that he may be favoured with an increase of 1000. Bhojrāj Kachwāha has got a contingent more than that laid down in the regulations and has with him serviceable men. He is himself a self-sacrificing soldier. I recommend a suitable increase for him. If these prayers are granted, it would redound to the glory of this servant (i.e. Jai Singh) and win their hearts.

Jai Singh accounts for the delay in starting for the Bijāpur expedition :

As regards the imperial order to me to start on the expedition soon, I have borne it in mind. As far as possible, I never

make any delay in performing the services entrusted to me. The treasure amounting to 20 lakhs of rupees was received on the 14th Jumadi I (13 November, 1665).¹⁶ Immediately I set myself during the remainder of the month to make due arrangements and pay the salaries due to the troops and then set out on 21st (20th Nov. 1665). The delay of a few days that occurred was owing to the need of despatching Mulla Ahmad and effecting abatement of baggages and accoutrements of the army. The Emperor has graciously sanctioned up to 10 lakhs of rupees for the expenses [Benares Ms. 82a/Sarkar Ms. 58] of the army of Safi Khān. If he had taken this amount now it would have whetted the demands of others. I asked the Khān to requisition the money only when it was necessary, and then it would be sent without delay.¹⁷ I have been trained by my *murshid* (i.e. the Emperor). I would not waste a single *dam* needlessly.

Mulla Yahya :

Again the letter of 'Umdat ul mulk Ja'far Khān¹⁸ written, in accordance with the (imperial) order, to Mulla Yahya¹⁹ was received. It was to the effect that if I am satisfied with him, there might be an increase of 500 *zat* and he could be taken with me, otherwise he should be sent to the Court. Although the tendencies and the modes of the people of the Deccan are not worthy of reliance, yet in summoning and despatching Mulla Ahmad to the Court, I have displayed my well-wishing for the empire. At any rate, as he has been instrumental in bringing Rustam Randaula²⁰ and he is an intermediary, his son whom 'Ādil Khān at this time has appointed the chief of a force is Mulla Yahya. He sent his *qaul* and agreement to some other people also. If, after all this, he remains straight in his words and deeds and loyal to the state it would be better. Otherwise he would be sent to the Court. But in these circumstances I would request for written papers in accordance with the royal mandate,—one relating to an increase of 500 on what had been granted to him and the other 500 in view of the exigencies of the time, the total being 1000. It should be written in that letter that as requested an increase of 1000 had been effected in the *mansab* of Mulla Yahya and he should carry out the

duties which he had promised. In that case he would get promotion. As for the second paper it should be to the effect that Mulla Yahya was being [Benares Ms. 82b/Sarkar Ms. 59] summoned to the Court and that he should be sent immediately. God willing, action would be taken according to that letter to which his deed and conduct would conform.

Jai Singh's recommendations for the sons of Bahādur Khān :

Another affair was concerning the *altamgha* of Bahādur Khān the deceased, which was also recorded in the reports of the diwān. I also had given the details thereof. I know for a long time what the Emperor has in mind about it. And whatever was said about concessions must be present in your mind. Now I submit that Dilir Khān, is a very useful and serviceable officer, through whom the Afghans who form more than half of the army of Bijāpur may be managed. I pray that 11 lakhs *dam* by way of *altamgha* be granted to Izzat and others, the sons of Bahādur Khān.

Disaffection of Dilir Khān :

In this connection the affliction and indignation (*dilgiri*) of Dilir Khān²¹ proves to be prejudicial to many tasks which are likely to happen. Although it would be impudent to submit repeatedly that this obstruction should be removed yet, owing to the fact that the things submitted have often come from our own army, there is a likelihood of disunion occurring among the imperial servants on disclosure of those matters. Although the enemy is worthless, he might get scent of it and set his affairs aright. In the case of both these situations it is necessary to observe caution in my '*arzdāsh*t, specially with a view to removing this obstruction from that side.

Jai Singh's recommendations to win over 'Abdul Muhammad Miāna, son of Bahlol (Bijāpuri) and other Bijāpuris :

Bahlol,²² who in the past owing to his ill luck, fled from Hindusthan to Bijāpur had two sons. The first 'Abdul Qādir, inherited his father's title after his death. The second, 'Abdur Rahim, was so entitled after the death of his brother [Benares

Ms. 83a/Sarkar Ms. 60]. The details of these are known to the Emperor. When Bahlol Khān also departed (from this world)²³ there were left seven sons of 'Abdul Qādir and seven of 'Abdur Rahim. Induced by avarice, 'Ādil Khān²⁴ conferred the headship of the family on 'Abdul Karim, son of 'Abdur Rahim, who, in the estimation of the Afghans, was not so true-born as 'Ābdul Muhammad, son of 'Abdul Qādir. At this 'Ābdul Muhammad became disgusted with that place and turned towards the imperial court through the mediation of Dilir Khān.²⁵ After the coming of the *qaul* and the letters men came in his pursuit but they did not succeed in their object. He came and reached here. As it would be felicitous for those who seek the imperial service to be encouraged and,—his brother is still there, enjoying the title of his father,—for the sake of offering further inducements and encouragement to him and others, and keeping other things in view, I propose that the rank of 5000 *zat* and 5000 *suwār* on condition of six months (*az Karār i Sash mah*) in accordance with the regulations of Hindustān²⁶ and 50,000 rupees in cash by way of aid and a *jāgīr* of one lakh of rupees from pargana of Sultānpur Nadurbar may be granted to him so that he may keep his sons there and be made reliable and trustworthy. If, on seeing these favours, 'Abdul Karim Bahlol also turns towards the imperial court it would be advisable to confirm the title and the *jāgīr*s he already enjoys, and 'Abdul Muhammad may be granted another title. Otherwise the same title and *mansab*²⁷ (may continue). To grant such concessions in favour of 'Abdul Muhammad is to open the road to others; otherwise for other people, the *qual* has been given to the effect that the *mansabs* and the *jāgīrs* which they enjoyed in Bijāpur would be confirmed, but the aid in the shape of cash and a small *jāgīr* in their old country (Hindustān) would be for the sake of their sons, so that their minds might be set at rest. [Benares Ms. 83b/Sarkar Ms. 61] I hope that these things would take shape according to the proposals of the well-wishers of the state. For the present in regard to 'Abdul Muhammad I hope that my submissions would be accepted and an exalted farmān issued in his name.

Qutb Shāh to send reinforcements to the Mughals in Bijāpur :

The state of affairs of Qutb ul mulk is the same as has been

indicated in the royal orders. The reports of Khwāja Muhammad Darwesh, the envoy to Golkonda (*Sāhib i Golkonda*) about sending reinforcements to Bijāpur have been repeatedly received and the same have been sent. I have written repeatedly to him (i.e. Qutb ul mulk) in accordance with the contents of the *farmān* and also written to Khwāja Darwesh. If he sends it would be better, otherwise he would reap the consequences of his deeds.

Emperor accepts Jai Singh's recommendations Re : Dā'ud Khan and Bhojrāj Kachwāha :

On the first Sha'ban (27 January, 1666), I received two *farmāns* : one, decorated with royal signature, together with special robe, through Muhammad Amin mace-bearer; the second also illumined by the imperial signature through Niyāz Beg with a robe for the winter. I offer my thanks for these royal favours. I submit that the increase of 1000 horse on the existing *mansab* of Dā'ud Khan *du aspa seh aspa* and that of 200 horse on the *mansab* of Bhojrāj Kachwāha has been a source of exaltation to them and very gratifying to me. I offer my salutation for the same.

Re : Dilir Khān, the sons of Bahādur Khān and 'Abdul Muhammad :

The Emperor, the cherisher of his slaves, has been pleased to pass orders for the suspension of the demand of the instalment of one lakh on Dilir Khān and for the grant of *altamgha* villages to 'Izzat and Muzaffar, sons of Bahādur Khān. [Benares Ms. 84a/Sarkar Ms. 62]. The said Khān has been exerting himself and devoting his life in winning the goodwill of the Emperor. Any favour shown to him is opportune and just proper. The sanction of the *mansab* of 5000 *zat* and 5000 *surwār* for six months according to the regulations of Hindustān, and the allowance by way of aid and the grant of *jāgir* to 'Abdul Muhammad, son of 'Abdul Qādir, son of Bahlol, is the cause of favours and expectations of others. The aforesaid 'Abdul Muhammad is a warlike, young and useful person. An *'arzdāsht* has been submitted to the Court by him and he is praying for a reply to the same.²⁸

Jai Singh's recommendations for Asad, son of Mulla Ahmad deceased :

Favours had been bestowed on Mulla Ahmad. How I wish that Fate had vouchsafed a longer life and granted more time to him so that the Emperor could have seen him and realised his capacity and worth. I have already reported that his son (i.e. Asad)²⁹ is a useful soldier, and that he has got such a reputation in the regions of Bijāpur. They tell us that in the battle against Siddi Jauhar and in other places he made himself prominent and this is evident from his face. He is also very skilled in calligraphy and is generally uncommunicative. In short, he (Mulla Ahmad) had entered the imperial service at the end of his career and I hope that his son should be exalted with suitable title and *mansab*. The sum of two lakhs of rupees, the half of which was to be paid out of the account of the marching army and half out of that of *Khujaṣṭa buniyād* (Aurangābād) had been suspended after that affair. The remaining sum of 50,000 rupees and another sum which was given by way of aid by his followers [Benares Ms. 84b/Sarkar Ms. 63] were taken from the royal treasury in accordance with his requests and the *hundi* (bill of exchange) for it was given by him to me. An order may be issued so that I might adjust it.

Bijāpur Campaign : Jai Singh creates a diversion ; Shivāji's proposal :

The despatch³⁰ of a rich robe of honour and a jewelled dagger for the loyal Shivā at my request is very opportune and a proof of the Emperor's favours. He had exerted himself to the utmost in imperial service up to the neighbourhood of Bijāpur. He was ready to co-operate at the siege of the fort of Bijāpur. But for reasons detailed in a separate letter, I did not deem it expedient. On this he said to me, "I would be responsible for the cavalry charge and assault. I do not know to what extent it would be effective. If you detach me, I can proceed towards the fort of Panhala, of which I know all the ins and outs and while the garrison would be off the guard I can capture it and offer it as a *peshkash* to the Emperor. I shall raise so much tumult and disturbance in that district that the enemy will be compelled to divert a large force from their

army to oppose me." As the signs of his action were visible from the forehead of his talk³¹ I gave him leave to depart on the promised errand with a few men.³²

Shivaji's night attack on Panhala fails (16th January):

On the 5th day he reached the place and in the last *pahar* of the night he delivered the assault on the fort of Panhala. But the garrison of the fort had got information before and offered a stubborn resistance. About 1000 men of Shivā fell down, were killed or wounded. When the rising sun lit up the scene, he found it madness to continue the struggle and he was compelled to withdraw his men from there. He retired baffled to the fort of Khelnā³³ at a distance of 60 *kos* from there and stayed there. He sent his troops for assault and plunder here and there [Benares Ms. 85a/Sarkar Ms. 64] and the lands of the worthless enemy were ravaged. Siddi Masaud,³⁴ 'Abdul 'Aziz³⁵, Rustam Randaula³⁶ and others and about 600 horse of those demoralised contingents made attack on Shivā.³⁷ The long and short of the matter is that Shivā carried out whatever he had at the time of his departure; he brought his deeds in accord with his words. Now that he has received the glad tidings of imperial favours he would be much more active in the imperial service than before.

First month of Bijāpur Campaign: Jai Singh's uninterrupted triumph (Purandar to Mangalbira):

I have already sent an *'arzdāsh*t about the entry of the victorious forces into the land of Bijāpur and the capture of the forts of Phaltan and Thāthvadā. After that the situation is this: it had been learnt from the report of Mulla Muhammad Sādiq, *Sāhib* (envoy) of Bijāpur and the submissions of certain reporters that *the enemy's troops are disunited and quarrelling among themselves; the fort of Bijāpur has no protective works, no materials or provisions for standing a siege; and as soon as the imperial army arrives in that tract most of the nobles (chiefs), pillars of state (*ārkān*) and gentry (officers) (*aiyān*) of that region will enter into the circle of imperial servants. On account of these occurrences 'Ādil Khān would be brought down on his knees. If such be the situation I shall not let

this golden opportunity to slip away.³⁸ Having got complete information about the chief features and suburbs of that fort, I shall devise my plans for the accomplishment of my purpose. I have postponed summoning (i.e. without waiting for the arrival of) any big artillery and siege materials (for taking the fort) from Parenda.³⁹ Making forced marches I reached the fort of Mangalbira⁴⁰ which is at a distance of 60 *kos* from Bijāpur, and sent Netu with a contingent to Shivā.⁴¹ Those in the fort being unable [Benares Ms. 85b/Sarkar Ms. 65] to maintain their stand took to their heels. Sarfrāz Khān was appointed the *faujdār* (of the district) and Udit Singh Bhadauriyah⁴² was given charge (*qiladār*) of the fort which was strongly fortified, made of stone, strong, extensive and high above the ground.

The Mughals halted: defensive preparations and 'scorched earth' policy of the Bijāpuris:

The fact about the forces of the wretches is this: till the arrival of the victorious army within a distance of 6 *kos* from Bijāpur,⁴³ more than 20,000 of the enemy, who were in agreement with 'Ādil Khān in short-sightedness, had gathered. The path had been opened for the cavalry and foot soldiery of the Karnātak and a large army was expected to arrive from Qutb ul mulk (to help Bijāpur).

As regards the features of the fort of Bijāpur it has been put in a strong posture of defence; its extensive, high and solid walls have been repaired; large quantities of provisions and material have been laid in. The regular garrison of the fort had been reinforced by more than 30,000 foot soliders of the Karnātak. It was impossible for such a siege to be laid as might reduce the defenders of the fort to their last extremities. Outside the fort⁴⁴ the tank of Nauraspur, which provided water for the whole army of Āsaf Jāh as well as the tank of Sāhu (Shāhpur) had been damged and drained dry; the *baoli* wells in the environs of the city had been filled with earth; what was likely to be destroyed by the imperial army they themselves had ruined and made desolate. They had razed large buildings to the ground and cut down big trees, so that not a green branch or shade-giving wall left standing (to afford shelter to

the invaders). It did not behove the victorious army to use its hand in such desolation. The victorious army did not find any trace of the power of resistance in the enemy which bore marks of defeat.

The Bijāpuri diversion in Jai Singh's rear :

Under the leadership of short-sighted Iliyās, well known as Sharzā⁴³ and (Siddi) Masaud, 'Aziz, Dalil and other wretches, the enemies invaded the imperial dominions and raised tumult; many of them took shelter in the fort of Bijāpur. They did not make themselves prominent in any place. The pile of grain which was with the (imperial) army was nearing its end.⁴⁴

Mughal Retreat begins : 5 Jan. 1666 :

[Benares Ms. 86a/Sarkar Ms. 66] For the seven days that the victorious army remained in that land⁴⁷ they had nothing tangible to do and therefore it was considered advisable to turn back in order to expel the enemy's raiding parties that had invaded the imperial dominions. As soon as we reached the bank the river Bhimā⁴⁸ which is at a distance of 15 *kos* from Bijāpur the accursed Iliyās with other archers (*Kamānān*) from Bijāpur came out from imperial territories and re-entered their own devastated *lāluqs*. For four or five days I was on the look out for an opportunity to smash the accursed ones. Although I was always engaged in conflict, the object was not achieved.

Jai Singh plans a second advance :

Success was not achieved in accomplishing this task. Accordingly considering it necessary to strengthen the fort of Mangalbira with implements of war, I left in the fort Sayyid 'Abdul 'Aziz, an experienced soldier, with Udit Singh Bhadauriyah and horse and footsoldiers, the details of which would be known to the Emperor from the news-letter. I decided to rest at the foot of the forts of Sholāpur and Parenda and, then effecting necessary curtailment in baggage and encumbrances, to make a dash at their army and country and finally decide upon what was expedient.⁴⁹

First contact with the Bijāpuris :

After the capture of the fort of Mangalbira when the army was about to make a march, news arrived on 25th Jumadi II (23 December, 1665) that the defeated Bijāpuri army had come at a distance of 5 *kos* from the victorious army. Before any act of insolence could be done by those black-fortuned people, I considered it advisable to send the victorious army for punishing them.⁵³

First battle, 27th December, 1665 :

On 29th of the said month (27th December)⁵¹ Dilir Khān, Rajah Rāi Singh, Qutb ud dīn Khān, Fateh Jung Khān, Kirat Singh (my son)⁵² and Shivaji and others were deputed to the task of punishing those people.⁵³ [Benares Ms. 86b/Sarkar Ms. 67] Before the arrival of the victorious army those accursed people abandoned their camps and took to their heels. When I proceeded to join the victorious army, 'Abdul Muhammad, who these days is *madār i kār* (lit. Principal of affairs) of these regions (i.e. Bijāpur) and 'Abdul Karim Bahlol and Ilyās Māhdavi *alias* Sharzā, Ikhlas, son of Khān Muhammad, Vyānkoji, son of Shāhu Bhonsla, and Jādav Rao of Kaliani (Ghorpare) and other insignificant chiefs,⁵⁴ made their appearance. The intrepid Dilir Khan proceeded, with other brave warriors, both on the right and left, to face the enemy who were unable to maintain their stand, and dispersed in every direction, some to right, some to left and some in the rear.⁵⁵ Out of them one contingent of the enemy from the left faced Rajah Rāi Singh, who was the right hand man of Dilir Khān. The Rajah bravely threw his horse amidst the crowd, and engaged himself in repulsing them. Subhkaran⁵⁶ and Mitrasen Bundela, whom the said Rajah, had appointed his vanguard, did good deeds. Yāqut, the Abyssinian, who was one of the great warriors on the enemy side, was killed. Fourteen or fifteen captains were also put to the sword. One parasol (*Chhatra*), two standards, 20 horses and 2 swords were captured.⁵⁷ Dilir Khān and the other officers repeatedly repulsed the opposing forces. After a good deal of exertions when some distance has been covered, the army began their return march to the camp. The accursed ones, in accordance with the

practice of the Deccanis, divided and galled (the imperialists) severely from the two wings and rear. When they were attacked they sustained defeat. [Benares Ms. 87a/Sarkar Ms. 68] In the meanwhile a number of them came to face the army of Shivā which was under Netu.⁵⁸ They hemmed him round and pressed him hard. He placed his reliance on (i.e. called for reinforcements from) Kirat Singh, my son, who had a very inferior force under him. The latter with Fateh Jung Khān came to his help and repulsed the enemy. Meanwhile a *Ramchangī* musketshot⁵⁹ struck Jādav Rāo of Kaliani, who entered the hell after 5 or 6 days.⁶⁰ Dilir Khān, with other officers having gained success, returned to the camp after two hours had passed after dusk.

Second Battle of 28th December, 1665 :

On the first of Rajab, after the arrival near the halting place (*Manzil*), the informants brought the news that the right hand contingent of the enemy had made its appearance.⁶¹ I sent a wise man named Maqṣud Beg 'Alī to that side for ascertaining the truth of the news. He had not gone beyond half a *kos* from the victorious camp when the said chiefs appeared in rows. Besides this big army another was visible from behind. According to their old (i.e. usual) custom they sent a group to the right and other groups spread themselves in different sides.⁶² The engagement began from both sides with fire of rockets and matchlocks. Till the arrival of the news of the fighting column (*jadāwal*) in the camp it was necessary to stay. When Quth ud dīn Khān with those left behind in charge of bag and baggage joined the army, Dilir Khān who had reached with the *harāwali* (vanguard) forces, was summoned for the purpose of repelling those who had appeared on the left side. After the arrival of the said Khān and the engagement of the inferior army with the biggest division of the accursed ones, Kirat Singh, Fateh Jung Khān and Shivāji,⁶³ proceeded in front of the slaves. Achal Singh Kachwāha with a contingent of mine also proceeded further in full speed. [Benares Ms. 87b/Sarkar Ms. 69] The enemy took to flight, when those who were proceeding with alacrity followed the former closely on their heels ; they reduced the fugitives to extremities. In

their desperation those unlucky fellows began to fight with their swords and lances.⁶⁴ A desperate struggle took place with Achal Singh and with the forces of *iltimish* (advance guard of the centre).⁶⁵ The brother's son of Bhupat Panwar, who had himself died in the siege of fort of Purandar, suffered four to five wounds from swords and spears. They sent some of the accursed ones to the other world. In the same manner every one of these people threw those opposing them down from the saddle of horses down on the ground and killed them. About 100 of the accursed people were killed in that battle and many more were wounded.

Eventually they accepted the dishonour of flight and they were pursued up to six *kos*.⁶⁶ Dā'ud Khān with his followers was on my right side and he repulsed the forces opposing him. Rajah Sujān Singh,⁶⁷ at the head of the vanguard of the Khān's forces, performed good deeds and captured one parasol and two standards. Dilir Khān made a dash to attack the army on the left side. He had reached within a distance of an arrow shot and a fight with implements was impending when the accursed ones took to flight. They were pursued up to a great distance.

Third battle :

After reaching the camp on the 29th Rajab (25 Jan. 1666).⁶⁸ I used to stand every day to enjoin my men to take care of the bag and baggage and guard the treasure and wheeled field pieces (*rahkalah*) of the artillery.⁶⁹ Many of my followers had gone to their own camps because there had been no news of the approach of the wicked ones. I had no more than 4000 horse at a time, when I saw that Dā'ud Khān who was [Benares Ms. 88a/Sarkar Ms. 70] on the right hand of Dilir Khān had gone to the left side and was taking his stand there. The enemies became visible. Immediately I placed myself in between these two forces. In the beginning the accursed people were about 7000 horse in number and they were in front of me and Dā'ud Khān. Others had turned their face towards Dilir Khān, Kirat Singh, my son, with *iltimish* force (advanced guard of the centre) and Fateh Jung Khān were sent with a contingent to Dilir Khān. Much time had not lapsed when out

of 7000 who were on that side the majority went to oppose Dilir Khān. I also joined my forces with those of the said Khān. One *pahar* of the day was still left when the enemies acted insolently against Dilir Khān. The said Khān then fell upon them by performing valorous deeds and exerting himself and utterly defeated them. 'Izzat and Muzaffar, his brother's son, and 'Abdul Majid Bahlol, Ghālib Khān and Qubād Khān⁷⁰ and other officers of the court, who were in that army, performed good deeds at their own posts. On whomsoever of them the accursed people fell in large numbers, Dilir Khān immediately rushed to his rescue.

Jai Singh hard-pressed : Bijāpuris make an onset on his person :

At the time the said Khān was busy in meting out punishment to those unlucky and accursed ones he had gone much ahead of me ; the enemies turned away from Dilir Khān and, trickling down, gathered to face the forces under me. I made Kirat Singh and Fateh Jung Khān stand before me, and relying upon the grace of God and the favour of the Emperor, engaged them in battle. If these accursed people, acting under the idea that many of them had gathered together and there was very little force at my disposal,—although I was in charge of the management of the sole force,—had decided upon a desperate battle, they could not have [Benares Ms. 88b/Sarkar Ms. 71] a better opportunity.⁷¹ And the whole affair would be decided within the twinkling of an eye. The accursed ones having such ideas, summoned courage which they had lost and began to perform impudent deeds. As soon as those accursed ones approached us, I made a cavalry dash against them. Kirat Singh with the *iltimish* (advance guard of the centre) and the other officers who were appointed as vanguard and Fateh Jung Khān with a force came immediately to join the engagement. And I, with their help, began to exert myself. The fire of the battle began to blaze. First, Harnāth Chauhān, my servant, with his relations and followers, engaged the enemy. After fighting much against the accursed people and shaking them, he suffered 21 wounds and sacrificed his life for the work of the Emperor with his men in the battlefield. Sayyid Munāwwar Khān, and Rām Singh (son of Ratan Rāthor) and his brother

came from the *fauj i qul* (centre) and performed excellent deeds. And the sons of Kusal Singh Nanhavat (?) and the other servants of mine also fought in this battle and suffered wounds. The enemies tried their utmost but at last fled with heavy loss. They were pursued up to two *kos*. Dā'd Khān also came back from the place where he had taken his stand and joined us. [Benares Ms. 89a/Sarkar Ms. 72]. The victorious army also returned. A more detailed account will be known to Your Majesty from the news letter (*afrād i waqa'i*). The spies have brought the news that some 400 persons of the enemy or more were killed or wounded.

Jai Singh's recommendations for Sayyid Munāwwar and Rām Singh Rathor :

Sayyid Munāwwar is a serviceable officer and if he is favoured with an increase, he would render much more service. Rām Singh, son of Ratan Singh Rāthor, has also put in much exertion and requests for an increase of 500 *zāt* and 200 *suwār* on his *mansab*. I hope it will be sanctioned.

Deputation of Rai Karan to Zafarabad :

My son⁷² had, in accordance with the imperial orders, written for the deputation of Rai Karan to the fort of Zafarābād, if I approved of the suggestion. I offer my salutations for the royal favours. My approval depends upon the accomplishment of the royal tasks.

Jai Singh's detachment :

I have repeatedly submitted to Your Majesty that, in order to keep myself straight in my devotion I keep myself dissociated with all my relations and near ones. Their excellence and goodness lie in the fact that they have maintained my integrity (i.e. they have not played me false). Now if they are not willing (to co-operate) with me they should themselves take the initiative in performing the imperial tasks.

Jai Singh suggests transfer of Saf Shikan Khan :

Orders may be issued to Saf Shikan that he should be sent

either to Parenda or towards Purandar. I hope this fact should not be disclosed. He may say again that I pay my respects (to some) and accuse others.⁷³

Inefficiency and corruption in Mughal secret service :

The fact about the couriers (*harkārās*) is, as remarked by the Emperor, that even the tenth part of their news is not in consonance with reality ; and this is quite evident to Your Majesty. [Benares Ms. 89b/ Sarkar Ms. 73] Although there is none at Bijāpur who can detect the falsehood in their statements, yet the nature of their news and other signs of these ignoble and worthless people give clear proof that they are liars, selfish, greedy of gain and pro-Deccanis. For some time when the enemy forces were at a distance of 10 or 12 *kos* from the imperial army it was repeatedly ascertained that the Bijāpuris have bribed them into betraying to them all information about imperial army, big or small. Whatever they say is against the truth.⁷⁴ The presence of these people in the victorious camp is tantamount to giving the spies of the enemy access to us.⁷⁵

Jai Singh explains the failure in the Bijāpur campaign :

I hereby submit that on the 16th Sha'ban (11th Feb. 1666) I was favoured with the receipt of the letter written in the Emperor's own hand. The way Your Majesty has directed your devoted servants to establish *thānāhs* from Parenda to Bijāpur, to send an army for the punishment of the accursed opponents and to provide supplies (provisions) to the army reveals not only the excess of grace but also wisdom and knowledge of affairs of the Emperor.⁷⁶

Although to confess one's fault is also to travel along the way of devotion and to gain felicity, yet I consider it necessary to lay before Your Majesty the reality of the situation. I have already sent a detailed '*arz dāsh*t re: the abandonment of the siege of Bijāpur fort. [Benares Ms. 90a/Sarkar Ms. 74] Had it not been the case I would have appointed a force to punish those who had invaded the imperial dominions and established police posts on the way of the coming of the enemy, in spite

of the obstructions placed by those short-sighted enemies. If I had erected forts everywhere and left the *thānāhdārs* there, it would have taken a long time, and a smaller number of people outside the shelter of the *thānāh* would have perished. The Emperor might have come to know of the harm done to the enemies and the punishment meted out to them from place to place by the grace of God and through the good fortune of the Emperor. I hope that with the aid of God and fortune of the Emperor this expedition would be brought to a successful end.

Your Majesty knows how small Shivaji's territory is and yet how very long our troops had to fight against him (before achieving success). Surely, a war against such a kingdom requires very great effort and organisation (of resources). Knowing that the conquest of Bijāpur is the preface (*muqaddama*) to the conquest of all Deccan and Karnātak Qutb ul mulk and other *zamindars* of the south have thrown the veil of the face of devotion and obedience and they have united their interests (with 'Ādil Khān) and are acting in unison.⁷⁷ If this is the situation it is a matter of anxiety and requires earnest planning. I pray that I, who in my devotion and in performing the imperial service require no injunctions, may not be required to hurry up.

As regards what the Emperor has written about the nice sense of honour which makes Your Majesty think of proceeding to this region, why should your sacred Majesty take such trouble when your slaves are always ready to exert their utmost ? [Benares Ms. 90b ; Sarkar Ms. 75]. The accomplishment of this task would not be beyond the capacity of your servants. It had been represented before this that I was undertaking a trouble beyond strength but I have not ventured to say this nor would I ever do so. The minimum that is necessary for the accomplishment of the imperial tasks I do and shall ask for the same. I hope that even without the attainment of sanction⁷⁸ the most important thing about this expedition is to bring about disorder and disunion in the camp of the enemy. The chief nobles of that side had themselves represented that till they are reduced to the last extremities they would not lose heart. It is necessary to detach three races from the enemy. First, there are the Afghans who form more than half the army of Bijāpur and for whom the path was rendered easy by good

treatment and some of those who came were recommended for *mansab*, as will be evident from the news-sheets. The second group consists of the Abyssinians (*qaum i hābshī*) consisting of about 2000 brave troopers. Thirdly, the Māhdavi sect, foremost in raising tumult and numbering more than 3000 horse. The path of pacification was opened to them also and promises of royal favours were held out. These people have been practically dismissed there and are being oppressed.

After these (three races) have joined the imperialists, the Bijāpuri generals (*sardārān*) will be broken-winged and unable to carry out any exploit. Their hand of courage would be held back by the payment, by way of *lankhwah*, of something in cash and grant of many *jāgirs* (*tuyul*) from our old territory for the maintenance and sustenance of their children. Now from the egress and ingress of the victorious army the *tāluqas* of Naldrug, Sholāpur and Gulbarga, near the fort of Bijāpur and the entire country was devastated. Shivā plundered [Benares Ms. 91a/Sarkar Ms. 76] Hukri and Rāibagh and the places on that side. In these circumstances, when there is no possibility of the lands being populated for three years at least, how can people agree to come to that side in the hope of getting the *jāgirs*?⁷⁹ Although I, the slave of the court, know full well that the expenses of this expedition would not be (utterly useless) like those of Balkh and Kandahār, which did not yield adequate return, and that after the conquest of such an extensive kingdom (i.e. Bijāpur), God willing, we can get ample compensation, yet it is necessary to submit to the Court. It is hoped that, in view of the exigencies of the situation, it (the expenditure) should be approved.

The Emperor has issued an order to Shafī' Khān⁸⁰ to the effect that he must give effect to the recommendations for grant of *jāgirs* to whomsoever of these people (i.e. Bijāpuris) suggested by me, and must not put forward any excuse and make it a cause of delay; for even a little apathy shown might stop them from coming over to us. After the completion of this conquest the authority (responsibility) for performing all these works will vest in the hands of those who have got to deal with these affairs. As I have no other motive than to render service to the Emperor, I have ventured to make these submissions. I hope to be pardoned and be favoured (by the Emperor).

Jai Singh recommends promotion of his Bakhshi :

Regarding the increase (i.e. in *mansab*) and the title of Jāni Khan, the *Bakhshi* of the army, I have made my submissions before. The title was conferred on him but he is still awaiting the increase; as he is ready for service and had exerted himself in the expeditions and is a serviceable officer, therefore, I again request that he should be favoured with the increase.

Death of Emperor Shahjahan :

I have learnt from Your Majesty about the death of the late Imperial Majesty (Emperor Shahjahan).⁸¹ May God grant you a long life !

Military strategy proposed by Jai Singh for the overthrow of Bijapur—need of two Mughal armies :

[Benares Ms. 91b/Sarkar Ms. 77] I am submitting herewith separately my idea as to what I consider to be essential for the overthrow of the enemies by force. (i) *First*, if Your Majesty, as has been indicated in the letter, thinks of marching in person, then of what use would your servants be and why should they agree to your taking the trouble? You are suggesting a step which should be taken as a last resort. But the very news of the approach of the imperial army may cause the dissipation of the senses of the accursed enemy and this would have much to do in promoting the cause. (ii) *Secondly*, although I feel inclined to take upon myself the responsibility of this expedition, yet, as the management of the victorious army is a charge devolving upon me, I have considered it necessary to make my submissions.

The incorrect (*nādurast*) news about the Bijāpur expedition, which has reached the imperial ears, has no truth in it. The body of people who had to suffer defeat there are reduced to dire extremities. Moreover the aid of Qutb ul mulk openly given, was only to succour them. Sometimes both these wicked people get together and attain stability. The reality of the situation will be speedily ascertained. They have no legs of stability to stand on. And they are extending the hand of

plunder in every direction. If a small force is sent against them they hem round it and provide themselves with goods and property. But in the face of a bigger force they take to their heels. The advance of the imperial servants is for *mulkgiri* (conquest). To look behind is for the purpose of protection of the imperial domains. To precipitate matters is to invite resistance. To me it is crystal clear that two armies are necessary for the purpose of protecting imperial territories, [Benares Ms. 92a/Sarkar Ms. 78] the length and breadth of which are known to Your Majesty. When we, the slaves of the empire, advance for punishing the enemies of the empire and for conquering the territories of the hypocrites,⁸² another force should be left on this side (i.e. behind). The objective of both the armies would be same viz., the protection of the imperial dominions. They should be appointed for achieving this purpose. The ultimate object of the conjunction of the two armies is really for the purpose of advance. Although it is probable that at the time when the imperial dominions are denuded of the victorious army, the imperial army being engaged in devastating their territories,—the accursed enemies might not turn their attention towards this side, yet if they do so, both the armies,—those who are advancing and those with me,—would fall upon them. In the event of the enemy's not turning to this side, both the armies would, in unison, punish them adequately. If they divide themselves and raise tumult on two sides, these (two armies of ours) would adopt remedial measures, against them. But it is necessary to distinguish between the two armies and keep them separate in view of the vastness of the imperial domains as well as of the need of adopting caution on both sides. If I make a request for both these forces, I know that it might not be in accord with Your Majesty's wishes.

Although the details of the resources of the soldiers of the imperial army and the relative details of the men of Hindustan and the Deccan might already have been brought to your notice by the reports of the news-writers or they may be so brought later on, yet, in view of what I know of Your Majesty's mind, I have set apart, as stated in a separate sheet, a force consisting of the contingents of Dā'ud Khān, Qutb ud din Khān and others. I request that an army might be despatched from the imperial court. Mahārajah Jaswant Singh also is with Your

Majesty. If Your Majesty approves, the Mahārajah might be sent at the head of an army from the Court. After the appointment of both these armies, which will ensure composure of mind Your Majesty's servants will not spare any effort in engaging in battles and engagements whether it was the rainy season or not. [Benares Ms. 92b/Sarkar Ms. 79] If my name is brought in this matter and Dā'ud Khān and Qutb ud din Khān come to know that this counsel and request had been made by me, they might show disgust in accepting this service, or they might request for a selected body of the imperial force to be placed under them.⁸³ The difference it would make in the final issue of the affair would be quite evident to Your Majesty. The Emperor may issue an order and I hope that if these people want some other men from my contingent it may not be accepted.⁸⁴ Rather a peremptory order should be issued in my name (to the effect) that if any one proposed different names for deputation from the pick of the army, he would go against Your Majesty's wishes and that he would be dismissed from his service and deprived of his *jāgir*. If orders are issued on these lines it would insure the security of the imperial territories. A *farmān* should be issued to Dā'ud Khān that he should supply provisions for the army and that the Mahārajah may be made aware that he has to protect the imperial dominions. And it is imperatively necessary to depute trustworthy *bakhshis* and *waqa'i navises* in both the armies, so that people may be called to account and that at the time of emergency they may not put forward lame excuses and seek safety therein.

Bijāpuris besiege Mangalbira (3 Feb. 1666) :

The fact of the approach of the enemies and the siege that they laid to Mangalbira may have reached Your Majesty through the sheets of occurrences.

As a big force along with the people of that⁸⁵ side of the enemies was nestling under the forts of Sholāpur and Naldrug, waiting for an opportunity (to strike), if the victorious army went to the relief of the besieged of the fort (Mangalbira), those people (Bijāpuris), distressed in their circumstances, might have entered the territories of the empire [Benaras Ms. 93a/Sarkar Ms. 80] and raised tumults.

Recalcitration of Dā'ud Khān and Qutb ud din Khān (Khweshgi) :

Accordingly I ordered Dā'ud Khān and Qutb ud din Khān (Khweshgi) with my Right (*Maimanah*) and Rearguard (*Chandāwal*) wings to go to its relief ; for the enemy was reported to have numbered not more than 5000 horse and 6000 foot. I, with two other armies led by Dilir Khān and Rajah Rai Singh, was to have marched against the bigger (*Bijāpuri*) army (*Fauj i kalān*). These generals wasted some days in vain discussions (*harf o hakaik*), and, when strongly pressed, they flatly refused to go unless the left wing (*maisarah*) led by Rajah Rai Singh was sent with them. I could not but consent to it.⁸⁶ Allowing the three armies to depart I myself had to stay behind, apprehending the bigger army (of the enemy) either to proceed towards this side or raid the imperial territories ; in the latter case I would pursue them and chastise them adequately. By the grace of God and the good fortune of the Emperor they could not summon courage to make a move. At the approach of the three armies those short-sighted ones who had laid siege to Mangalbirā, raised it⁸⁷ and took to their heels. Our men, having thrown stores of grain and cash into the fort returned and on 24th Sha'ban (19 February, 1666) reached the imperial camp safely. If they are deputed to a different service and a good and new investigation is made into their offices, Dā'ud Khān and Qutb ud din,⁸⁸ both of whom adopted the same line and developed the same habit, may perhaps, keeping God and the Emperor in mind, render some service. Otherwise the fact is what has been stated.

Disloyal negligence of the Qiladār of Parenda :

I am motivated by no other consideration than the performance of service to the empire in bringing an accusation against the servants of the court. But I have been appointed to look after the management of the army (*ihām i lashkar*) and have to state facts. I had given an account of the facts about the *qiladār* of Parenda.⁸⁹ During this time Saf Shikan Khān had gathered a large number of *banjāras* (merchants) [Benares Ms. 93/b ; Sarkar Ms. 81] and had sent them. I, relying on this very thing, though that having made arrange-

ments for the provision of grain, we would proceed to the accomplishment of the object in view. But this man (the *qiladār* of Parenda) made no arrangements for the pacification of the *banjāras*. He did not keep them under control, with the result that they dispersed and went away.⁹⁰ Now after great efforts twenty thousand oxen of the *banjāras*⁹¹ had been gathered and the grain is being spent day after day. Although he is being asked to keep an eye on the imperial *karkhānās* and leave the camp followers near the *khandak* (moat or ditch) he puts forward excuses which are not worthy of credence. But the fact is that this is the place suitable for the provisions (arrangements) of such kind. Sikandar was killed uselessly, after having brought him from Parenda although he fought valiantly and ended his devoted life.⁹²

If all these efforts had been made in proper time with a good force something could have been achieved. The insolence and shortsightedness which the enemy committed was with regard to these two affairs—one, the affair of Sikandar and the other, the martyrdom of Sarafrāz Khān.⁹³ I had repeatedly written to the aforesaid Khān that although he was appointed *faujdār* of the environs of the fort, yet at the time of the arrival of the enemy he should enter the fort himself. The deceased, as ill luck would have it, paid no attention to this advice.

Initiative in Bijāpur Campaign not taken by Jai Singh :

I had taken no initiative in this work⁹⁴ and thought that this expedition would be undertaken in accordance with the royal orders. Now that the responsibility has devolved upon me, I pray to God night and day that the affair of this expedition should be accomplished in the way desired by the well-wishers of the Court. Till life is present in the body, I shall continue in the service of the Emperor. I have no other desire to put forward [Benares Ms. 94a/Sarkar Ms. 82] except that till breath remains in my body I should not be remiss in doing my duty.

Netāji deserts to Bijāpur : is lured back by Jai Singh :

Netu had gone along with Shivā, after taking leave. Afterwards he became dissatisfied⁹⁵ and deserted to Bijāpur. There he got a fortune worth 4 lakhs of *hun*, the annual revenue

of which was a little more than 12 lakhs of rupees. Then he came to raid the imperial territories. As he had become accustomed to such practices, I thought it necessary to pacify him and sent a messenger to reassure him. Meanwhile a trustworthy person came and said that if the *mansab* of 5000 *zāt* and 5000 *suwār* and a *jāgir* of 5 months in the old territory⁹⁶ together with 8000 rupees by way of reward (*inām*) and 30,000 rupees⁹⁷ by way of aid (*musāida*) are granted to him he would come back and join the imperialists. I, therefore, accepted that the aid, the *mansab* and the *jāgir* would be granted from the *Sarkār* (government) and that I would myself pay a reward of 8000 rupees from my own establishment (*khāna i khud*). I sent my *qaul* and agreement to this effect. As soon as he comes I shall dispatch my *'arzdāsh*t.⁹⁸

Jai Singh recommends increase in rank for officers, and concessions for others :

The imperial officers, who had put in their exertions in the capture of the fort of Purandar and been favoured with increase at my request, were pleading before me to remove the condition of joining the expedition. I wanted to submit an *'arzdāsh*t. Expediency demands that the feeling of discontent of everybody who rendered (loyal and devoted) service should be removed. So it is considered necessary to suggest the grant of unconditional increases. Although this would exceed the limits of the regulations and was against the desire [Benares Ms. 94b/Sarkar Ms. 83] of the Emperor, yet I deliberately ventured to make my suggestions about these *mansabs* and the increase of some men, for it appears to me to be necessary. I pray that for the sake of pacifying Your Majesty's servants they should be allowed to seek audience with the Emperor and if at the time of the interview, something else occurs to Your Majesty, I hope that it would be confidentially conveyed to my son, so that he may write to me about it. For the present the answer also may be sent through him. Whatever occurs to Your Majesty at any time would come to pass. Similar is the affair of aids and loans (*dast i gardan*).⁹⁹ Who is there today among the *jāgirdārs* of Hindustan and the Deccan who is not contentious and importunate in these matters? They placed their rights

and grievances before me. Along with them the 'aimādārs are also expressing great hardships on account of the non-receipt of the rents and the distance of the *jāgir*. As this is the time to take work, I pay them salary according to their needs and, God willing, I shall realise the same from their *jāgirs* without delay.

Loyal Shivāji to be sent to Court :

Shivā has proved very straight and correct in his devotion and servitude to the court and has kept the agreements and promises (*qaul* and '*ahd*') that he entered into. I am awaiting the time when I would send him to the Court. I would convince him by arguments and hold out the promises of pardon. Now that 'Ādil Khān and Qutb ul Mulk have united in mischief, it is necessary to win his heart by all means, and to send him to Hindustan before the Emperor makes a move towards the Deccan, so that he may have audience of Your Majesty.¹⁰⁰

1. *Disposition of the imperial army.*

- (i) Van (7500)—Dilīr Khān with entire artillery.
- (ii) Centre (12000)—Jai Singh.
- (iii) Right wing (6000)—Dā'ud Khān.
- (iv) Left wing (6000)—Raiah Rāi Singh Sisodia.
- (v) Left of the centre (9000)—Shivā.
- (vi) Besides the front skirmishers (*qarāwal*) the advance guard of the centre (*iltimish*) and Rearguard (*Chandāwal*) the two flanks were protected by two Divisions, marching parallel to the main army. Sarkar, *Aurangzib*. IV. 129 (based on A.N. 988).

2. Phaltan was reached on 7th Dec. 1665.

3. Baiājī Nayak Nimbalkar, *deshmukh* of Phaltan. Sarkar, *Shivaji*, 15, 60.

4. Netaji Pālkar, regarded by the Deccanis as "Second Shivaji". The Maratha contingent under Shivaji and Netaji (9000) constituted the left centre of the Mughal army.

5. Text reads Siddarām Gowar; Perhaps it may be read as Sudharām Gaur.

"During the first month of the campaign Jai Singh's march was an uninterrupted triumph. From Purandar to Mangalvide, a fort 52 miles north of Biāpur, the invaders advanced without meeting with any opposition. The Biāpuri forts on the way were either evacuated in terror or surrendered at call to Shivaji's men who had been detached from Jai Singh's army to capture them. . . ." Sarkar, *Aurangzib*, IV, 130. Shivaji was rewarded for the services with a letter of praise, a robe of honour and a jewelled dagger from the Emperor Parasnis Ms. letter No. 9. in Sarkar, *Shivaji*, 128.

6. Or Thathora, described as 13 m.S.W. of Phaltan (Sarkar, *Aurangzib*, IV-136) and 14 miles (Sarkar, *Shivaji*, 128) was reached on 8th December, 1665: Khatāv (25 miles S. of Phaltan) was reached about a week later. *Ibid*.

7. i.e. Chakān, It guarded the road to Puna from the north. Its keeper, Firangji Narsālā had to surrender it to Shaista Khān after a heroic defence, 1660. Sarkar, *Shivaji*, 53, 81.

Rohirā, a Maratha fort in Bālāghāt was wrested from Shivaji by Jai Singh.

8. Mulla Ahmad left for the imperial court sometime between 13th and 20th November, 1665. See *Ma'āsir i 'Alamgiri*, 52 (Eng. Tr. 33).

Kallian district (mod. Thānā), the northern part of the West Coast (Konkan) was held by a leading Bijāpur noble, Mulla Ahmad of an Arab family of Navāiyat clan. Shivaji invaded it in 1657 and seized the rich unwallled towns of Kaliān and Bhivandi, and turned them into naval bases and dockyards. It was lost and regained. See Sarkar, *House of Shivaji*, 99; *Shivaji*, 54-6, 166; *Aurangzib*, IV, 123-125.

9. Sayurgāhās or grants of land for charitable purposes. See Sarkar, *House of Shivaji* Ch. on The Leading Nobles of Bijapur, 1627-86.

10. Second son of Islam Khan Mashhadi. He was sent to the Deccan with Prince Mu'azzam in the 10th year of Aurangzeb's reign. *Ma'āsir ul Umara* Text II, 740-2; Eng. Tr. II, 667-9.

11. Text has *Wajah dakhil*.

12. For a reference to Shivaji's services as well as of his general Netaji, *Ma'āsir i 'Alamgiri* Text. 58-9 (Eng. Tr. 38).

13. Qutbuddin Khān Khweshgi deputed to the Deccan (*'Alamgīr-namah*, 827) under Jai Singh. He had already devastated Shivaji's territory with 7000 horse. Subsequently in the Bijapur campaign he was in charge of the rearguard and distinguished himself by heroic deeds. *Ma'āsir ul Umara* Text III 102-108; Eng. Tr. II. 550.

14. See note 19, Sec. D ante.

15. Dā'nd Khan Quraishi, *Ma'āsir ul Umara* Text II. 32-37; Eng. Tr. I, 464.

16. 12 November, 1665 in Sarkar, *Aurangzib*, IV, 129.

17. According to Sir J. N. Sarkar (*Aurangzib*, IV-120) the amount was placed with the *diwān* of the Deccan at his call. But this is not borne out by the above.

18. Ja'far Khān, Subāhdār of Mālwa, was appointed Wazir (9 November, 1663). *Ma'āsir i 'Alamgiri*, Text 47 (Eng. Tr. 29-30). Sarkar, *Aurangzib* III, 65-67 (Date of appointment as Wazir A'zam (30 Dec. 1663). M.U. Text I, 531-5; Eng. Tr. I, 722-23).

19. An Arab of the Navāiyat clan, settled in Konkan, Mulla Yahya, who had already joined the imperial service was "the intermediary in corrupting" Bijāpuri officers like Randaula (Rustam-i-Zamān), 'Abbās and others, Sarkar, *Aurangzib* IV, 123.

20. Randaula Khān (son of Farbād Khān and nephew of Khairiyat Khān) was an Abyssinian general of Bijapur. He was given the title of Rustam-i-Zaman and deputed to conquer W. Kanara (i.e. Ikeri and Bednur). The family held S. Konkan and Kanara in Kārwar dt. as their fief. He was the supporter of Shāhuji Bhonsle. Sarkar, *House of Shivaji* (3rd ed.) p. 99; *Shivaji*, Ch. X.

21. Dilir Khān Dā'ndzai (originally known as Jalal Khan), younger brother of Bahādur Khān Rohilla, was sent with Rajah Jai Singh against Shivaji. Afterwards he served in the vanguard of Jai Singh's army and devastated Bijapur, *Ma'āsir ul Umara* Text II. 42-56; Eng. Tr. I. 495-505.

22. For the history of Bahlol Khān Miāna, an Afghan noble of Bijapur, and his family, see Sarkar, *House of Shivaji*, (2nd ed.) pp. 94-97. The first to enter Mughal service, Hasan Miāna, died in the Deccan. His son, Bahlol, was promoted by Jahangir (1616) and given the title of Khān. Later on he became a soldier of fortune and joined Bijāpuri service (1647). His two sons, 'Abdul Qādir and 'Abdur Rahim became Bahlol II and III one after another.

23. 'Abdur Rahim (Bahlol III) died in July, 1665.

24. 'Adil Shah was induced by means of costly presents to confer the title of Bahlol Khan IV on 'Abdul Karim. Sarkar, *House of Shivaji* (2nd ed.), 95.

25. 'Abdul Muhammad Miana joined the Mughals two days after Jai Singh started (Nov. 1665). He served under Jai Singh (and other Mughal generals). But the main body of the Afghans remained loyal to 'Adil Khān under the leadership of 'Abdul Karim Bahlol Khān IV. So Jai Singh gained only slight advantage. 'Abdul Muhammad was raised to Mughal peerage as Ikhlās Khān (c. Feb. 1669). *'Alamgirnamah* 989; *Haft Anjuman*, 84a. Sarkar, *House of Shivaji*, 96; *Aurangzib*, IV. 130.

26. Jai Singh here proposed a First class rank for 'Abdul Muhammad, the *zat* and *sawar* ranks being equal. (Irvine, *Army of the Indian Moghuls*, 1962 ed. p. 6). It is well known that in the Mughal army pay was always in arrears. "Few of the officers received the whole twelve months' pay, the number of months pay sanctioned per annum ranging from four to twelve" (*Ibid.* p. 7). Nizam ul mulk boasted in his last testament (1748) that he "never withheld pay for more than three months". (*Ibid.*, p. 13). The expression *az karar i sash mah*, which does not occur in the above work of Irvine would imply that in that period of Aurangzib's reign the practice was to sanction was only for six months. See also *Haft Anjuman* 84a (Emperor's approval).

27. The text is doubtful here.

28. 'Abul Muhammad, grandson of Bahlol, joined Rajah Jai Singh after two stages had been passed. He was created a *5-hazari* (same number of troopers) at the Rajah's request and appointed to assist in the war. *Ma'āsir ul Umara* Text. 58 (Eng. Tr. 38).

29. On getting the news of the death of Mulla Ahmad, Aurangzib is said to have ordered to send his son Asad and other members of his family to the Court. *Ma'āsir i 'Alamgiri*, Text. 52 (Eng. Tr. 34). For the family, see Sarkar, *House of Shivaji*, ch. on Leading Nobles of Bijapur.

30. On 25th December, 1665, Sarkar, *Shivaji*, 130.

31. 'As his words bore promise of action'. *Ibid.*

32. Shivaji left Jai Singh on the bank of the Bhimā about 11th January, 1665. *Ibid.*, 131; also Sarkar, *Aurangzib*, IV. 137.

33. The attack on Panhala was made on 16th January. Khelna or Vishalgarh, Shivaji's own fort, was about 27 miles west of Panhala. Sarkar, *Shivaji*, 131; *Aurangzib*, IV. 137.

34. Siddi Masaud was the son-in-law of Siddi Jauhar. When the latter's son, 'Abdul 'Aziz, wished to imprison him, he took shelter in Adoni fort. Sarkar, *House of Shivaji*, 101; *Shivaji* 235, 310, 315, 324.

35. 'Abdul 'Aziz was the son of Siddi Jauhar. Jauhar, the Abyssinian, slave of Malik 'Abdul Wahāb and later on master of Karnul was created Salabat Khan by Ali Adil Shah II of Bijapur; died. 1662. Sarkar, *Shivaji*, 75-76; *House of Shivaji*, 101.

36. See note 19 ante.

37. From Khelna (Vishālgarh) where Shivaji went after the failure at Panhālā (16th January, 1662), he sent a Muhammadan officer with 2000 men to besiege Phonda (10 miles s.e. of Goa). The three Bijāpuri generals, Siddi Masaud, 'Abdul 'Aziz and Rustam-i-Zaman who were deputed by the Sultān with 5000 horse and 1000 foot to the Panhālā area, planned to surprise Shivaji. For details see Sarkar, *Shivaji*, 234-5. Thus though Shivaji failed at Panhālā he succeeded in drawing and detaining the Bijāpuris. Sarkar, *Shivaji*, 131; *Aurangzib*, IV. 137.

38. Sarkar, *Aurangzib*, IV. 128.

39. *Ibid.*, 129. cf. also *ibid.*, 134.

40. Brief reference to imperial advance in *Ma'āsir i 'Alamgiri*, Text 58-9 (Eng. Tr. 38). The fort of Mangalbirā (or Mangalvide) on the bank of the Bhima, 52 miles north of Bijapur, was reached on 18th

December, 1665. Jai Singh deposited his heavy baggage and other property here.

41. The *Maāṣir ul Umarā* (Text II. 469-73 : Trans. II. 717) states it was captured by Netu, commander-in-chief of Shivaji.

42. *ʿĀlamgīrnamah*, 992. For the life of Sarfrāz Khan Deccani, see *Maāṣir ul Umarā*, Text II. 469-73; Eng. Tr. II. 716-8. For Udit Singh, see Sarkar, *Aurangzib*, IV-132. M.U. (*op. cit.*) speaks of him as Udai, son of Raja Kishan Singh Bhadauriya M.U. II. 228-30. Eng. Tr. 828-29.

43. Jai Singh reached Makhnapur, 10 miles north of Bijāpur (or Nāgthāna, 8 miles n.n.e. of Bijāpur) on 29 December, 1665. Here his march was stopped. Sarkar, *Shivaji*, 129; *Aurangzib* IV. 133-4; *Maāṣir i ʿĀlamgiri*, Text 59. Eng. Tr. 38-9.

"This was destined to be the furthest point of his advance, for here the first stage of the war ended and the second stage began, in which the Mughals were outnumbered and out-manoeuvred by the Bijāpuris, totally lost the initiative and lived like a besieged camp as long they continued in hostile territory. By this time 'Ali 'Adil Shāh II's military preparations had been completed, all his vassals from far and near had gathered under his banners, a wise plan of combined defence and reprisal had been sketched and his capital and its environs had been rendered impregnable to attack". Sarkar, *Aurangzib*, IV. 133-4.

44. "... the country round, for a radius of six miles, had been remorselessly laid waste". Sarkar, *Aurangzib*, IV. 133.

"Adil Khan after strengthening the fort of Bijāpur, cut the banks of his tanks, filled up the surrounding wells with briars, razed to the ground the homesteads outside the fort, stood a siege, and appointed his army to repel the imperial forces". *Maāṣir i ʿĀlamgiri*, Text 59 (Eng. Tr. 39).

45. Sarkar, *Aurangzib*, IV. 134; *Shivaji*, 129.

Sayyid Iliyās, belonging to the Mahdavi sect, entitled Sharzā Khan (I) was 'the bravest of the brave' of the Decani warriors. He died suddenly during the campaign against Bijāpur on April 2, 1666. For details see Sarkar, *House of Shivaji*, 98-99; M.U. II 502-4; Eng. Tr. II, 624. For the life of Sarfrāz and his death during Sharza's attack on Mangalbirā. *Maāṣir ul Umarā* Text II, 469-73; Eng. Tr. II. 716-8.

46. "On account of the devastation of the environs of the fort, Jai Singh's army was faced not only with thirst, but also with starvation, as the pack-oxen of the grain-carriers (*banjāras*) accompanying the army could not get enough fodder and drink on the way". quoted in Sarkar, *Aurangzib*, IV. 134-5.

47. i.e. from Dec. 29, 1665, when Jai Singh entered Makhnapur to Jan. 5, 1666, when he was forced to retreat.

48. The text reads Bhunra i.e. R. Bhima. The Rajah crossed the river on 24th Rajab, 1076/20th Jan., 1666, *Maāṣir i ʿĀlamgiri*, Text. 59 (Eng. Tr. 39). "As the rainy season arrived, and the Rajah got a letter from the Emperor ordering him to pass the monsoon at Aurangabad, he gave up the campaign and returned." *Ibid.*

49. "His intention was to rest between the forts of Sholāpur and Parendā, leave his heavy baggage behind, and advance against Bijāpur a second time with a highly-equipped and mobile division". Sarkar, *Aurangzib*, IV. 135.

50. After reaching Mangalbirā 'the invaders marched on, and then on 24th December had their first contact with the enemy, because the Bijāpuri king had wisely concentrated all his forces near his capital and suffered the Mughals to penetrate unmolested thus far from their own frontier. In the night of the 24th the Bijāpuri Scouts, in the favourite fashion of the Deccanis, fired rockets into the Mughal camp". Sarkar, *Aurangzib*, IV. 130-31.

51. Sir J. N. Sarkar remarks (*Aurangzib*, IV. 130 n) that "for the

date of the first battle *Haft Anjuman* differs from 'Alamgirnāmāh by one day'. The date of the first battle given by him in the above book is 25 December 1665. But acc. to H.A. the date is 27th Dec. i.e. a difference of two days.

52. Rajah Rai Singh (Sisodia), *Ma'āsir ul Umārā* Text II, 197-301; Eng. Tr. II, 571-4. Qutbuddin Khān Khweshgi, M.U. Text III, 102-108; Eng. Tr. II, 548-52. Fath Jang Khān Rohila, *Ma'āsir ul Umārā* Text III, 22-26; Eng. Tr. I, 529-32. Kirat Singh, *Ibid.* Text III, 156-158; Eng. Tr. I, 827-8.

53. The Mughals marched 10 miles from their camp. The Bijāpuris numbered 12,000. Sarkar, *Aurangzib*, IV. 131-3; *Shivaji*, 128.

54. (i) The Bijāpuri Prime Minister was then 'Abdul Muhammad (Jan. 1661—Nov. 1672), son of Ibrāhīm Khān (also Wazir Nov. 1657—Dec. 1660). Sarkar, *House of Shivaji* (2nd ed.), 31. The text wrongly reads 'Abdul Majid.

(ii) On the death of 'Abdur Rahim Bahlol (III), son of Bahlol Khan Mīana (I) in 1665, Sultān 'Adil Shāh conferred the headship of the family on his son, 'Abdul Karim Bahlol (IV). This led 'Abdul Muhammad (s/o Abdul Qādir Bahlol II) to join the Mughals. *Ibid.* 95 also *ante*. He became Wazir (Nov. 1675-Dec. 1677). *Ibid.* 91.

(iii) Ilyas Mahdavi *alias* Sharza, *Ibid.* 97-98; f.n. *ante* 45.

(iv) Ikhlās, second son of Khan Muhammad (Muzaffaruddin Khan i Khanan, Wazir 1648-57), played a prominent part in Bijapur's resistance movements against Shivaji and Jai Singh (1665-6). As the head of the Deccani party, he subsequently ousted 'Abdul Muhammad and became Wazir as Khawās Khān (Nov. 1672-75). *Ibid.* 91, 93, *Aurangzib*, IV. ch. 42.

(v) Vyankoji was the half brother of Shivaji.

(vi) For Jādvā Rao of Kaliani, see f.n. *ante*.

55. "The Deccanis evaded the charge of the heavy cavalry/cavaliers of Delhi, but harassed them by their "Cossack" tactics, forming four divisions (dividing themselves into four bodies) and fighting loosely with the Mughal division opposite". Sarkar, *Aurangzib* IV. 131; *Shivaji*, 128.

56. For Subhakaran, see *Ma'āsir ul Umara* Eng. Tr. II, 720-1, 883.

57. "After a long contest Dilir Khān's tireless energy and courage broke the enemy force by repeated charges, and they retired in the afternoon". *Ibid.*

58. Netāji commanded the Mughal-Maratha rearguard and bore the brunt of the Bijāpuri attack. Sarkar, *Aurangzib*, IV. 131; *Shivaji*, 128.

59. It means some sort of light field piece. Irvine, *Army etc.* 137-8; Hodivala, 675.

60. Shivaji and his half brother Vyankoji fought on opposite sides. The Mughal loss was heavy. Sarkar, *Aurangzib*, IV. 131-32; *Shivaji*, 129.

61. "After a two day's stay, Jai Singh resumed his march on 27th December and next day in the afternoon, when approaching the halting place, he heard of the enemy's presence in force a mile off". Sarkar, *Aurangzib*, IV. 132.

62. "The Deccani horsemen, as usual, tried to envelop the Mughals, breaking into several loose bodies, each of which attacked its immediate opponent at the first sign of any weakness or disorder in the ranks of the latter. *Ibid.*

63. "The fighting soon became general, and Jai Singh himself had to charge the enemy's largest division. Shivaji and Kumār Kirat Singh, seated on the same elephant, led his van and dashed into the Deccani ranks". Sarkar, *Shivaji*, 129.

64. The Bijāpuris "began with a distant fire of rockets and matchlocks. But the Mughals, as was their wont, were eager to come to close

grips, and charged gallantly with sword and spear, while the Deccanis gave way but kept up a Parthian fight for the six miles they were chased." Sarkar, *Aurangzib*, IV. 132-33.

65. Irvine, *Army &c.* 226.

66. See f.n. 64.

"After a hard fight the enemy were put to flight leaving more than a hundred dead and many more wounded". Sarkar, *Shivaji*, 129.

67. Rajah Sujān Singh Bundela, *Ma'āsir ul Umarā* Text II, 291-5; Eng. Tr. 882-4.

68. The sequence of events mentioned in these despatches is not in strict chronological order. Examples have already been found before. Here is another. Between 28th December, 1665 and 25th January, 1666 many events took place which have not been mentioned. Sir J. N. Sarkar (*Aurangzib*, IV. 130n) has pointed out that (i) while the second battle is given in H.A. 87, the third battle is not given there, the fourth in H.A. 93b, while the fifth is given in H.A. 88, and that (ii) H.A. is entirely silent on events after 27 January, 1666. This is not wholly correct.

69. Irvine, *Army of the Indian Moghuls* (1962 ed.), pp. 135-141.

70. Ghalib Khān Bijāpuri, *Ma'āsir ul Umarā* Text II, 865; Eng. Tr. I. 579-80. Qubad Khān Mir Akhor, *Ibid.* Text III, 99-102; Eng. Tr. II, 531-4.

71. This seems to refer to the battle of Lohri on the bank of the Bhima (22 Jan., 1666), described in Sarkar, *Aurangzib*, IV. 139, 135n.

72. i.e. Ram Singh who was in the imperial court. Zafarabad is fort Kalian.

73. Evidently Jai Singh found disloyal activities on the part of Saf Shikan Khān whose duty was to arrange for provision of supplies to the imperial army. This is another instance of Jai Singh's being ill served by his subordinates; see Sarkar, *Aurangzib* IV. 149, and n.

Jai Singh's effort at ensuring secrecy in such matters is also highly commendable from the administrative point of view.

74. An efficient and reliable espionage system is one of the essential prerequisites of success not only in civil administration but also in military campaigns. Jai Singh was evidently ill served by his spies. Cf. Sarkar, *Aurangzib*, IV. 149.

For Mughal secret service, see Sarkar, *Mughal Administration*. See also Jagadish Narayan Sarkar, 'News-writers of Mughal India' in *Indian Press* ed. by Dr. S. P. Sen, Institute of Historical Studies, Calcutta, 1968.

75. The gist of this involved sentence of the text is as given below : ('In the Mughal camp itself, they acted as the enemy's spies'. Sarkar, *Aurangzib*, IV. 149).

76. It is already known that "As early as the beginning of January, 1666, when Jai Singh retreated for the first time Aurangzib had censured him for his failure and asked him to show what he had gained with the vast army and treasure given to him". When Jai Singh's second campaign produced no better result, he felt that he had fallen under his master's wrath, and that if this failure were not relieved, his life-long devotion to the Mughal throne would be forgotten and he would be dismissed with every mark of ignominy. The unhappy general tried hard to retain the command of the Deccan army, so as to get another chance of retrieving his fame. He was troubled by Court news of the Emperor's angry remarks on him and of a talk about sending Prince Mu'azzam to the South to supersede him in the vice-royalty. He then besought his son and friends at Court to exert themselves to save him : he offered the prime minister a bribe of Rs. 30,000 for inducing the Emperor to let him continue as *subahdar*. But is was all in vain". Sarkar, *Aurangzib*, IV 146-147 (based on *Basatin us Salatin* 415; *Haft Anjuman* 89b-93a, 195a-196b).

But here we come to know of two new facts : (i) Aurangzib's intention of coming personally to retrieve imperial prestige, (ii) Aurangzib suggested establishment of thanas from Parenda to Bijāpur to safeguard supplies and controlling the region.

77. "Aurangzib refused to forgive Jai Singh the one failure of his life. But the Rajah had never a fair chance in this war. His army was hopelessly inadequate for the conquest of so large and rich a kingdom; his war material and food supply were sufficient for a month or two only, and he had no siege guns. At the same time the power of the Bijapur state was unimpaired in contrast with its exhausted condition when Aurangzib himself captured its capital 19 years later. Its king was still able and energetic; its nobility laid aside their factions quarrels for the time being Sarkar, *Aurangzib*, IV. 148-9. The *Ma'asir-i-'Ālamgiri* (59) states : "As the Raja did not design to conquer the fort of Bijāpur and had not brought with him siege-materials, he halted for some days, and then marched away". (Eng. Tr. 39).

78. "At first Aurangzib had objected to such lavish expenditure on mere speculation" Sarkar, *Aurangzib*, IV. 145.

79. "Hāji Shafī' Khān, the *diwān* of the Deccan, used to object and delay in granting jāgirs to the Bijapuri deserters; but Jai Singh complained to the Emperor against this obstructionist subordinate and had him removed from the province". Sarkar, *Aurangzib*, IV. 146 (based on *Haft Anjuman* 91a; Bhimsen, *Nuskha i Dilkusha*, 62).

80. Text has Rasi' Khān. It should be read as Shafī' Khān.

81. Shahjahān died of strangury on 22nd January, 1666; 26th Rajab, 1075. *Ma'asir-i-'Ālamgiri* 53 (Eng. Tr. 34).

82. A veiled reference to the Shia Sultanautes.

83. Jai Singh is conscious of the recalcitrant attitude of his subordinates, and is apprehensive that these internal dissensions in his army would have an adverse effect on its morale. So he is careful to maintain strict secrecy in the matter.

84. Text has *shawad*. It should be *nāshawad*.

85. Text has *inja*. It should be *anja*.

86. Cf. Sarkar, *Aurangzib*, IV. 140. This is a clear instance of the fact that many of Jai Singh's officers were "unreliable, and refused or delayed in carrying out his order". (*Ibid.* 149).

87. About 12th Feb. 1666. *Ibid.* 140.

88. The proposal shows Jai Singh's tolerance and readiness to condone the remissness of these two generals by giving them another chance. But he himself did not receive a similar attitude from Aurangzeb.

89. Text reads *Tareda*, which is wrong. For the *banjaras*, see Irvine, *Army etc.*, 192.

90. See Sarkar, *Aurangzib*, IV. 149 n.

91. 12,000 in *op. cit.*

92. c. 12th January, 1666. He was brother of Fath Jang Khān. See Sarkar, *Aurangzib*, IV. 136 for details.

93. 24th December, 1665. *Ibid.* 132.

94. 'When appointing Jai Singh to the Deccan Aurangzib had instructed him to punish both Shivāji and the Bijāpur king'. *Ibid.* 118.

The *Ma'asir-i-'Ālamgiri* (51) states : "As 'Ādil Khān of Bijāpur had delayed in paying his tribute and tried to help Shivā, an imperial order was sent to Raja Jai Singh saying that, after settling the country and forts gained from Shivā, he should hasten to attack the Bijāpur territory and destroy the enemy without engaging himself in the siege of the fort." (June, 1665) (Eng. Tr. 33). Jai Singh means to say that though the expedition was undertaken at Emperor's orders, and not on his own advice, he had to bear the burden of its responsibility.

95. 'dissatisfied with his master (Shivāji) probably at the inade-

quate recognition of his valuable services and gallant feat of arms'. See Sarkar, *Aurangzib*, IV. 137-8; *Shivaji*, 131.

96. Jai Singh could not afford to lose such an efficient man and so lured him back, by overbidding 'Ādil Shāh in bribery. A "jagir in the settled and lucrative old territory of the empire (as distinct from the unsettled, ill-conquered and ever-ravaged new annexations in the Deccan)" was naturally preferred by Netaji. *Aurangzib*, op. cit.

97. 50,000 in Sarkar, *Shivaji*, 131 (based on *Haft Anjuman*, 193).

98. Netaji returned to the Mughals (20 March, 1666); for his subsequent fate see *Aurangzib*, IV. 138 and fn. ante.

99. *Dast i gardān* is defined as "A form of buying, by which part of the price is given to the seller, then re-taken by way of loan, to be handed back as a further instalment, and so on until the full amount is reached, when the purchaser is considered as owner of the object bought, and as debtor for its price, which must be paid at a stated term". Steingass, *Persian-English Dictionary* (1957), p. 524.

100. See Sarkar, *Shivaji*, 133.

APPENDIX A

MILITARY AND ADMINISTRATIVE DETAILS GLEANED FROM THE DESPATCHES

A. MILITARY ASPECTS

1. WRITING OF MILITARY DESPATCHES

The practice of writing military despatches was quite well known in Mughal India. Like a modern general sending a despatch to his authorities, a Mughal commander also used to prepare and submit a report (*'arzdāshī*) to the Emperor. The latter, if satisfied, gave orders for having the victory recorded in the imperial diary of proceedings (*Wāqī'ah*), corresponding to a modern gazette. Sometimes the general also sent an account (*tumār* or roll) to his friends and equals.

But today few despatches are extant. From this point of view the *Haft Anjuman* is not only invaluable to students of medieval India but it throws considerable light on the art of warfare prevailing in India in the seventeenth century.

About the frequency of writing these military despatches, Jai Singh held that it was "proper to despatch the first *'arzdāshī* after one or two victories". But it must be admitted that to be useful such despatches have to be sent regularly and frequently. At the same time writing the despatches was a time-absorbing process depending on collection of reports of isolated events and reports. Their transmission also took considerable time in those days. An energetic emperor like Aurangzeb, who loved to dictate to his officers and generals, would naturally like to have frequent reports. In fact Aurangzeb once complained of the delay in getting the despatch during the Purandar campaign. So Jai Singh had to explain that he 'had no leisure for a moment' because of the quick succession of a series of inter-connected events,—the arrival of Shivāji and later of his son, capture of Purandar, despatch of one report, gathering reports of capture of certain other forts e.g., Kondānā, Rohirā, Lauhgarh etc. Moreover, 'composure of mind was necessary for

writing the '*arzdāsh*.' Again the special messenger was held up by 'excessive rains and floods' (60b-61a).

Sometimes for reasons of expediency, the despatches were accompanied by separate sheets (*band*) (55b), and also by secret enclosures. Thus Jai Singh sent the matter of promotion of Dilir Khān "in a separate piece of paper, not known to anybody." (58a).

2. ASPECTS OF WARFARE

The art of war has been described as "the art which enables any commander to worst the forces opposed to him" and includes a variety of subjects,—strategy and tactics, discipline, organisation, armament and all means adopted to improve military efficiency, physical and moral. In ultimate analysis, however, the art of war is nothing but a mental process, nothing but an outcome of reflection and resolution. The despatches of Mirza Rajah Jai Singh fully bear this out. We find Jai Singh communicating to his inquisitive master the details of his well-thought out arrangements—the strategy, tactics, the planning and preparations of war, both with Shivāji and Bijāpur. At the same time the despatches also illustrate the over-centralisation of Aurangzeb and show how Jai Singh had to refer minute things, viz., personnel, postings and transfers, rewards, punishments, logistics, etc., to the Emperor. Jai Singh wanted to know the Emperor's wishes regarding Bijāpur so that he might "submit proper plans for truly carrying these out" (57b). Deep reflection was also illustrated by the way in which Jai Singh unfolded his plans regarding Shivāji (Treaty of Purandar) and Bijāpur (especially military strategy). The despatches also reveal how at times the discernment of the man on the spot, was overridden by the imperial fiat from a long distance or set at naught by selfish, scheming or negligent subordinates in the actual theatre of war. At times Aurangzeb accepted the recommendations of his General for which the latter had to give detailed reasons, based on consideration of the actual circumstances, and all possible pros and cons of a matter. But the despatches also high-light the differences between the Emperor and his General especially with regard to Shivāji and Bijāpur.

3. GEOGRAPHICAL FACTORS

It is well known that three basic factors have decided wars throughout the ages : physical features,—the terrain for strategy and tactics alike; psychological factors and mental attitudes of a people : and organisational factors. The *Haft Anjuman* offers many illustrations of this truism.

The military history of any country is largely influenced by its strategical topography or terrain. Hills or mountains, rivers, rugged paths help the defender but impose numerous obstacles to the invader. During Jai Singh's Purandar campaign Shivaji suggested to him that the Mughals might turn to the invasion of Bijapur, as "such a course would be better than undergoing many hardships (of campaigning) in this hilly region of difficult paths and stony soil." Jai Singh, however, conscious of his own strength, could gravely warn the Maratha leader: "Do not put your faith in your hills and stony country" (54a). Speaking of the difficulties of campaigning during rains in the Maratha country, Jai Singh reminded Aurangzeb of "what happens from the excessive rains, floods, storms, mud and marshes in Mulkokan" (71b), and asked "when small rivers and high unexpected floods make the place a limitless sea, how can one pass through such difficult seas?" (60a). The influence of the geographical factors in shaping policy is clearly illustrated by Jai Singh's two decisions. First, he did not annex all the forts of Shivaji, because "distance from the imperial capital" would create complications in controlling them (69a). Secondly, he secured the surrender of such Shivaji's forts, as would "hem" i.e. surround him by Mughal possessions for eventual annihilation in case of disobedience (57b).

4. PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS

Warfare presupposes certain psychological factors and is largely determined by the character and mental development of the people. The individual soldier must possess moral qualities like courage, audacity and self-sacrifice. As Jai Singh wrote to the Emperor after the conquest of Purandar and on the eve of the Bijapur campaign: "There is much work here for intelligent and serviceable people imbued with the zeal for work, honesty and loyalty" (63a).

The despatches also reveal a broad characteristic of human nature, viz., self-interest as determining human behaviour. The prospect of rewards, concessions, promotions, conferment of office proved to be a sure solvent of traditional loyalties. Land hunger, the craze for *watan*, the desire to possess rich *jāgirs*, caused men to change sides. Netāji, dissatisfied with his master Shivāji at what he felt to be inadequate recognition of his gallant services, deserted to Bijāpur, where he got a fortune worth 12 lakhs of rupees, and he had to be lured back by Jai Singh (94a). Similarly the two Navaiyāt brothers, Yahya and Mulla Ahmad, deserted from the Bijāpuri side to the Mughal. (76a, b, 82a, 84a).

It is not surprising, therefore, that Jai Singh preferred diplomacy to war. "If policy can accomplish a thing, why should we court delay (by resorting to force)?" (55a). If the victory over Shivāji illustrates his generalship, the Treaty of Purandar illustrates his diplomatic success. He considered it necessary to detach three races from the Bijāpuris: Afghāns, Habshis and the Māhdavis, who were oppressed in Bijāpur (90b). But Jai Singh was under no illusion about the sincerity of the Bijāpuris. While weaning Mulla Ahmad he knew that "the tendencies and the modes of the people of the Deccan" were not worthy of credence (82a).

5. ORGANISATIONAL FACTORS

Organisational factors,—like numerical strength, battle formation, trained leadership, arms and equipment, military administration, discipline, logistics, espionage, etc.,—usually determine the efficiency of the army as a fighting force. The despatches clearly show that numbers alone did not decide the war. The numerically superior Mughal army could score a victory over Shivāji, but had to eat the humble pie in Bijāpur, as explained Sections II and III of Introduction.

The battle array of Jai Singh's army in the Bijāpur campaign, referred to in the despatches, broadly followed the long-standing Mughal tradition, based on Central Asian practice (Davy & White, *Institutes of Timour*, 228 ff & plates):

- (i) Van (*Harāwal*) (87a); (ii) Centre (*Kul* or *Ghol*) (88a);
- (iii) Right Wing (*Maimanah*) (87b, 93a); (iv) Left Wing (*Maisarah*)—(93a); (v) Left Wing of the Centre—and (vi)

Rearguard (*Chandāwal*) (93a, see note 1, p. 126). Besides the front skirmishers (*qarāwal*), the advance reserve or guard of the centre (*iltimish*) (87b, 88) or Commando troops and rearguard (*chandāwal*), the two flanks were protected by two divisions, marching parallel to the main army.

An all-round personality, deep devotion to duty, exceptional qualities of character and strength of mind and soul constitute the essential pre-requisites of leadership. Jai Singh possessed these in full measure. He was, observes Sir Jadunath Sarkar rightly, "an ideal leader of the composite army of Afghans and Turks, Rajputs and Hindusthanis, that followed the crescent banner of the Sovereign of Delhi." (*Shivaji*, 104). He not only showed great initiative even while serving under a hard taskmaster like Aurangzeb but could also boldly argue his case (e.g., terms of Shivaji's surrender, 56b) and justify his course of action when these ran counter to the Emperor's policy. He was again, not in favour of two simultaneous wars on the same front (68a). Though he had to depend on the Emperor in matters of policy and administration it may not be an exaggeration to say that he had both "the head to plan and the hand to execute". Jai Singh, again, was a devoted officer. In several despatches he avowed his devotion to the imperial cause, particularly when his bonafides came to be suspected by Aurangzeb. (71a, 78a, 81b, 89b). The despatches reveal that Jai Singh possessed the supreme art of discernment. Though he realised that Shivaji must be reduced to dire straits (54a-b, 55a), he was deeply conscious that a definitely negative attitude would drive the Maratha leader to seek an alliance with Bijapur which must be avoided. (55a). Though not accustomed to swearing, Jai Singh took oaths only to observe the interests of the State. (67a) Again he possessed the royal gift of judging human character, of appreciating who is who, which enabled him to recommend rewards or honours or offices for deserving men and to suggest punishments or transfers of negligent, disloyal or inefficient men, officers and privates alike (58a-60a, 64a), and even to recommend grant of pardon for remissness (e.g., Dilir, 58a). The need of maintaining secrecy in such matters as well as military deputation (e.g., Jaswant Singh) was also so fully realised by Jai Singh that he did not hesitate to write to the Emperor that his suggestions should be kept secret in order to

prevent untoward repercussions (58a, 82b, 92a). His detachment enabling him to rise above personal considerations or nepotism (89a), his cool judgment and calmness of temper even in the hour of victory or moments of danger are fully illustrated in the despatches.

The Mughal infantry, as is well-known, was not well-developed as a fighting arm. The Emperor ordered that *mansabs* should not be proposed for men of the auxiliary forces (*Kumākis*) (61a). The despatches, however, make a significant reference to the *Kālāpiādās* or the famous Karnātaki infantry, enlisted by the Bijāpuris. (85b).

Artillery played a very important part in bombarding the forts and in reducing Shivāji to submission. The despatches give only general remarks about assaults and capture of Shivāji's forts (55b and 58b). We have more details with regard to Bijāpur. Efficient artillery along with an adequate number of mounted musketeers was one of the essential pre-requisites of success in the Bijāpur campaign. Jai Singh's urgent but futile appeals for the same had an element of pathos and helplessness (64b, 65a, 74a). Full details have been given in Section III of the Introduction. Among others, we read of the Rāmchangī muskets of the Bijāpuris and the wheeled field pieces (*rahkalah*) of the Mughal artillery (87a-b).

6. FORTIFICATIONS

Fortifications constitute artificial obstacles to the enemy though these may not be able to shut him out permanently from a particular area. These are built to gain time,—to inflict the maximum delay on the attackers at a minimum loss of men on the part of defenders and also to increase the relative value of the defensive forces. But these subserve certain other military needs: to safeguard supply depots, to threaten the enemy's communications, and afford a sanctuary or shelter,—especially when these are large or well provisioned. The ancient practice of building fortified or walled towns (*pettah*) continued during the medieval period. The Deccan in general and Mahārāshtra in particular, were studded with fortresses till the end of the eighteenth century. The number of forts also was surprisingly

larger than elsewhere in India. The history of the Deccan illustrated how, more than that of other regions of India, forts could make or mar the fortune or future of warring powers. The forts of Shivāji and of Bijāpur mentioned in the despatches may be broadly classified under three categories: hill forts, land forts, and marine forts. A few examples are given below.

A. *HILL FORTS*: (a) *Shivāji's*: Rudramāl (54a-b), Khadkalā (55b), Kondānā (57a), Rājgarh (57a-b), Rohirā, Lauhgarh, Tikonā (57b), Purandar (58b), etc. (b) *in Bijāpur*: Thāthvadā or Thathora (79b) etc. Panhala or Parnala (84b) was sometimes occupied by Shivāji.

B. *LAND FORTS*: (a) *Shivāji's*: Punā (54a, 68a) etc. (b) *in Bijāpur*: Bijāpur (85b); Mangalvide or Mangalvira (85a) etc.

C. *MARINE FORTS*: The rocky island of Jānjira along with twin towns of Dandā-Rājpurī was a bone of contention between the Siddis and Shivāji. (78a).

7. MILITARY ADMINISTRATION

(a) *Important Army personnel*:

The despatches make mention of certain officers in the army, viz.,

- (i) the *Bakhshi*,—Jāni Beg (60b)
- (ii & iii) the *diwān* and the *buyutāt*, to control and collect stores and to submit accounts. (63b)
- (iv) the *diwān* of the army,—‘Abdul Lalif (74)
- (v) the Superintendent of artillery in the Deccan—Saf Shikan Khān Muhammad Tāhir (71b).
- (vi) the chief of artillery—Turktāz Khān (61b)
- (vii) the Mir Tuzak,—Ghāzi Beg (53b).

(b) *Provisioning the army*: As befitting a true general, Jai Singh placed due emphasis on logistics or regular supply of provisions as well as war materials for the army in the Bijāpur campaign. There were imperial *kārkhanās* accompanying the army for producing and storing various articles needed for the army. Suitable *thānāhs* were established not only for military security but also to provide supplies to the army (89b). Saf Shikan Khān was entrusted with this task of providing cannon, shots, lead and powder and plenty of grains and despatch of

the musketeers. (65a, 73a). In fact Saf Shikan had gathered a satisfactory number of *banjāras* or grain merchants. There were, however, two dangers. The first was devastation caused by war. For example, owing to Bijāpuri diversion in Jai Singh's rear, the supplies of the Mughal army seem to have been plundered by the Bijāpuris and Jai Singh plaintively reported that the pile of grain in the (imperial) army was nearing its end. (85b; Sarkar, *Aurangzib IV*, 134-5). The second factor that stood in the way of regular supplies of provisions was human negligence (e.g., the *qila'dār* of Parenda, 93b).

(c) *Military Espionage*

There were arrangements for getting information about movements of armies, conduct of officers and soldiers and also inter-state information. To enable news to move a *dākchauki* (or postal relay) was set up. (60a) Out of the various agencies of espionage functioning in Mughal India we find references only to *harkāras* (or couriers) and *Wāqī'anigar* (or *Wāqī'anavis*) or reporters and spies in these despatches. Sir Jadunath Sarkar was of opinion that the *harkāras*, the most secret class of spies, carried oral news. But from the *Haft Anjuman* we learn that they sent written reports also (65b, 69a). Spies brought the news that 400 persons of the Bijāpuris or more were wounded or killed (89a). At times, besides the usual despatches and their secret separate enclosures or sheets (*band*), the General also used to send separate letters to the Emperor. War-news (e.g., capture of Purandar) were sent also in separate but detailed news-letters (55b), and *afrād i wāqī'a* (e.g. skirmishes in Bijāpur, 89a). News-writers sent to the Emperor details of the resources of the imperial army and the 'relative details of the men of Hindustan and the Deccan' (92a)

The working of the intelligence department depended largely on the personal equation. At times it worked well. Thus "trustworthy spies" brought to the General the news of the duplicity of the Sultān of Bijāpur (55a). The reporters (*wāqī'anigār*) wrote about the "ill-treatment and recklessness" of the Afghāns of Ludi Khān (71b). On the other hand the general working of the Mughal secret service was most unsatisfactory. Much of the failure of Jai Singh in Bijāpur was due to this (89a,b). Details may be read in Section III of Introduction.

The despatches also throw light on inter-state espionage. The Mughal envoys posted to Bijāpur (Mulla Muhammad Sādiq) and Golkonda (Khwāja Muhammad Darwesh) used to send, as may be expected, reports about the defences, the internal conditions or military movements in these countries to the General (85a, 93b).

(d) *Discipline* is an essential condition of success of an army. But the despatches show that even as early as the first decade of Aurangzeb's reign sound discipline was lacking in the imperial army. At first Aurangzeb had entrusted Jai Singh with only the command of the field operations, leaving all administrative work,—including promotions, punishments, transfers, payment of salaries and regulation of jāgirs,—with Prince Mu'azzam, Mughal viceroy at Aurangabād. It was only at Jai Singh's right insistence that the Emperor recalled the Prince and allowed Jai Singh "absolute authority", civil and military alike (71a, 93a). This shows that the necessity of undivided command was fully grasped by Jai Singh.

In practice, however, the Mughal army did not act in unison. Jai Singh's authority was set at naught by recalcitration of several discontented captains like Dilir Khān (82b), Qutb ud din Khān and the negligence of the *qila'dār* of Parenda (93b). True, the first three were sincere and devoted, yet they at times allowed their personal considerations to override the wider interests of the Mughal army. The spirit of indiscipline was not only displayed by Muslim captains but also by Hindu captains like Manohar Dās Gaur (nephew of Rajah Bithal Dās) and Amar Singh Rāthor, eldest son of Rajah Gaj Singh, with regard to Māhuli fort. Jai Singh recommended punishment as a warning to others (73b-74a).

8. DEFENSIVE STRATEGY OF BIJĀPUR

Bijāpur's defensive strategy proved successful in warding off the Mughals and preserving independence for twenty years more. Such were the defensive arrangements that even Jai Singh felt dubious of the fate of his proposed siege. Moreover, they rendered the advance of the Mughals difficult by adopting what is called a 'scorched earth' policy, by destroying sources of water supply, razing buildings, cutting down trees, etc. (85b).

The Bijāpuris also indulged in 'cossack' or guerrilla tactics. Under Iliyās (Sharzā Khān), (Siddi) Masaud, 'Aziz and Dalil and others including archers, they raided Mughal dominions and caused tumult. The store of grain in the Mughal camp became almost empty (85b, 86a). When charged by Mughal captains, the Bijāpuris used to abandon their camps, disperse in different directions and take to their heels. In accordance with "the practice of the Deccanis", they "divided and galled (the imperialists) severely from the two wings and rear" (86b). They "hemmed" Netaji round and pressed him hard (87a). They also made an onset on the person of Jai Singh, then denuded of troops. (87b, 88a).

B. JAI SINGH AS AN ADMINISTRATOR

(i) *His administrative arrangements in the Deccan:*

Jai Singh's first task after the capture of Purandar and some other forts of Shivāji was to provide for their management and post forces there. He had two guiding principles,—to enforce the administrative regulations and to enforce economy. He issued orders for 'fixing contingents in proportion to the needs' of each fort. The practice of the former governors in the Deccan was to keep 10,000 foot on terms of monthly allowance. But Jai Singh did not enlist more than 5,500, then present in the Deccan (1665). Of these 1700 footmen had been settled by Ludi Khān in the villages and *mahals* of the Deccan on the strength of the *sanad* of Shaista Khān. This was against the regulations of the Deccan. Jai Singh now modified this arrangement so as to make it conform to those regulations and they were now given less pay. He intended to dismiss 2700 footmen of the rural areas if found advisable (i.e., economical or superfluous) in the conquered forts. More troops, if necessary, could be called for (from the Imperial Prince, then still in the Deccan) out of the contingents of the old forts "situated in a comparatively secure area in the hinter-land behind the frontier". (63a-b).

Of the twentythree forts surrendered by Shivāji to the Mughals by the Treaty of Purandar Jai Singh entrusted the forts of Purandar, Kondānā, Laugharh, Rohirā and Māhuli to Manohar Dās Gaur. He proposed to entrust the remaining

forts to other *mansabdārs* pending imperial sanction. As speedy possession of the conquered forts was necessary, Jai Singh took quick action in deputing suitable persons to places far and near. Permanent postings of fort-keepers were, however, made when Aurangzeb's orders came (63b-64a).

As Diwān Safi Khān was deputed to administer the affairs of Ahmadnagar, Jai Singh proposed that he should administer Shivaji's territory during the Bijāpur campaign. Jai Singh was, however, aware that such arrangements like taking charge of the *mahals* of his *watan* were bound to lead to ill-treatment or untoward events which might alienate the Marathas and lead to loss of their confidence in the Mughals. So he suggested that the *diwān* should first ascertain the total revenue (*Jamā*) of the villages and *mahals* yielding one lakh of *hun* at the end of the year and then act according to the agreements in consultation with himself, i.e., by following a conciliatory attitude towards the Marathas. (76a). The arrangement was approved by the Emperor, who also granted a sum of two lakhs of rupees from the imperial treasury for Shivaji's army in an emergency. Jai Singh solicited imperial sanction for paying the annual instalment in *tuyul* as salary of Sambhuji, which would be fixed by the diwāns after calculating increase or decrease (in revenue) (80b-81a).

Jai Singh also provided for the Jānjira territory. By the Treaty of Purandar the neighbouring territory of Jānjira was left to Shivāji if he could wrest it. The Jānjira territory with an estimated revenue of 10,000 *hun* and the Ahmadnagar territory yielding one lakh *hun* were resumed in Mughal crownlands (*Khālṣa i Sharifa*) in 1665. Necessary directions for resumption were given to the *mutasaddis* of Chaul (78a-b).

After the capture of fort of Mangalbira Sarfrāz Khān was appointed *faujdār* of the district and Udit Singh Bhadauriyah (or Udai), son of Rajah Kishan Singh, was appointed *qila'dār* of the fort (85a).

(ii) *Loss of Revenue in War-devastated areas:*

There is a commonly accepted view that in those days wars did not affect the even tenor of economic life. Nothing can be farther from truth. The despatches make definite mention of the immense harm which warfare caused to eco-

conomic life,—decline of revenue due to flight of peasants, depopulation and unsettled conditions. Two instances would perhaps suffice.

(a) In Bijāpuri Tāl Konkan ryots were unsettled owing to 'Ādil Shāh's "hostility", while in Bijāpuri Bālāghāt they were expected to disperse and cultivation would cease during the Bijāpur campaign. As there was little prospect of revenue in these unsettled and war-affected parts, Shivāji prayed for grant of parganas yielding one lakh of *hun* also in the new Nizāmshāhi territory besides those in the old (settled) Nizāmshāhi territory already granted by the Emperor. Jai Singh, as a true administrator, first got the entire Nizāmshāhi territory except 12 forts of Shivāji administered as crownlands so as to ascertain the actual revenue from the Mughal collectors, before ceding the land to Shivāji (75a-b). This throws very welcome light on Jai Singh's methods of government and proves his administrative insight.

(b) The other shows how *jāgirs* in war-devasted *tāluqas* of Naldurg, Sholāpur and Gulbarga as well as places near Hukeri and Rāibagh, plundered by Shivāji, ceased to be profitable and hence Jai Singh's scheme of winning over the Bijāpuris by lavish grant of *jāgirs* could not be implemented in practice. There was no possibility of the lands being populated for three years at least. (90b-91a).

(iii) Military postings :

Requests for requisitioning soldiers had to be made to the *Bakhshī ul mulk* or *Mir Bakhshi*. Before the Bijāpur expedition Jai Singh had requested the *Mir Bakhshi* (Muhammad Amin Khān) to send Fateh Jung Khān (Rohilla) and Purdil Khān in place of Ludi Khān, *faujdār* of Konkan. Ludi Khān was at first entrusted, during the rains, with the administration of the captured forts of Tāl Konkan. But owing to the "ill treatment and recklessness" of his Afghans, Jai Singh had to recall him in order to pacify the subjects and repopulate the conquered lands. With great administrative ability and insight Jai Singh was naturally keen in preventing molestation of the local people. Any oppression would lead not only to disaffection but also to loss of revenue on account of their flight to neighbouring territories but also to ill-repute of the Mughals in the Deccan. In

place of Ludi Khān Jai Singh deputed Rasul Beg Rozbihāni together with his brothers and several others and a force of 1000 cavalry as a temporary arrangement. For a permanent arrangement the Emperor had directed Jai Singh to depute Fateh Jung Khān. But Jai Singh learnt that the latter was earmarked for deputation to Nānder during the Bijāpur expedition. Jai Singh, however, desired to have him with himself in the Bijāpur campaign, as much exertion was expected of him and he had a good contingent, while there was not much work to do in Konkan. Evidently Bijāpur was regarded to be more important than Konkan. Fateh Jung Khān was better than Purdil Khān. Only one officer with 1000 cavalry could easily supervise the conquered lands. If the Emperor directed, Purdil Khān might be sent there. (71a-72a).

(iv) *His solicitude for his subordinates*

As a general Jai Singh, like Mir Jumla, was very keen in looking after the welfare of or enhancing the interests of his subordinates. The despatches are replete with many instances where Jai Singh recommended increase in *mansab*, promotions, grants of *jāgirs* and even revision of imperial orders,—as a reward for past services or as an incentive to greater services in future. Jai Singh even defended some of his subordinates against imperial orders and succeeded in getting these modified or moderated. To take a few examples only. For rendering useful services in the siege of Purandar Jai Singh recommended promotion for Dilir Khān (58a), Dā'ud Khān (72b), several Bundelas like Angad, Jam, Chhatrasāl and others (64a). Restoration of rank was recommended by Jai Singh for Rāo Amar Singh Chandrāwat and Raghunāth Singh (73b). Restoration of confiscated *jāgirs* or *tuyuls* was recommended for Dilir Khān's assistants, Arab and Muzaffar, sons of Bahādur (73a). Sometimes even grant of *jāgir* (e.g., to Qutbuddin Khān) in lieu of pay was recommended as an incentive for useful services in Bijāpur expedition (73b). He pleaded for restoration of 120 *suwār* in the *mansab* of Muhammad Ibrāhim, which Aurangzeb had reduced for some alleged faults in going to Bijāpur along with the embassy (64a). Imperial approval seemed to have been received in many instances in August-September 1665 (72a-b, 73a). Finally, to keep men satisfied

on the eve of and during the Bijāpur campaign, Jai Singh recommended the grant of unconditional increases for officers, who wanted to be exempted from the condition of joining the Bijāpur campaign, though this "would exceed the limits of the regulations and was against the desire of the Emperor." The *jāgirdārs* also placed their rights and grievances with regard to *dast i gardān* (i.e., virtually hire-purchase system). The *'aimadārs* also experienced much hardship on account of non-receipt of rents and distance of *jāgirs*. Jai Singh paid them salary according to their needs (94a-b).

APPENDIX B

IDENTIFICATION OF SOME PLACE NAMES

1. Bhorap (Sudhagarh), Sudhagad Peta, Bhor State, $18^{\circ}30' \text{ N}$, $73^{\circ}15' \text{ E}$, 15 miles east of Roha. Kolaba Dt. Gaz. pp. 81, 798.
2. Bīrvadi Fort, 8 miles west of Roha. *Ibid*, pp. 712-4.
3. Ghosalgad, Roha Taluka, 6 miles south of Roha. *Ibid*, p. 799.
4. Hukeri, Chikodi Taluka, Belgaum Dt., $16^{\circ}13' \text{ N}$, $74^{\circ}36' \text{ E}$, 30 m. n.e. of Belgaum. Bombay Gaz. vol. 2, p. 22.
5. Karnala (or Funnell hill), Panvel Taluka, $18^{\circ}50' \text{ N}$, $73^{\circ}05' \text{ E}$, South of Panvel. Kolaba Dt. Gaz. pp. 823-4; about 15 miles S.W. of Karjat. Campbell, Thana Dt. Gaz.
6. Khirdurg, Is it Khed n.e. of Ratnagiri Dt. ($17^{\circ}33' \text{ N}$, $73^{\circ}20' \text{ E}$)? Bomb. Gaz. II. p. 158.
7. Khadkala near Kondana.
8. Khatav, $16^{\circ}45' \text{ N}$, $74^{\circ}50' \text{ E}$. Satara Dt. Gaz. pp. 816-7.
9. Kondana, See Sinhagad.
10. Lingana, Mahad Taluka, 14 miles n.e. of Mahad, between Raigad & Torna. Kolaba Dt. Gaz. p. 850.
11. Lohgad, $18^{\circ}42' \text{ N}$, $73^{\circ}29' \text{ E}$, 4 miles south of Malavali. Poona Dt. Gaz. p. 622.
12. Mahargarh (Mahad), Mahad Taluka, $18^{\circ}05' \text{ N}$, $73^{\circ}25' \text{ E}$, 53 m. south by east of Alibagh, near Raigarh. Kolaba Dt. Gaz. pp. 851-2; Bombay Gaz. II. p. 136.
13. Mahuli, Satara Taluka, $17^{\circ}40' \text{ N}$, 74° E . Satara Dt. Gaz. pp. 844-7.
14. Malanggarh, Kalyan Taluka, Thana Dt., $19^{\circ}7' \text{ N}$, $73^{\circ}13' \text{ E}$, 10 miles south of Kalyan town, also known as 'Cathedral Rock'. Tomb of Bawa Malang is near. Bombay Gaz. I. p. 381. Bombay Sh. 47E/4.
15. Māngad, in Māngān Taluka, about 8 m. n.e. of Māngaon town, smaller than two other forts, Visramgad & Talagad. Kolaba Dt. Gaz. pp. 855-6, 967-8.
16. Muranjan, Perhaps Manaranjana, which together with Sriyarthana, constitutes Rajmachi ($18^{\circ}49' \text{ N}$, $73^{\circ}24' \text{ E}$) the double-peaked fort on the Sahyadris. Poona Dt. Gaz. p. 680.
17. Nardurg not traceable in Konkan. Naldurg, east of Sholapur, does not suit.
18. Pābal (Pābala), $18^{\circ}49' \text{ N}$, $74^{\circ}3' \text{ E}$, 10 m. east of Khed, 22 m. west of Sirur. Poona Dt. Gaz. p. 626.
19. Palgad, Ratnagiri Dt., Khed Taluka, n.w. boundary of Khed, near Dāpoli, vill. Pāli at foot. Ratnagiri Dt. Gaz. p. 780.
20. Paligad (or Sargad), Roha Taluka, Bhor State, Perhaps Surgad, 8 m.n.e. of Roha town. Kolaba Dt. Gaz. pp. 965-7.
21. Panhala (Parnala), $16^{\circ}45' \text{ N}$, $74^{\circ}05' \text{ E}$, about 12 miles n.w. of Kolhapur—Ratnagiri Road. Kolhapur Dt. Gaz. (Revised), pp. 886-90.

22. Rohira (Rohidā) or Vichitrāgad, 18°05' N, 73°50' E, 6 m. south of Bhōr. Poona Dt. Gaz. p. 680.
23. Sinhagad or Kondana, 18°22' N, 73°46' E, 15 m. s.w. of Poona. Poona Dt. Gaz. p. 682.
24. Tanki, Either Tungi Fort (Talūqa Karjat) 12 miles east of Neral stn. Kolaba Dt. Gaz. pp. 797n, 973 or Tungi fort, 18°39' N, 73°27' E, with temple of goddess Tungi in Bhōr Talūqa Poona Dt. Gaz. (Revised) vol. xx. p. 686.
25. Tathvade (Santoshgad), Satara Dt. Gaz. pp. 918-21. Really South of Phaltan and not north (p. 101).
26. Tikona, in Mulsi, 18°38' N, 73°30' E, 25 m. N.W. of Kolvan. Poona Dt. Gaz. p. 686.
27. Vishalgad (Khelna), Sahuvadi Talūqa, 16°50' N, 73°45' E on Gajapur hill about 45 miles n.w. of Kolhapur. Kolhapur Dt. Gaz. pp. 895-6.

A FEW ADDITIONAL PLACE NAMES

- Ankola (Khaigarh). Not traceable in Konkan. There are Akola (74°1' E, 19°30') in Ahmadnagar Bomb. Pcy. (Plague) map (1891) and a town of the name Ankola in Kanara Dt. Campbell, Bomb. Gaz. xv. But these do not suit.
- Asheri, famous fort in Thana Dt., about 16 miles n.e. of Manor. Campbell, Thana Dt. Gaz., p. 7; Orme, Hist. Fragments, 141.
- Bhandardurg. Bhandargad fort in Thana Dt. Campbell, Thana Dt. Gaz. xiv, p. 219.
- Chakan, 10 miles s. of Khed. Poona Dt. Gaz. (1884).
- Chincholi, Chinchavli, 73°13' E, 19°2' N about 8 miles n. of Karjat. Thana Dt. Gaz. Bomb. Sh. No. 47 E/4.
- Hatgarh (73°40' E, 20°32' N) about 20 miles S.W. of Salher. Bhopal Plate 141.
- Isagarh. Is it Isapur, a town near Lohgad? Poona Dt. xviii, Part 2, p. 303; also p. 156. The map 'India The Upper Portion' shows it in Baglana (18°59' N).
- Kohaj, 8 miles s.e. of Manor and 16 miles w.s.w. of Vada. Thana Dt. Gaz., p. 7.
- Kumari. It is stated to be in Poona Dt. by Sir J. N. Sarkar. I have not been able to trace it there. There is one Kumbharlighat (73°40' E, 17°25' N) about 32 miles s.w. of Satara, just West of the Koyna Lake (Bomb. Pl. 34). There is a town, Kameri (74°16' E, 17°N), in Satara Dt. South (Bomb. Sh. No. 47K8).
- Marggarh (Atra). Is it Murgod, a town in Parasgad Talūqa, Belgaum Dt.? Campbell, Bomb. Gaz. xxi, 589; I. pt. ii, 285n.
- Nang—There is Nangali fortress in Nairne's Konkan, pp. 496-505. But this seems very far to the south.
- Parli Fort (Sajjagarh) 73°54' E, 17°37' N Bombay Topo Sheet, 47 G/14.
- Pratapgad. 73°34' E, 17°56' N Ibid. 47 G/9.
- Rudramal (Vajragad). Vajragad, peak in Poona Dt. Campbell, Bomb. Gaz. xviii, pt. 1, p. 5.

Tulsi Khul. Perhaps to be identified with Tulshi ($73^{\circ}15'$ E, $17^{\circ}58'$ N) (Tulsi Khurd, Tulsi Budrukh 1 mile n.w.) about $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles s.w. of Mandangarh (Bombay Topo sheet Nos. 47 G/1, G/5). There is Tulsi lake in Thana Dt. and a stream of the same name in Kolhapur. Campbell, Bombay Gaz. xiii, p. 12; xxiv, pp. 9-10. But these latter do not seem suitable.

Vasantgarh Fort $74^{\circ}7'$ E, $17^{\circ}20'$ N in Satara Dt. (Bombay Sh. 47 K/3).

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
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
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10. The following Atlases and Maps have been consulted:
 - (a) Bombay-Konkan the Concan Colaba Division (1868) (Scale 2 miles to an inch).
 - (b) Bombay Presidency (excluding Sind), showing principal places where plague was endemic. (Oct. 1891) scale 1"=32 m.
 - (c) India the Upper Portion.
 - (d) National Atlas—Bhopal Plate 141 (1961), Bombay Plate 34 & 144 (1960) scale 1"=15.78 m.
 - (e) Survey of India one inch sheets, Bombay & Maharashtra.
 - (f) Maps given in Bombay Gazetteers by Campbell and revised Bombay and Maharashtra Gazetteers.

MAP TO ILLUSTRATE JAI SINGH'S CAMPAIGNS IN THE DECCAN

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2. Bhatgarh
3. Birvadi
4. Chincholi
5. Gosale
6. Khadkala (near Kondana)
7. Lingana
8. Mangad
9. Rajgarh
10. Sinhagarh (Kondana)
11. Sudhagarh





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


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